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ABSTRACT
THE APPLICATION OF A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TO 
ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
George T. Hodermarsky 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz
This dissertation proposes an approach and methodology for the utilization of the 
fundamentals o f systems theory as an aid to national security decision-making. At its core 
is an examination of the elements of nations’ or non-state actor’s power resources. The 
product o f the analysis is the compilation of a set of nodes, and the relationships between 
these, upon which actions may be taken to achieve desired effects. Since the boundaries 
between the subsystems of power resources are flexible and permeable, and there will be 
interactions between elements in different subsystems, a system o f  systems approach is 
essential so that the functioning of the system may be better understood and the 
secondary consequences of actions considered. The premise is that changes cannot occur 
in isolation, and that alterations in one component will result in modifications (intended 
or unintended) to related elements. The goal of the approach is not precise prediction of 
the effects of actions, but rather to provide for understanding of the relationships between 
elements of national power that will lead to expectations of the consequences of those 
actions. The hypothesis is: If national power is characterized as nonlinear and complex; 
and, if  approaches recently developed in mathematics and the physical sciences provide a 
means of enhanced understanding of nonlinear systems; then, utilization o f such an 
approach may provide a metaphor or model for increased understanding of the system 
and the secondary effects of coercive actions taken to achieve objectives. This
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dissertation will attempt to confirm the existence of the first two conditions, and will 
provide arguments and a design for accomplishment of the third. An ex post analysis of 
three conflicts where coercion by military means was the primary strategy— Somalia, 
1992-1995; Kosovo, 1999; and, Afghanistan, 2001—will be used as case studies. These 
examples will provide illustration of the utilization of the principles of the system of 
systems construct and exposition of the potential of this methodology to enhance the 
understanding of the effects of coercive actions.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Among the most critical components of the relations between sovereign states in 
an anarchic international system are the efforts of nations to influence the behavior of 
others. This endeavor is often described in terms of the application of some aspect o f 
national power with the objective of coercing a change in the conduct, or deterring 
actions of another state. While a variety of methods may be employed, military force 
historically has been the primary instrument of national coercive power. The successful 
employment of a nation’s influence to this end requires, inter alia, a capability for 
examination and understanding of the power capabilities of other nations.
If power is thought of in purely military terms, such assessments become 
relatively simple. Force on force analysis is relatively linear, and is amenable to modeling 
and simulation. Hence, in many cases an assessment may be accomplished through 
relatively uncomplicated means such as a numerical summation of capabilities. Among 
the many examples is the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain resulting 
from the launching of the Dreadnought battleships in the early days of the twentieth 
century. Later, in the nuclear era, assessments of relative power during the Soviet-U.S. 
cold war often gravitated toward the counting of launchers, warheads, and deliverable 
megatonnage.
However, in a complex international environment, where the elements of national 
power are multifaceted and interrelated, the task of accurate assessment becomes
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements o f  the Chicago Manual o f  Style, 15th ed. 
(Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2003).
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2exceptionally difficult, and the tools available for analysis are more limited. 
Determination o f the relationship between cause and effect remains problematic. This is 
particularly true in the anticipation and comprehension of the secondary effects of actions 
that are designed to achieve national or coalition objectives. Consequently, a process or 
methodology that can assist decision-makers in the formulation and execution of coercive 
actions is a worthwhile aspiration.
Rationale for the Study
Throughout history, nations have attempted to influence the behavior o f other 
states. If coercive actions by nations have been routine, the question emerges as to why a 
new appraisal and fresh approach to assessments is necessary. The reasons are centered 
principally on the altered nature of the milieu in which the systems of power exist. These 
include a geo-political security environment where the contention for global military 
supremacy has, at least for the present time, been generally accepted. Coincident with this 
relatively stable security situation is steadily increased globalization and interdependence 
between nations, and consequently the emergence o f interrelated and networked 
societies.1
The former condition means that conflict and the occasions of coercion are likely 
to be short of battles for national survival and will focus instead on limited scale 
operations such as peacekeeping and military operations other than war. The latter
1. Globalization is more than the existence o f  increased interrelationships between societies and has 
been described as “a state o f  the world involving networks or interdependence at multicontinental 
distances.” Robert 0 .  Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially G lobalized World (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 193. He emphasizes that globalization refers to networks o f  connections rather than 
simple linkages. For an extensive analysis o f  the changing environment see Gregory F. Treverton, 
“Emerging Threats to National Security: Testimony Presented to the House o f  Representatives Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence on 2 February 2005,” http://rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/ 
RAND_CT234.pdf (accessed 5 April 2005).
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3situation suggests that operations with multiple objectives, including humanitarian relief 
and nation building, will be relatively unconstrained by political or geographic 
boundaries.
These connections are an immensely extended consequence o f the economic 
dependencies that emerged in the mercantile and colonial era, which expanded in the 
industrial age and became a defining characteristic of international relations in the 
twentieth century. More recently, the advent of an information age where knowledge 
itself becomes a commodity has changed the environment. While the extent and future 
impact of the effects of this globalization are contentious, the existence of increased 
interconnections and dependencies that transcend national boundaries is irrefutable.
When considered together, the result is an international climate that is increasingly 
complex and substantially unlike that of the cold war era. Recognition of this radically 
changed situation has been a primary rationale for political realignments and military 
transformation efforts among nations across the globe.2
Regardless of the nature and character o f these transformations, the essential 
purpose remains the same, i.e., the ability to influence the behavior o f other actors in the 
international environment. Just as in earlier endeavors, an understanding of system of 
power of the nation being acted upon is critical to effective achievement of this objective.
Power is applied by one nation to affect the systems of another. Hence, a calculus 
that considers the political, economic, military, and social systems as interrelated
2. In the military context, this transformation is sometimes referred to as a Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA). The RMA is principally a U.S. Department o f  Defense concept and described as “a major 
change in the nature o f  warfare” that involves changes to application o f  technologies, doctrine, and 
concepts that “fundamentally alters the character and conduct o f  operations.” Chris C. Demchak, 
“Complexity and Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” in The Sources o f  Military Change, ed. Theo Farrell 
and Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002).
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4elements of an overall system of power, which is different from the sum of the parts, is 
critical to the assessment. Therefore, a construct that can provide enhanced understanding 
of the functioning of that system can contribute to more effective and efficient attainment 
of objectives. However, an effective utilization of such an approach requires an 
understanding o f the systems to be acted upon, especially in the interrelationships 
between elements within and across the systems.
Most past and extant net assessments have considered the elements of political, 
economic, military, and social power; however, these were often treated as separate and 
distinct entities, and consequently did not adequately present the holistic view. This 
results in a less than optimum level of analysis. This shortfall produces, at minimum, 
inefficient applications o f power and increased potential for failure to achieve the stated 
objectives.
A segmented and linear view of the adversary can lead to an inability to anticipate 
secondary effects that occur beyond system boundaries. Incomplete assessments can 
produce unnecessary levels of violence, increased destruction of human life and the 
means to support it, and a worsening of the situation that the operation was intended to 
alleviate. The deleterious effects of the lack of an adequate level o f understanding are 
evident; tools to assist the decision-maker in dealing with them are less abundant. In an 
attempt to reduce that shortfall, this dissertation proposes a methodology that approaches 
assessments of national power from a systems perspective. This construct is a logical 
progression from, and synthesis of, previous work.
This study uses the complex adaptive systems (CAS) as a paradigm for national 
power. With the publication in 1979 of Kenneth Waltz’s seminal Theory o f  International
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5Politics, consideration o f dealings between nations from a systems approach became a 
much discussed and debated concept. Hence, use of the term system is not without 
precedent in the field o f international relations. Additionally, there is little debate that 
nations are adaptive, that is, they react to external as well as internal stimuli. Hence, a 
portrayal o f nations as complex adaptive systems is not a radical departure from 
mainstream concepts. Despite the relative lack of contentiousness of these suppositions, 
acceptance has not provided significant practical advantages to those who desire to 
influence those complex adaptive systems.
Robert Jervis presents the key challenge to the selection of the optimum 
alternatives when confronting a complex system. “To alter the state of a system, it is 
necessary to understand the interaction of the elements that make up the system. It is 
impossible to change one element of the system without affecting the remaining 
elements.”4 This condition presents to decision-makers a virtually universal problem that 
lacks satisfactory solutions. This is the dilemma that this dissertation seeks to address.
The approach is to look beyond the traditional methods of power assessment and to 
explore the potential for incorporation of processes that have proven useful in a wide 
range of intellectual disciplines.
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, a quantity of popular literature associated with certain 
scientific communities, notably the fields of mathematics, biology, and physics, displayed 
an increased attention to, and an advocacy for, a shift from linear to non-linear 
paradigms. The emergence of complexity and chaos theories into the parlance of
3. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979). Waltz focuses on an international system, vice the system o f  systems o f  individual 
nations that are the core o f  this study.
4. Robert Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” Political Science 
Quarterly 112, no. 4 (Winter 1997-1998): 582.
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6educated observers outside of those previously identified academic fields best 
exemplifies this trend. Interest in these approaches expanded beyond the realm of 
technical scientific journals and entered the popular domain with publication of James 
Gleick’s Chaos: Making o f a New Science in 1987.5
Concurrently, researchers and scholars in the social sciences, most notably in 
Behavioral Psychology, attempted to apply these concepts. Interest was slower to build 
within the social sciences. However, a review of academic journals from the 1990’s did 
reveal some limited exploration into the potential for application of chaos and complexity 
theory into this arena.6 These initial searches for relevancy were intellectually appealing, 
but interest waned, due at least in part to the inability to extract useful insights or 
practical methodologies from the analysis.
While these theories, in their purest sense, never became integral parts of research 
and writing in the field, few would disagree with the description of the international 
political system and relations between sovereign but increasingly interdependent nations 
as complex. Despite the lack of controversy on this depiction, acceptance o f this 
characteristic of national power has not proven to be particularly useful. Perceived by 
some as little more than stating the obvious, moving beyond agreement presents the
5. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking Penguin Inc, 1987). This work, 
which made several bestseller lists, was followed by a related Public Broadcasting Service presentation. 
Subsequent chapters will expand on chaos and complexity.
6. Very limited examination o f  Chaos Theory emerged and most o f  these were in the fields o f  Public 
Administration and Management. Among these are David Levy, “Chaos Theory and Strategy: Theory, 
Application and Managerial Implications,” Strategic Management Journal 15, Special Issue: Strategy: 
Search for N ew  Paradigms (Summer 1994); and, E. Sam Overman, “The New Sciences o f  Administration: 
Chaos and Quantum Theory,” Public Administration Review  56, no. 5 (September - October 1996). 
Complexity was addressed only slightly more often. Examples include Michael D. Wallace and Peter 
Suedfeld, “Leadership in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 
4 (December 1988); George Modelski, “Evolutionary Paradigm for World Politics,” International Studies 
Quarterly 40, no. 3 (September 1996); and, Karen Guttier, Michael D. Wallace, and Peter Suedfeld, “The 
Integrative Complexity o f  American Decision Makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The Journal o f  Conflict 
Resolution 39, no. 4 (December 1995). Additional contributions will be cited in Chapter III.
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7important question, “so what?” The important issue remains whether or not this 
recognition of nations as complex adaptive systems presents any practical applications. 
Even if the models are accurate, an important question emerges. Can utilization of the 
components of these theories provide any realistic assistance to those who must make 
foreign policy decisions in such an environment? If so, are examples extant that can 
provide additional insights into the potential value of the consideration of these theories? 
Satisfactory answers to these questions are far less evident.
There are many opportunities for further study and progress in this area.
Literature focused on complex adaptive systems is not abundant, and a systems approach 
to the study of the relative power o f nations has not generated sizeable interest. In System 
Effects, an examination o f a systems approach to international relations, the renowned 
and respected scholar, Robert Jervis, candidly provides that “several private foundations 
and public funding agencies declined to support this research.”7
Perhaps terms such as complex adaptive systems and the technical nature of most 
of the previous examinations of chaos and complexity theory are viewed as too remote 
and too difficult to apply to international studies. Alternatively, many scholars in this 
field of study may perceive this approach as being outside of their academic comfort 
zone. The paucity of previous work in this area suggests that it resides beyond the 
mainstream, and some may consider it to be threatening to current postulations. As Lars- 
Eric Cederman observes, “the CAS approach generates surprising and counterintuitive 
insights about existing theories.”8
7. Robert Jervis, System Effects (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Acknowledgements.
8. Lars-Eric Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 7.
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8While acknowledging that use of a systems approach in examinations o f the 
relations between states is not without precedent, efforts aimed at practical application of 
the relevant principles of a systems methodology are less abundant. Hence, this inquiry 
views national power from a systems perspective, and attempts to fill the existing gap in 
the literature. It addresses the inadequacy of tools available to policy makers by 
proposing a methodology for application of these principles. However, further 
exploration requires a common understanding of terminology and a foundation in the use 
of systems in the context of this study.
Why a Systems Approach?
A system may be described as a “regularly interacting or interdependent group of 
items forming a unified whole.. .under the influence of related forces.”9 Most o f the 
essential components of modem and technologically advanced societies may be depicted 
as systems, and these often have been developed as the result of systems analysis. 
Sophisticated communications, transportation infrastructure, information management, 
manufacturing, distribution of resources, and health systems are but a few examples. 
However, such a breakdown into component parts is not adequate for successful analysis.
While categorization is useful for descriptive purposes, such systems do not 
operate independently. Due to the size and complexity of the total structure and processes 
of a nation’s capabilities, depiction as a system o f systems would enhance understanding. 
The inherent complexity and interactions make this holistic system of systems different 
from merely an arithmetic sum of the subsystems. Hence, the challenge facing those who
9. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. “system.” All subsequent citations are to this 
edition.
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9would utilize a systems approach becomes more problematic. Nevertheless, some 
intellectual energy has been expended in this arena.
Although most commonly connected with the physical sciences and engineering 
spheres, a multiplicity o f academic disciplines now employ an analysis o f systems. 
Observing this inclusion across many fields of study, Jervis noted, “The fact that 
congruent patterns can be found across such different domains testifies to the prevalence 
and power o f the dynamics that systems display.”10 While exceptionally useful in 
mathematics and the technical scientific disciplines, concepts in the social sciences have 
not included the systems perspective extensively or productively. In the field of 
international relations, the systems approach has been limited to examinations of the 
anarchical international political system, and most focus on the theoretical aspects. 
Prescriptions for the pragmatic application of systems theory have been less abundant.
A systems approach has been applied in the domains of political science and 
international security studies to a larger extent; however, employment has been more 
often aimed at defense planning, and the development o f offensive and defensive military 
systems, not specifically the analysis of the systems of potential adversaries. Among the 
areas where a systems approach has been proposed and utilized is in the concept of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Strategists and analysts within the U.S. defense 
establishment continually examine, discuss, and debate the merits of NCW.11 There is
10. Robert Jervis, “Complex Systems: The Role o f  Interactions,” in Complexity, G lobal Politics, and  
National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University, 1997). Systems Analysis is an academic discipline in its own right with a set o f  conventions and 
standards. This study will use analysis o f  systems in a more generic sense, extended to any examination o f  
the interacting components o f  the unified whole.
11. NCW is normally considered in the context o f  design o f  military command and control systems. 
James Moffat, Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: DOD Command and 
Control Research Program, 2003), 45, describes NCW as “an emerging theory o f  war based on the concepts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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less evidence of efforts aimed at applying these concepts to examinations of the 
individual and collective elements that comprise the set of a nation’s assets and 
capabilities. One reason for this reluctance to adopt a systems-based style include the 
daunting task of explaining and understanding the complex nature of national systems of 
power, and the absence o f practical tools and approaches for such analysis. What are the 
possible explanations for this paucity of potential solutions?
Unlike many physical structures, national and international systems are nonlinear, 
complex, and at times, chaotic; and the relationships between nations are complicated, 
and not readily explained or fully understood. There is no calculus, and there are no 
universal laws of relations between states that can precisely equate cause to effect.
Further complicating the analysis, these systems are dynamic and reactive. In the physical 
world, if the force applied to an object is changed, the laws of motion lead us to expect a 
commensurate alteration in the resultant velocity of the object.
The effect of a standard cue ball, traveling at a certain velocity, impacting a 
grouping of solid and striped balls of known mass, at a specific angle of incidence, may 
be determined with some degree of accuracy if the environmental factors, e.g., wind 
velocity, temperature, humidity, etc, are known. Moreover, the effects o f the secondary 
collisions are calculable. However, there is no equivalent equation to predict with much 
confidence the consequences of state actions. The law of unintended effects, i.e., there 
will be more than one consequence o f an action, remains in force.
If a government increases the level of efforts of its actions, e.g., tightens an 
economic embargo against another regime, there is not a precise means of determining if
o f nonlinearity, complexity and chaos.” Investigations into the use o f  airpower as a means o f  military 
coercion also address systems.
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the resultant impact will increase proportionately, or even if there will be a variation at 
all. Additionally, the secondary or unintended effects of the action may work counter to 
the embargoing nation’s objectives, such as strengthening, rather than weakening 
domestic support for the regime in the targeted nation. Hence, the methods of analysis 
that utilize a linear Newtonian approach in subjects such as mathematics and physics, 
have had a more limited application to description and prediction in social sciences, and 
particularly in international relations. However, examinations of the seemingly linear 
character o f physical systems now include a different perspective.
Systems previously described as simple, with linear relationships between 
elements, are now attributed with complex nonlinear components. Investigations into 
chaos and complexity theories since the 1970’s have resulted in nonlinear approaches in 
multiple scientific disciplines. While many of these are still in an embryonic stage, these 
advances may provide some useful application to the task of analysis in areas previously 
believed to be too dissimilar for useful application.
While the recognition of nonlinearity is centuries old, and the scientific 
community has made continuous attempts to understand and deal with this phenomenon, 
it is the recent advances in information systems and computer technology that are largely 
responsible for this increased ability to recognize nonlinear relationships. As Alan 
Beyerchen observed, “What is new is that computers have allowed us to attack nonlinear 
problems numerically, in the process highlighting patterns of instability that have 
captured scientific and popular imagination alike.”12 Consequently, new approaches and 
advances in the physical sciences may provide insights for other academic disciplines.
12. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War,” International 
Security 17 (Winter 1992-93): 65.
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There are benefits to a cross-disciplinary approach. As Gleick argues, “Often a 
revolution [in science] has an interdisciplinary character—its central discoveries often 
come from people straying outside the normal bounds of their specialties.”13 This 
excursion beyond the normal limits of foreign policy analysis is an attempt to capture and 
apply these central discoveries to an examination of national systems of power, 
specifically the consequences of actions taken by one nation against another.
I undertake this study due to the recognition that a successful employment o f national, 
coalition or alliance power requires a holistic knowledge of the systems of power o f the 
nation upon which the coercive actions are taken.14 Accepting this premise, I propose an 
approach that uses a system of systems analysis o f a nation’s sources o f power as the 
basis for assessments.
The Hypothesis and Proposition
Fundamental questions emerge in appraisals of the application of elements of 
systems theory, particularly the recent advances in understanding nonlinear systems, to 
analysis of national power. Can the process and capabilities through which a nation 
operates be properly described as a complex and nonlinear system? If so, do the 
principles of nonlinearity in other systems apply to national systems of power? If national 
systems of power are nonlinear; and, if fresh scientific approaches, such as chaos and 
complexity theories, provide aids to understanding nonlinear physical systems; can the 
application of the principles derived from chaos and complexity studies contribute to the
13. Gleick, Chaos, 37.
14. While I will describe the approach with an individual nation as the normal target o f  the coercive 
power, the construct applies to certain non-state actors as well. I will expand on that supposition in later 
chapters.
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understanding of national systems of power?” Stated differently: If elements of national 
power are nonlinear and complex; and, if  approaches recently developed in mathematics 
and the physical sciences provide a means of enhanced understanding of nonlinear 
systems; then, utilization of such an approach may provide a metaphor or model for 
increased understanding of the system and the secondary effects of actions taken. This 
dissertation first will attempt to confirm the existence of the first two conditions— 
systems of national power are complex and nonlinear, and existing scientific approaches 
may be relevant to assessments of national power. Subsequently, I will provide a design 
for the product—a model for development of an understanding of the systems and for 
anticipation o f secondary effects.
A fundamental assumption for the utilization of a system of systems analysis in 
this context is that the elements of national power are interrelated, i.e., an action upon a 
node (nexus, junction, leverage point) in one system is likely to have an impact on other 
nodes in other systems. Awareness of these interactions represents the critical output of 
the system of systems process. The proposition is that improved comprehension of the 
elements of national power, and the interactions within and between these, can provide a 
broader knowledge o f the whole system, which may contribute to more informed 
decisions regarding actions designed to influence those systems.
The foundation of this premise is that a system of systems analysis of a nation’s 
elements of national power can provide enhanced understanding of the functioning of that 
system. This understanding will allow for improved comprehension o f the linkages 
between units of the system and could contribute to better awareness of secondary effects 
of actions. This awareness can be a useful tool for those who must consider the
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alternatives in selection of the actions and resources applied to achieve desired effects. 
This task is not new or unique to the geopolitical environment of the early twenty-first 
century. Consideration of the secondary effects of actions has been an element of 
relations between nations throughout recorded history.
There is a need for this approach now due to the dramatically changed 
environment in which nations will employ coercive power. The evolving nature of 
conflict and the perceived decreased likelihood of symmetrical force-on-force 
confrontations give this study an increased relevance. Historically, wars have involved 
direct conflict between military forces. Hence, assessments that focused on primarily 
military aspects were adequate. However, the wars of the second half of the twentieth 
century involved more than exclusively military engagements.15 That phenomenon is 
likely to continue into the twenty-first. Therefore, assessments must consider all aspects 
of national power.
During the Second World War, in discussions following criticism from the 
Vatican of Soviet actions, Joseph Stalin reportedly asked, “How many divisions does the 
Pope have?” While that rhetorical question may have been appropriate in large-scale wars 
of national survival, it was less relevant to the successors of Stalin who learned that the 
soft power o f the Pontiff could be a powerful force. Hence, assessments must extend 
beyond numbers of divisions, tanks, and aircraft.
Vietnam and Afghanistan provide the models where overwhelming military force 
was not sufficient to achieve the respective national objectives of the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The economic, political, and social structures have become as
15. Certainly, there are multiple exceptions to this trend. Korea, Falklands/Malvinas, and the 1991 Gulf 
War were primarily military conflicts. The Israeli military victories o f  1967 and 1973 have not yet 
produced their primary objectives o f  peace and stability in the region.
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important as the military correlation of forces. Conflicts that are more recent have 
reinforced this need to consider all elements of national power. To be effective, those 
who employ coercive actions must consider the entire system of power of the adversary. 
However, assessments still focus on the military, and examinations treat the other 
components of power as separate entities. There is no adequate means of developing an 
understanding of the system as a whole, and as a result, the ability to anticipate the effects 
of actions is limited. Hence, decision-makers need better models and processes.16
Recognition o f the requirement for such tools is not new; the best strategists have 
always sought a comprehensive understanding of the adversary. This approach to 
improving the level of understanding is possible now due to the merging of new 
approaches to complexity and systems analysis with advances in computer processing 
and information technology capabilities. This synthesis of evolving concepts and 
information processing tools may overcome obstacles that made earlier attempts at 
grasping the nature of secondary effects ineffectual.
Enhanced understanding is the product of the process described in the chapters 
that follow. While seemingly modest, this goal is of great potential value to the decision­
maker whose arsenal of analysis tools is currently limited. The inability to provide 
precise predictions of secondary effects does not connote that the effort is not potentially 
important. “Some problems are just too complicated for rational, logical solutions. They
16. The National Military Strategy o f  the United States declares, “Our experiences in Afghanistan and 
Iraq highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy to achieve longer-term national goals and objectives. It 
also provides, “commanders must expect and plan for the possibility that their operations will produce 
unintended 2nd- and 3rd-order effects.” U.S. Department o f  Defense, “The National Military Strategy o f  
the United States o f  America,” http://www/oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document.297_MT_.Strategy/ 
Doc.pdf, 33 (accessed 5 April 2005).
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admit insights, not answers ”17 The objective of this methodology is the development of 
the former, as a tool to provide the latter.
The proposition does not represent a grand unification of chaos, complexity, and 
international relations theories that will provide a panacea of previously unattainable 
capabilities. It is not a “Theory of Everything” and it will not always produce lucid and 
unambiguous explanations of how the elements of systems interact or how the total 
system operates. Nor will it enable precise predictions of future events or the specific 
effects resulting from an action. The methodology is not an attempt to make linear, 
systems that are nonlinear. It is not a means of directly applying the mathematical 
equations developed by practitioners of chaos theory to the international relations 
discipline. Most importantly, it is not a repackaging of reductionist approaches hidden 
under the banner of chaos, complexity or other more contemporary theories.
New or improved concepts and methodologies are important to decision-makers, 
as well as the analysts who support them, not solely because o f the perceived increased 
complexity of national systems, but also due to the acknowledged need to improve the 
ability to understand the secondary effects of actions. Recent applications of American 
power in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan provide examples where actions 
designed to achieve effects in support of objectives also resulted in secondary 
(unintended, unanticipated, undesired) effects, which may or may not have supported 
these overall national objectives. While not a universal remedy for this problem of 
contending with secondary effects of actions, this methodology may at least provide an 
awareness of possible secondary effects that could help mitigate their deleterious impact.
17. A. B. Cambel, Applied Chaos Theory: A Paradigm fo r  Complexity (Washington, DC: Academic 
Press, Inc., 1993), vi. Emphasis added. Attributed to President Emeritus o f  MIT, Jerome B. Weisner.
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The justification for this study and proposed methodology is the need for a 
rudimentary tool for decision-makers to contend with the consequences of actions when 
dealing with complex systems of national power. This investigation into the relationship 
between elements of national power, and the potential for benefits of such an analysis 
will consider three key questions:
1. Can the sources of national power be examined and better understood through 
utilization of a systems approach?
2. Can the interaction between elements within a system be determined using a system of 
systems model?
3. Can knowledge of these interactions provide insight into the consequences of actions, 
including the secondary effects?
An examination of coercive power and the basic elements of systems theory will 
provide the response to the first question. A methodology based on a system of systems 
approach will address the second proposition through illustrations of the model. The 
response to the third question must rely on case studies to demonstrate the potential of the 
approach.
The answers are important to foreign policy decision-makers who must operate in 
an increasingly complex and interdependent geo-political environment. Actions taken to 
produce desired effects may also generate outcomes that are damaging to overall 
objectives. Therefore, identification of alternative actions is a valuable product. While the 
methodology can only provide estimates of general patterns of behavior, any tool or 
process that can provide insight into these interrelationships is useful, and the potential 
for exploitation is worthy of examination.
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Organization of the Dissertation
I have organized this dissertation into nine chapters. Chapter II begins with an 
examination of what power means within the context of this study and how that power 
may be used to achieve objectives. It includes the theoretical foundations and 
components o f power and a presentation of the relevant terminology. The focus is on 
coercion as the central strategy to goal attainment. The limitations of current models 
provide the rationale and justification for this analysis. Chapter III examines nonlinear 
approaches, including complexity and chaos theories, and provides an evaluation of their 
applicability to assessments of national power. Chapter IV describes the foundations of a 
systems approach and the advantages its application may contribute to assessments of 
national power. It also supports the contention that national systems o f power are 
nonlinear complex adaptive systems; and, examines the impact of nonlinearity on 
assessments of national power.
Building upon the insights provided in the previous sections, Chapter V describes 
the system of systems approach and presents a methodology for its utilization in 
assessments of national power. Chapters VI through VIII utilize case studies to examine 
three distinctive episodes where elements of a system of systems approach were used 
(although not necessarily overtly) with varying degrees o f success. An ex post 
determination of the effects attained, and how these supported the declared objectives, 
provides the foundation for the analysis contained in these sections. The final chapter 
synthesizes the insights from the case studies and summarizes the contention that a 
system of systems analysis may be useful in the understanding o f secondary effects. With 
the rationale for the study presented, the systems approach introduced, the hypothesis
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stated, and the structure outlined, I will now commence with the first essential task—an 
examination of the concept of power.
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CHAPTER II
THE EFFECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF COERCIVE POWER
Nations apply coercive power in order to produce effects that support objectives. 
While they may achieve success in the generation of the primary effects, the same actions 
may also be the cause o f secondary consequences. Although there is wide 
acknowledgement of the problem presented by the phenomenon of secondary effects, 
there currently are no practical models available to decision-makers that focus on the 
unintended, unexpected, or undesired effects resulting from actions intended to influence 
the behavior of other actors. Accepting this premise, a reasonable conclusion becomes 
that an enhanced method and tool set for this task could be useful.
If adequate instruments were available to the decision-maker that could provide 
some level of understanding of both the primary intended, as well as the secondary 
effects, there would be little justification for this analysis and proposition. However, a 
review of the existing literature suggests that this is not the case and that the ability to do 
so is at best limited; or at worst, non-existent. Therefore, a vital initial objective is to 
provide evidence that demonstrates that currently available tools and processes are not 
sufficient for a comprehension of the effects of actions. It is not possible to accomplish 
this task without a preliminary examination of the theoretical foundations of the 
application of coercive power, the rationale for its use, and the factors that make the 
calculus regarding effects nonlinear and complex.
Since the primary utility of the proposed methodology is within the context of the 
use of power to influence behavior, this chapter will begin with a brief examination of the
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sources of national power, identifying key elements and providing basic definitions upon 
which to base the discussions that follow. This includes a description of how national 
power is comprised of a set of interrelated components. Because power is such an 
expansive concept, this coverage will be rather cursory and will provide only the 
essentials necessary for subsequent discussion of the points upon which I base the 
construct of the proposition. The focus will be on the application of power to influence 
the behavior of other actors.
Coercion best describes the type of power application central to this study, and I 
will examine it in some detail in the second section of the chapter. This concentration is 
necessary, since coercive actions are the major source of the effects for which this inquiry 
hopes to provide some level of increased understanding. If coercion is the chosen 
strategy, then currently available methodologies are not adequate for envisaging the 
inevitable secondary effects resulting from coercive actions. This segment includes an 
overview o f the decision-making process related to the selection o f coercive actions. 
Again, this is a vast area for consideration, crossing multiple academic disciplines, and I 
address it in a level of depth only sufficient to support the proposition.
Subsequently, I will provide an examination of the impact o f linkages, along with 
illustrations of why current methodologies are insufficient, since they do not provide the 
requisite holistic knowledge o f the relationship between elements within the larger 
system. A primary cause of this comprehension deficit is often the result of attempts to 
apply linear concepts, models, and thinking to nonlinear systems. This assertion requires 
an introduction to linearity and consideration of arguments as to why it is an 
inappropriate approach to understanding the effects of actions. That supposition will
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segue into an examination of nonlinearity and the consequent complications to 
development of any practical predictive capability. This leads to the conclusion that 
linear approaches are inadequate for the task, and provides the prologue for the 
investigation into the benefits of nonlinear approaches that I present in Chapter III.
Concepts of Power
An analysis of power first requires some agreement on a definition of the term. 
Reduced to a simple statement, power is the ability of A to get B to do something B 
would not otherwise do at a reasonable cost to A. Hence, power is the ability to change 
behavior. In a variety o f permutations, this concept o f power is central to debates in 
international relations theory.
Power is a fundamental, and some argue the most important, factor in the 
relations between states. Not surprisingly, the concept of power has been the subject of an 
immense amount of study, analysis, and contention, and has generated an enormous 
amount of academic discourse. There is no intention to capture the entirety of that trove 
of data here, or to provide a treatise on contemporary political theory regarding the 
interactions between nations. However, development of a theoretical foundation upon 
which to base the proposition contained herein is important to providing an understanding 
of the proposed methodology.
Traditional realist thought explains the international system primarily in terms of 
the distribution of power. This relative power relationship, derived from assessments of 
capabilities, represents a key factor in policy decisions and the determination of 
outcomes. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson assume that political leaders think
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and act in terms of interest defined as power, which they define as, “man’s control over
the minds and actions o f other men.” 1 They distinguish power from the application of
force, useable from unusable power, legitimate from illegitimate power, and hence, the
differences between political and military power. Additionally, they identify the
“elements of national power,” which are distinguished by those that are relatively stable,
such as geography and natural resources, and those which are subject to change,
4 2
including national morale and the quality of government and of diplomacy.
While he disagrees with many tenets of the traditional realist approach, Joseph 
Nye offers a definition similar to its advocates. He argues, “Power is the ability to 
achieve one’s purposes or goals:” and contends, “Power is often equated with resources
and requires an ability to convert this potential power into realized power (the ability to
■>
change the behavior of others).”
David Baldwin also equates power with the ability to influence or control, but 
contends that the essential element in any discussion of power must be scope and 
domain.4 He believes it important to distinguish between power and capabilities. Baldwin
1. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Nations, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1985), 32. Presenting a realist perspective, the authors justify their approach to the definition o f  
power in the relationships between nations. “The concept o f  interest defined as power imposes intellectual 
discipline on the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter o f  politics, and makes the 
theoretical understanding o f  politics possible” (ibid., 5).
2. Ibid., 27-169. Among the subsets o f  natural resources are food and raw materials. It is the 
contribution o f  these, along with geography and industrial capacity, to another factor, military 
preparedness, that provides their importance to national power.
3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Changing Nature o f  World Power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2 
(Fall 1990): 177-78. He contends that power “is easier to experience than to define or measure,” but 
nevertheless proposes, “the ability to do things or to control others.” He also offers Robert Dahl’s “the 
ability to get others to do what they would not otherwise do.” In a later work, Nye defines power as “the 
ability to produce the outcomes you want.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Velvet Hegemon,” Foreign Policy 
May-June 2003, 74. He elaborates, “Soft power is the ability to secure those outcomes through attraction 
rather than coercion.”
4. David A. Baldwin, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, the Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), 15. He provides additional views on the “troublesome” term “power,” including 
Robert Gilpin’s 1975 observation that “the number and variety o f  definitions should be an embarrassment 
to political scientists.”
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also observes that a user of the latter term must consider the “capability to get whom to 
do what?”5 Similarly, Robert Keohane views Morgenthau’s definition as “murky” in that 
it fails “to distinguish power as a resource (based on tangible as well as intangible assets) 
and power as the ability to influence others’ behavior.”6
In the neorealist viewpoint of Kenneth Waltz, “To use power is to apply one’s 
capabilities in an attempt to change someone else’s behavior in certain ways.” To define
•j
‘power’ as ‘cause’ confuses process with outcome.” The important factor to Waltz is 
relative, not absolute power. Gains and declines in power are important only in their 
relationship to those of other actors.
Moving beyond neorealism, Stefano Guzzini examines the concept of structural 
power, which he describes as “indirect institutional power.”8 This widening of traditional 
concepts of power to include features such as indirect institutional and unintended effects 
is important to this study since an understanding of these types of effects is a major 
rationale for the conduct of a system of systems analysis.
To those within the liberal or institutionalist camp, power remains an essential 
element in international relations. They contend, however, that power in its purest sense 
may not be the most critical factor. Rejecting the realist model, they contend that other 
factors, such as the impact of information, domestic institutions, and international
5. Ibid., 17.
6. Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 11. 
He also observes, “Theories based solely on definable power capabilities have proven to be notoriously 
poor at accounting for political outcomes.” He later advocates, “When trying to explain a set o f  outcomes 
in world politics, always consider the hypothesis that the outcomes reflect underlying power resources, 
without being limited to it” (ibid., 185).
7. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 191. In his analysis, “The first concern o f  states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.” Hence, “power is a means and not an end” 
(ibid., 126). He adds “To define ‘power’ as ‘cause’ confuses process with outcome” (ibid., 191).
8. Stefan Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits o f  Neorealist Power Analysis,” International 
Organization 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 451. These notions o f  structural power contain varied 
categorizations o f  power. Among these are indirect institutional power, nonintentional power, and 
impersonal empowering (ibid., 450).
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regimes, provide an improved underpinning for understanding. A third, but less 
developed epistemic paradigm, focuses on the impact o f collectives, ideas, roles, and 
beliefs.9
While this pithy theoretical discourse regarding the concept of power provides a 
necessary foundation for further analysis, its inclusion does not represent a primary 
objective of this study. The key factors in this examination are the components of power, 
and the essential question becomes, what factors comprise a nation’s overall system of 
power?
Across the theoretic spectrum, most analysts essentially agree that assessment of 
power resources is not as straightforward or as palpable as the counting o f ships, tanks, 
and aircraft. This type of analysis is relatively simple, has been attempted before, and has 
proven to be of only partial value. The overall system of power may include more hidden 
and nebulous factors.
John Mearsheimer differentiates between military and latent power, the latter 
referring to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power.10 
Keohane, Nye, et al, contend that power goes beyond Mearsheimer’s limited view of 
military power as the principal indicator of overall power. They identify multiple
9. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravczisik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, 
no. 2 (Fall 1999): 10. Along with the epistemic model, they identify another two paradigmatic alternatives 
to realism: (1) institutionalist, which “contains theories and explanations that stress the role o f  international 
institutions,” and (2) liberal, whose theories “stress the role o f  the exogenous variation in underlying state 
preferences.” Although, as the title would indicate, the authors are particularly critical o f  the realist model, 
this article represents one o f  the best available sources for comparison o f  the most prominent theories o f  
international relations.
10. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f  Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
Inc., 2000), 55-56. The basis o f  power is the particular material capabilities that a state possesses. See 
discussion on wealth and power, 55-82. Both latent and military power will be considered elements in the 
broader characterization o f  national power used in this study, since it is these socio-economic elements, 
along with the more commonly explored political-military power, that comprise the system o f national 
power.
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additional components and dispute his view that socio-economic factors are important 
only in the degree to which they support or enhance military power.
Regardless o f their theoretical persuasion, most investigators into the nature of 
power describe it as a multifaceted issue, i.e., not based on a single source. Power may 
have tangible and intangible manifestations. It is possible to readily identify and 
enumerate some of these, such as the components of a highly developed electrical power 
distribution network. Others, such as moral and cultural influence, are more esoteric and 
difficult to quantity. The debate is largely over degree o f importance, not over whether 
less concrete factors, such as ideas and beliefs, are part of the power equation. Hence, for 
the purposes of this constrained analysis, the differences between the views of 
Mearsheimer, Waltz, Nye, and Keohane provided earlier are not considerable.
This brief excursion into concepts of power produced three tenets that are 
important to this analysis: (1) power includes the ability to change behavior; (2) while 
theoretical divides exist, power is a major element in relations between states; and, (3) 
power is comprised of multiple elements, and these elements may be physical or 
intangible. Further discussion and confirmation of the limitations of current models and 
tools requires an examination of the components of national power.
Elements of Power
Having established that national power is multifaceted, it is worth some effort to 
identify a few of the elements that contribute to it. As addressed earlier, national power 
most often equates with military might. Ancient Greece extended its influence through its 
skilled use of the phalanx and trireme; the British Empire through sea power; and the
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Post-World War II United States by its nuclear arsenal supplemented by potent 
conventional forces. Although, as Nye and others insightfully point out, the total 
influence of Greece, Britain, and the United States extended beyond raw military power. 
Military conquest may be ephemeral. The culture of ancient Greece permeates the 
western world; while little remains of the Mongol martial victories.
Despite a general acknowledgement of power as a multifaceted concept, there is 
little agreement as to the number of categories or to their respective boundaries. In the 
literature discussed in earlier paragraphs, military power was included in nearly every 
theoretical viewpoint. Mearsheimer assigns socio-economic power to the role of 
supporting elements of military power. Waltz allows for some basic decomposition and 
includes military, economic, and political potential as components in power assessments. 
Nye has offered soft power to the discussion.
While the specific means of acquiring and applying this power may have varied, 
historically the major manifestations of national power have been military might, 
supported by economic capacity. Certainly, military power is itself comprised of multiple 
capabilities and resources such as population, degree of industrial or technological 
development, natural resources, etc.11 These assets are often regarded as sub-elements of 
economic power.
Klaus Knorr observes, “We distinguish between military power, economic power 
and political penetrative power.”12 This distinction becomes germane and helpful in
11. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1990, 153-71. Because the ability to control 
others is often associated with the possession o f  certain resources, politicians and diplomats commonly 
define power as the possession o f  population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, 
and political stability.” He adds, “The factors o f  technology, education, and economic growth are becoming 
more significant in international power” (ibid., 154).
12. Klaus Knorr, The Power o f  Nations (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), 6. In the last category, he 
includes propaganda and other information-centric actions.
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discussions regarding interconnectedness and interdependence of activities. In an
examination of the structure of international trade, Steven Krasner observes this wide
range of power and proposes a classification o f elements: “At least four major state
interests affected by the structure of international trade can be identified. They are
• 1 ^political power, aggregate national income, economic growth, and social stability.” 
Historically, most categorizations of power have included groupings under 
military, economic, and political elements. However, Nye sees three sources of power: 
military, economic, and soft. He has written extensively on the concept o f soft power, 
which he attributes with the ability to influence without coercion. Resources such as 
technology, culture, ideology, and education all contribute to the calculation of a nation’s 
soft power. Nye views both military and economic power as examples o f hard power that 
could induce others to alter their behavior or positions. Although hard power may be 
exercised through inducements or threats, “soft power co-opts rather than coerces.”14 In 
the context of this study, I will consider both hard and soft power in the assessment of 
national power.
While inclusion of political, military, and economic elements of power is not 
particularly contentious, visualizations that are more recent describe power in additional 
terms. This has necessitated the broad category of social, which can have cultural, ethnic, 
religious, and informational components. Adding to the confusion, Guzzini introduces the
13. Steven D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure o f  International Trade,” in International Politics, 
ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and Company, 1985), 341. Krasner 
views power as the possession o f  control over resources. He expands on this concept o f  power as being also 
a source o f  influence in Steven D. Krasner, “Regimes and the Limits o f  Realism: Regimes as Autonomous 
Variables,” International Organization 36 no. 2 (Spring 1982): 497-510.
14. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox o f  American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9. 
Following on to previous writings, Nye explains that soft power is “not the same as influence, though it is 
one source o f  influence,” and in an interesting comparison, contends that soft power “like love is hard to 
measure and to handle” (ibid., 12).
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concept of “indirect institutional power.” Hence, there are no universally accepted criteria 
for categorization or description of the elements of power.
While perhaps professionally discouraging, this condition does not render this 
analysis unachievable. It is the interaction of the elements, not the broad categorizations, 
which is critical to the proposition. Therefore, an arbitrary segregation into broad 
groupings for analysis is justified. For purposes o f the discussion of the interactions to 
follow, I consign the elements that comprise the overall system of power into four major 
categories: political, economic, military, and social.15
Specific elements or sources of power are easier to identify than they are to assign 
to a particular category. For example, most would probably consider a nuclear powered 
aircraft carrier an element of military power. However, others are less obvious. Should a 
religious leader in a theocracy be classified as a political, social, or economic node? One 
could make compelling arguments for inclusion in any one, or in all three categories. 
Chapter V outlines a methodology that offers some practical means of overcoming this 
dilemma, but for purposes of the discussion contained here, I defer that issue, and a 
preliminary examination of interrelationships between elements will be undertaken first.
Relationship between Elements of Power
While the elements of economic and military power are mutually supporting, the 
temporal order o f acquisition is not universally consistent. Historically, military power 
was a means to attain economic assets. The Mongols, Huns, and Vikings all used military 
power to achieve economic resources. More recently, economic prosperity enabled the
1 5 .1 present this initial categorization o f  the subsystems now in order to facilitate understanding o f  the 
issues addressed in this chapter. I will be define and develop in the chapters that follow the criteria for 
inclusion o f  specific elements, as well as the scope and boundaries o f  these categories.
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acquisition of modem weaponry. The economic assets gained from sixteenth century 
Spain’s American colonies allowed her to mount a challenge to British sea power. In a 
modem example of economic power enabling military power, the sophisticated weapon 
systems possessed by many middle-eastern nations is a direct result o f their oil wealth. In 
many cases, these factors are so closely interrelated that any discussion of what came 
first—economic or military strength—becomes irrelevant.
External to the categorization issue is the interrelationship o f elements within and 
across the arbitrary boundaries established earlier. Waltz contends, “The economic, 
military, and political components of the capabilities of nations cannot be sectored or 
separately weighed.”16 However, acceptance o f this argument does not connote that the 
separate parts are exchangeable. If power is a combination of capabilities provided by the 
various elements, the question emerges as to whether these elements or types of power 
may be interchanged. For example, can economic power be a substitute for military 
power? If soft power is a viable concept, then is its utilization possible instead of the 
more aggressive manifestations of hard power?
David Baldwin looks at the issue of fungibility as the ability to transfer power, or,
17“the ease with which capabilities in one issue-area can be used in other issue-areas.” He 
argues that power is not always fungible. Instead, multidimensional is a more accurate 
depiction. The common perception of power in the social sciences is, “a type of causal 
relationship in which the power wielder affects the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or
16. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 31.
17. Baldwin, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, the Contemporary Debate, 20. The high-fungibility 
assumption is more useful in the longer the period. In his view, “In politics as well as in economics, more 
things are fungible in the long term than in the short.”
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Manifestations of attempts by nations to influence the behavior o f others are frequent, 
reoccurring, and varied. Actions may deny an opponent some vital commodity; 
punishment may be the primary intent of others. The objective may be to maintain the 
status quo, i.e., at least one opponent is convinced not to take actions that are counter to 
the interests of another. In other instances, the goal may be to get the adversary to take 
actions that they would not undertake without the threat or application of power. Making 
the cost of resisting appear to be greater than the costs of complying is a means of 
accomplishing both goals. Therefore, the objective just as well may be to influence an 
adversary not to do something, as it may be to induce an action. Attempts to prevent 
actions that have not yet materialized may be categorized as deterrence, while those 
intended to reverse an action or alter the status quo normally are considered compellence.
The U.S Department of Defense defines deterrence as “The prevention from 
action by fear of the consequences intended to prevent an action.”19 Two potential 
adversaries, currently at peace, making efforts to persuade the other not to embark upon 
courses of action normally characterize deterrence. Compellence is similar, in that the 
basis of the concept is convincing the adversary that the costs exceed the payback. In the 
case o f compellence, however, the objective is for the opponent to elect to undertake an 
action because it evaluates the benefits of doing so to outweigh the consequences of not 
taking the action. Compellence and deterrence combined may be regarded as subsets of 
coercion.20
19. U.S. Department o f  Defense, “DOD Dictionary,” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ 
data/d/01641.html (accessed 27 September 2004). Expanding on this concept and addressing the 
multifaceted nature o f  power, the dictionary defines deterrent options as “a course o f  action, developed on 
the best economic, diplomatic, political and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary ffom a 
current course o f  actions or contemplate operations.”
20. Deterrence itself has many faces, and may be categorized into general deterrence and immediate 
deterrence. Immediate deterrence is the type germane to this study. See discussion in Daniel Byman,
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Arguments over characterization can result over whether deterrence actually 
represents a change in behavior, and if strategies that employ denial and punishment are 
in themselves types of coercion. Avoiding that semantic trap, this project will focus on 
the more active means of eliciting behavioral change. While the proposed methodology is 
applicable in other schemes, it is most relevant to the use of coercion and the subsequent 
case studies will focus on this method. Therefore, further analysis warrants an inclusive 
inquiry into the concept of coercion.
Coercion
As with much terminology in the social sciences, there is no universal agreement 
on the definition of coercion, or on its scope and boundaries. Acknowledging that 
condition, further investigation requires acceptance of definitions that are harmonious 
with typical, albeit not all, understandings, and that are satisfactory for presentation of the 
methodology to follow in later chapters.
Dictionary entries include defining coerce as, “to enforce or bring about by force
or threat.”21 Karl Mueller provides a broad definition in describing coercion as, “a matter
of changing the adversary’s expectations to make compliance with the coercer’s demands
appear more attractive than resisting them.”22 The definition is independent o f the means
used to achieve this coercion. Methods range from the application of overt military force,
to economic sanctions or political initiatives, and these may take the form of carrots
Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric V. Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1999), 9-13.
21. Webster’s N ew  Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. “coerce.” To add to the confusion in commonly utilized 
terms, another offering is “to compel to an act or a choice.”
22. Karl Mueller, “The Essence o f  Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists,” Air and  
Space Power Chronicles. September 2001, 5. He includes in his definition both deterrence (making the 
adversary not do something) and compellence (making an actor take an action that he normally would not). 
Much coercion lies in the gray area between these.
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(promise of rewards) or sticks (threats of punishment). Importantly, Mueller stresses that 
the choices are relative vice absolute. Successful coercion only must make the coercer’s 
preferred action to be more appealing to the adversary than the action it would take in the 
absence of the coercive effort.
Thomas Schelling makes the important distinction that while the use of military 
force may at times be an instrument o f coercion, its employment does not connote that 
coercion has occurred. Coercion has as its goal a change of behavior. It requires “finding 
a bargain,” that is, arranging for the adversary to believe himself to be better off by doing 
what the coercer wants; worse off if he does not.23 If sufficient military force is available, 
a nation may not have to take any purely coercive actions. Based on this disparity, it can 
simply take or do what it wants.
A RAND study offers, “Coercion is the use of threatened force, including the 
limited use of actual force to back up a threat, to induce an adversary to behave 
differently than it otherwise would.”24 This view stresses the advantages of displays of 
force as threats, over what Schelling describes as the employment o f military capabilities 
as brute force. Compellence is exceptionally difficult to distinguish from deterrence and 
in practice, “they tend to blur.”25
Robert Pape offers, “‘Coercion’ means efforts to change the behavior o f a state by 
manipulating costs and benefits.’”26 He does not consider deterrence to be a subset of
23. Thomas C Schelling, “The Diplomacy o f  Violence,” in International Politics, ed. Robert J. Art and 
Robert Jervis (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and Company, 1985), 173. Some actions may do both. He 
uses the example o f  the Soviet crushing o f  the Budapest uprising in 1956. This application o f  power solved 
the immediate Hungarian problem for them, but also had a coercive effect on other Warsaw Pact nations, 
especially Poland.
24. Byman, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 9.
25. Ibid., 11.
26. Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 4. Here he differs from Mueller by equating coercion with compellence.
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coercion. In his view, coercion differs from deterrence only in that the intent of the 
former is to alter the behavior of an adversary while the latter seeks to maintain the status 
quo. He concurs with Mueller’s observation that non-military means may be used in 
coercive efforts, but contends that military actions deserve special attention because they 
represent the most common applications.
Alexander George provides a different perspective in his examination o f coercive 
diplomacy, the central task of which is, “To create in the opponent the expectation of 
costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing.” He 
provides two major types of coercion, offensive and defensive. The former is described 
as blackmail and is the expectation that the opponent will give up something without 
resistance. The aim of the latter is convincing the opponent to stop an action or undo 
those already accomplished. Force is to be used in an exemplary manner—to persuade, 
rather than to bludgeon. Through coercive diplomacy force becomes, “a much more
97flexible, psychological instrument of policy.”
Pape segregates theories o f coercion into four broad groupings: (1) Balance of 
resolve—the state with the greater resolve prevails; (2) balance of interests—the edge 
goes to the protagonist with the largest stake in the outcome; (3) vulnerability o f the 
civilian population to air attack; and, (4) balance of forces—ability to strike an 
adversary’s military targets. He believes these theories to be incomplete and possessing
27. Alexander L George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simmons, The Limits o f  Coercive Diplomacy: 
Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 18. This strategy focuses on affecting 
the opponent’s will rather than capabilities. Force goes beyond being merely an instrument o f  military 
strategy; it becomes subordinated to a political-diplomatic strategy. See also Alexander L. George, Forceful 
Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f  
Peace, 1991), 5. Here he contends that both blackmail and coercive diplomacy would be included in 
Schelling’s definition o f  compellence. George prefers to distinguish between the two in order to 
“emphasize the possibility o f  a more flexible diplomacy that can employ non-coercive persuasion and 
accommodation as well as coercive threats.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
28limited explanatory power, since they often represent single factor explanations. 
Additionally, he contends it is not the intentions or the behavior of the coercing state that 
is most critical to defining coercion, rather it is the, “nature of the decisions faced by the 
potential target states.”29 In his view, success or failure of coercion is in the final analysis 
a function o f the target state’s decision process. Consequentially, knowledge about the 
nature of this process is critical to the planning and execution of coercive actions.
In the evaluation of coercive threats, nations commonly use three factors: 
credibility, capability, and communication. Is the threat credible? Does the target believe 
that the coercive action will actually be carried out? Capability: Does the coercer actually 
have the ability to fulfill the threat? Communication: Is the signal and intent clear, and is 
the message transmitted the same as the message received? Applying examples from 
1961 Cuban Missile Crisis: Did the Soviets believe that the U.S. would go to war over 
Cuba? Did they believe that the U.S. had the military power to destroy the missiles in 
Cuba or to launch a strike against the Soviet homeland? Was Kennedy’s threat clearly 
communicated to Khrushchev? Without attempting to reproduce or even to summarize
28. Pape, Bombing to Win, 4-7. Pape considers air power as a principal, but not the sole manifestation 
o f effective coercion. He also contends, “Coercion is generally assumed to operate according to the same 
principles as deterrence” (ibid., 6). He views these as distinctly different activities, with coercion being 
more difficult.
29. Ibid., 12. He argues that the target states must decide to make concessions or accede to demands. 
This is more important to success o f  coercion than the nature o f  the threats. He has developed an equation 
to display the logic o f  coercion:
R = B p(B) -  C p(C), where
R = value o f  resistance
B = potential benefits o f  resistance
p(B) = probability o f  attaining benefits by continued resistance
C = potential costs o f  resistance
P(C) = probability o f  suffering losses
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the volumes dedicated to this event, analysts and historians generally agree that the
• TOanswer to all three questions would be yes, and that the coercion was successful.
This section provided a brief examination o f coercion and concluded: (1) 
definitions and categorization can vary, but Pape’s “efforts to change the behavior of a 
state by manipulating costs and benefits” is appropriate for purposes of this study; (2) 
coercion may be employed through multiple methods; and, (3) affecting the expectation 
and perceptions of the adversary is the critical element in coercion. This last observation 
is the most significant aspect of the application of power.
With this examination of coercion complete, the next step is to develop an 
understanding o f the factors that will cause an adversary to select one course over 
another, i.e. what actions will cause the opponent to conform to the objectives of the 
coercive power? This requires an examination of the components and processes of 
decision-making.
Selection of Alternatives
Thus far, this chapter has looked at the specific applications of power rather than 
at power in a broader sense. While the overall equation of relative power is important, it 
is not the primary consideration here. The relative power of adversaries is not the most 
important factor to this endeavor. Rather, it is the quality and utility of the knowledge 
base that supports decisions to take actions that are intended to coerce behavior. 
Regardless of how systems of power are organized and how the components interact, at
30. Mueller, “The Essence o f  Coercive Air Power,” 4, proposes the categories o f  threats, and notes, 
“coercion is a matter o f  the adversary’s perceptions, it depends upon a set o f  subjective factors.” A variety 
o f interpretations o f  the crisis exists. The degree o f  employment o f  these criteria for coercion and the 
degree to which they were successful remains a topic for debate.
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some point an explicit decision concerning possible actions must be made. Those 
decisions rely on knowledge.
Within the context of this study, the consideration of secondary effects is part of 
the decision calculus. That decision-making process is important whether the 
understanding of potential secondary effects is deep and exhaustive, or thin and cursory. 
Hence, a brief discussion of decision-making in the selection of alternatives for the use of 
coercive power is germane to this discussion.31
The debate over the rules that lead to decisions is animated and wide-ranging. 
Extending beyond the traditional political science and international relations fields, 
psychology and sociology have contributed to the debate. While other explanatory 
alternatives exist, the rational actor and cognitive psychology schools contribute the most 
models, and the relative merits of these have provided the largest amount of discourse
' i ' j
and contention.
Tracing its antecedents back to the 1940’s, the rational school assumes that utility 
and optimization of results are the primary goals of the decision-maker. Simply put, the 
premise is that the actors will operate in their own self-interest. In its most basic sense, 
the process includes determining the possible results of a decision, evaluating the 
probability of the outcomes, and selecting the alternative that provides the best
31. Ryan Beasley, “Collective Interpretations: How Problem Representations Aggregate in Foreign 
Policy Groups,” in Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. Donald A. Sylvan and 
James F. Voss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 109. He contends that many analysts 
believe that policymaking is more than simply making decisions. He advocates the use o f  the term foreign  
policy problem  solving, which he believes to describe more appropriately, what is accomplished when a 
decision is made.
32. The plural must be emphasized; there is no single “rational’ model, and many cognitive models o f  
choice exist.
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potential.33 Mueller contends that coercion theory, “does assume a minimal amount of 
rationality in the target state’s behavior,” but believes that it is more accurate to require 
only that the “adversary state not behave irrationally.”34
Proponents of the cognitive (or psychological) model do not fully agree with the 
basic premise o f actors’ striving to maximize utility. In their view, choices normally are 
made for reasons that cannot be explained by a utility calculus. Those on the cognitive 
side of the debate tend to focus on filters through which people process information and 
which can lead to “conflicting expectations about judgment and behavior.”35 Critics of 
cognitive models point out that the psychological approach does not provide additional 
explanatory power. However, they often will concur with the contention that the rational 
approach has inherent limitations and does not provide a total explanation for decision­
making. While this debate is useful in analyses of the decision-making process, for the 
purpose of this proposition it is sufficient to recognize that choices may not always be 
understood or completely explained. This would apply to coercive actions taken to 
influence the behavior of others.
Alex Mintz contends, “people/leaders/decisionmakers use a mixture of choice 
strategies (analytic, cybernetic, cognitive) on route to a decision.” That conclusion is 
fitting and adequate for the purpose of this endeavor, which focuses on enhancing the
33. Alex Mintz, “Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: Bridging the Gap between the Cognitive Psychology 
and Rational Actor Schools,” in Decisionmaking in War and Peace, ed. Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997), 11-30. This collection provides an in-depth analysis o f  the 
debate and includes chapters on Prospect Theory and Poliheuristic Theory. I will not consider these 
approaches further.
34. Mueller, “The Essence o f  Coercive Air Power,” 5. Italics in original.
35. Janice Gross Stein and David A. Welch, “Rational and Psychological Approaches to the Study o f  
International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses,” in Decisionmaking in War and Peace, ed. 
Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997), 5. The authors do not view  
cognitive psychology as a “true competitor to rational choice,” but believe it to be useful in determining 
why deviations from the rational ideal take place” (ibid., 54).
36. Mintz, “Foreign Policy Decisionmaking,” 215. The consensus o f  the contributors to this collection 
is that these approaches are not competing, but rather are complementary.
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knowledge upon which decisions are made, not the mental processes that are used to 
formulate them. While examination of the latter issue is an important effort, I leave it to 
others.
Having selected appropriate understandings of power and coercion, and having 
concluded that decision-making is not an entirely rational process; the discussion may 
now consider how these theoretical constructs apply to the existing international 
environment. I will examine the systems approach in some detail in Chapter IV.
However, for the sake of clarity in this discussion related to linkages, broad elements of 
power, i.e., political, economic, military, and social, I will refer to as systems. This 
perspective provides a basis upon which to develop further the suppositions that provide 
the foundation of this proposition.
I base this proposition on a primary assumption of the existence of connections 
between elements of national power. The elements are interrelated but are not universally 
substitutable. That is, although economic power may not be metamorphosed directly into 
political power, they both contain interconnected and interrelated elements of the same 
overall system of power. Therefore, by extension, an influence applied upon one of these 
interconnected elements is likely to produce a secondary effect on the other, as well upon 
any nodes or elements connected further within the network.
While this premise will be developed further in subsequent chapters, a brief 
departure is warranted in order to describe the environment where these assumptions 
would be applied. The identification of interrelated sources of power is not a new 
revelation. There is no major epiphany in that realization. The more important question is
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whether this recognition of interrelated elements is transformable into a practical model 
for decision-makers. The issue of linkages, therefore, becomes the next topic to consider.
The Impact o f Linkages
Earlier sections contain the contention that elements of power within a holistic 
system are interrelated. The existence of linkages between elements of national power is 
not often contested. However, transformation of this recognition into an understanding of 
how this condition can influence applications of coercive power is not abundant.
Linkages are the critical element in this analysis, since they provide an indicator of where 
and when secondary effects of actions may occur.
Linkages vary greatly in type of relationship and intensity. Mere geographic 
proximity provides one type of linkage. Tribal or ethnic identity, political allegiance, 
religious sect membership, and economic dependencies also provide some type of 
connection. Evaluation o f linkages includes an awareness of the general nature of the 
relations and interactions that exist between entities. J. David Singer considers these 
linkages to be in the horizontal plane (among entities is the same subsystem) and vertical 
and diagonal planes (linking entities across different sub-system classes). Hence, 
multiple economic entities, e.g., mines, factories, banks, etc., may be related. However, 
each of these also may link to a political leader, foreign supplier, or transportation 
facility.
37. J. David Singer, “The Global System and Its Sub-Systems: A Developmental V iew,” in Linkage 
Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 35. Singer observes the “operational 
substitutability o f  interaction and interdependence, but believes these to be conceptually distinct. That 
distinction is not important to this discussion and both types o f  relationships will be included as indicators 
o f linkages. Additionally, he does not “consider it useful or necessary to define the boundaries among 
social, economic, or political phenomena” (ibid., 24). “It makes little sense to differentiate between polity, 
economy, and society, intertwined as they are, unless one is trapped in a ‘functionalist’ matrix” (ibid., 30).
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Figure 1 provides a simplified illustration. It depicts three subsystems: economic, 
political, and social. Each box represents an entity within one of those subsystems. The 




Figure 1. Linkages within and across Subsystems
Economic entity E2 is interrelated with another economic node (E3). It also relates to an 
entity within the political subsystem (P2), as well as a social node (S2). For example, E2 
could be a major industrial facility. It links to P2, for example, because the factory owner 
is a political supporter of the prime minister. E2 also connects to S2, which could be an 
ethnic group that comprises the majority of the factory’s workforce. Hence, an action 
taken with the intent of influencing E2 may also produce a second order effect on E3, P2, 
and S2; and third order effects on the elements connected to those entities, e.g., P3 and 
PI.
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This simple illustration appears to provide no major intellectual challenges. 
Reasonable estimates of where secondary effects can occur may be readily determined. 
However, because some entities have multiple linkages, the results of an action upon one 
of these, e.g., E2, produces results that are indeterminate. This exacerbates the analytical 
challenge further in actual applications since even the least industrially and 
technologically advanced nations have a number of entities and linkages that defy precise 
analysis. Thus, an understanding of the impact of linkages is no simple task.
In 1969 Rousenau observed, “political science as an intellectual discipline has yet 
to develop theoretical constructs for explaining the relations between the units it 
investigates and their environments.”38 He defines linkage, “as any recurrent sequence of 
behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another.”39 Nearly thirty years 
later, Robert Jervis opined, “In politics, connections are often more idiosyncratic, but 
their existence guarantees that here too most actions, no matter how well targeted, will 
have multiple effects.”40 The existence of multiple effects resulting from the linkages 
between elements justifies the conclusion that reductionist approaches and methods that 
employ a linear analysis are not suitable for the determination of secondary effects of 
actions. Before assessing currently available tools as inadequate, it is important to define 
the uses for which they are lacking.
38. James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 4. 
Advocating more work in this arena, he argues, “The need for linkage theory is multidimensional.” The 
examples suggest that political analysis would be “greatly facilitated if propositions that link the stability, 
functioning, institutions, and goals o f  national political systems to variables in their external environments 
could be systematically developed (ibid., 7).
39. Ibid., 45. He distinguishes between outputs, which are conventionally called a nation’s foreign 
policy, with inputs, or the reaction in the other system. In this reactive process, the behavior o f  the latter is 
a response to the actions o f  the former.
40. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 571. He cautions against the 
inappropriate use o f  reductionism and rejects the reductionist claim that “the system is ‘nothing’ but 
individual behaviors” (ibid., 573).
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Utilization of coercive power with the objective of changing behavior through 
manipulating perceptions o f costs and benefits requires knowledge o f the adversary’s 
system of power. The decision as to what course to undertake requires determination of a 
cause and effect relationship, i.e., what action will produce the desired effect? In the 
simple physical world, this relationship may be readily determined. In a vacuum, 
application of a force will result in a predictable effect. However, when environmental 
conditions are considered, such predictions become more problematic. When we add 
multiple actions to the equation, then the foreknowledge of results becomes even more 
imprecise. Since these conditions exist in the world in which the decision-maker must 
operate, the process is complicated and simple solutions are impracticable.
At the outermost limits of the range of options are two radically diverse 
alternatives. The first is to declare the quandary to be too challenging, and to abandon the 
idea of ever being able to develop practical models and methods that can aid the policy 
maker. The other extreme is to inappropriately oversimplify the situation, ignore the 
complicating factors, and assume the absence of nonlinear conditions. The former course 
involves surrender to complexity, and does not provide much opportunity for further 
productive analysis. However, an exploration into the common errors associated with the 
attempts at the latter course, including the peril inherent in ignoring the impact of 
complex conditions, is worthy of additional consideration and will be examined next.
Complexity and Linear Analysis
Determination of any compatibility between complexity and linear analysis first 
requires a common understanding of the terms. Simple cause and effect relationships,
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where an action taken upon A produces a constant influence on B are considered to be 
linear. Such relationships are readily understood and present uncomplicated solutions. In 
those situations, the use of linear methods to predict outcomes of actions is apposite. 
However, when we add a third variable to the equation the relationships become complex 
and such applications are no longer valid. Nevertheless, there is temptation to ignore 
these complicating factors and to apply linear analysis processes even when conditions of 
linearity do not exist. This incongruity between linear methods and complex systems is 
the focus of this section.
A primary objective o f this chapter is to respond to the first question in the 
hypothesis statement, i.e., to determine if systems of national power are nonlinear and 
complex. Atkins describes the international system as “a complex political, military, 
economic, and social structure of both power and interdependence.”41 Further 
complicating the analysis, a complex system is dynamic, i.e., the condition of the system 
is time dependent. Although the interactions between components are complex, the 
constituent parts are not the most important factors. Rather the system as a whole and 
how the parts interact with each other, are most significant. The central contention of this 
section is that complexity does not hold up to linear analysis. Hence, more readily 
comprehensible linear approaches fall short in providing an understanding of how 
systems function. Support of this argument warrants a brief discussion of linearity and its 
limitations.
41. G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1995), 4. He later provides justification for this assessment: “Capability analysis, which is crucial to foreign 
policy formulation at several stages o f  the process, is partly an inventory o f  relative strengths and 
weaknesses as measured by a state’s military, economic, political and other resources “ (ibid., 11).
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A prima facie characteristic of a linear system is that the whole is merely the sum 
of its parts. In mathematical terms, a linear system is one in which all observations of a 
given variable plot as a straight line (hence, linear) against the observations of a second 
variable. No variable is raised to a power other than one.42 Beyerchen succinctly provides 
two requirements for a system to be linear: proportionality and additivity,43 The 
proportionality aspect means that the effect o f actions upon dependent variables directly 
relates to the change in the independent variable. Replication may be possible, and the 
linkage between cause and effect may be established. Behaviors may be understood and 
predicted. Solutions to linear equations are known.44
While neat, clear, and relatively easily understood, the use of linear analysis has 
limited use in the complex world characterized by systems with multiple components and 
interactions. Herein resides the danger to the analysis. John Casti discerns that many 
inherently nonlinear processes are treated like linear phenomena until some type of 
catastrophic event forces acknowledgement of the “effect of the nonlinear structure on 
the system behavior.”45
42. Garnett P. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed (Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press, 1997), 458. The 
equation: Y = a + bX; where b gives the amount o f  change in Y when X increases by one unit, most simply 
expresses linearity. See David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences (New York: Routledge, 
1998), 18-20, for a clear expansion o f  the relationship, and its limitations in the examination o f  complex 
systems.
43. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War,” 62. “If the behavior o f  a 
system can appropriately be broken into parts that can be compartmentalized it may be classified as linear, 
even if  it is described by a complicated equation with many terms.” He also offers, “linear systems are 
often restrictive narrow and brittle” and “seldom very adaptive under significant changes in their 
environment.” Alan Beyerchen “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance o f  Imagery,” in Complexity, 
Global Politics, and National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, 1997). 162.
44. For readable elaborations on the impact o f  nonlinearity on the analysis o f  systems, see Glenn E. 
James, Chaos Theory: The Essentials fo r  M ilitary Applications (Newport, RI: Naval War College, Center 
for Naval Warfare Studies, 1996).
45. John Casti, Nonlinear System Theory (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, Inc., 1985), 1. He notes that 
the tools o f  linear analysis are quite well developed, while those for nonlinear phenomena have until 
recently been “feeble and fragmentary at best.” His text focuses on the mathematical tools for describing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
In the assessment of the systems of power, the interaction of the component 
elements makes the system nonlinear, not their size or numbers. National systems of 
power—ranging from the largest, most populous, and industrialized nations, to those 
furthest away on the developmental spectrum—may display complexity.
Regardless of the number of the categories selected for analysis, all nations have 
some type of political, economic, and social components. Although the interactions 
between these elements can vary greatly in scope, intensity, and frequency, every nation 
possesses these, and therefore their system of power may be regarded as complex. Eve 
Mitleton-Kelly recognizes this relationship between interactive components and linearity, 
and she offers, “Complex behavior arises from the inter-relationship, interaction, and 
inter-connectivity of elements within a system and its environment.”46 Therefore, 
complex systems are not linear. That conclusion requires additional evidence and further 
development of the condition of nonlinearity.
Nonlinearitv
Simply stated, nonlinearity is the antithesis of linearity, i.e., that which is not 
linear. The determination of that situation is of critical importance to the decision-maker. 
In conditions o f nonlinearity, we cannot extrapolate, change scale, or project; and we 
cannot disassemble and combine the elements together again to provide a view of the 
whole. Nonlinear conditions require differential equations; most differential equations are 
not amenable to solution. Most importantly, an action taken to affect a nonlinear system
and understanding nonlinear relationships, and can provide additional detail for those with sufficient 
background to comprehend the equations.
46. Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Systems, ed. Eve Mitleton- 
Kelly (Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science LTD, 2003), 26.
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becomes a part of that system. As Glieck observes, “Nonlinearity means that the act o f 
playing the game has a way of changing the rules.”47
Nonlinear does not mean random. Nor are nonlinear systems always disorderly. 
There may be order in the whole event although the components appear to be in disorder. 
I will discuss this order embedded in apparently chaotic systems further in Chapter III.
W. Mitchell Waldrop observes that methods that reduce the world to a simple 
system, where two or three laws explain a complicated environment, use Newtonian 
physics as a model and have been the foundation of scientific endeavors up until the 
twentieth century. However, while potentially useful in the analysis of linear systems, 
this reductionist, or Cartesian approach, possesses significant limitations when examining 
nonlinear phenomena.
Diana Richards observes that nonlinear relationships imply that an independent 
variable does not have a constant effect on the dependent variable. Manifestations of 
nonlinear relations are, “lack of closed-form solutions, complex and varying dynamics, 
sensitivity to initial conditions, and the possibility of multiple outcomes or dynamic 
patterns.”48 David Bearce adds, “Nonlinearity also means that the direction of the 
relationship between two or more variables may not be the same across all cases.”49 
Chapter I introduced the proposition that a holistic approach to assessments of 
national power can provide an organized means for analysis. However, if  incorrectly 
applied, even an appropriate methodology can result in erroneous or even
47. Gleick, Chaos, 15.
48. Diana Richards, Political Complexity: Nonlinear M odels o f  Politics, ed. Diana Richards (Ann 
Arbor: The University o f  Michigan Press, 2000), 1.
49. David H. Bearce, “Economic Sanctions and Neural Networks: Forecasting Effectiveness and 
Reconsidering Cooperation,” in Political Complexity: Nonlinear M odels o f  Politics, ed. Diana Richards 
(Ann Arbor: The University o f  Michigan Press, 2000), 270. He also observes, “Nonlinearity means that an 
independent variable, such as the ambition o f  the sender’s goal, should not be expected to have a ‘constant’ 
effect on sanctions effectiveness (the dependent variable) over time.”
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counterproductive results. The most common errors are adoption o f a reductionist 
approach, application of linear methods to nonlinear problem, and expectations of the 
ability to predict phenomena that are beyond the capabilities of the available tools. I will 
consider each of these in turn.
Limitations of the Reductionist Approach
This condition of nonlinearity has denied political scientists the ability to provide 
useful explanations or, to a lesser extent, predictions o f the effects o f actions. In the 
physical sciences, one method aimed at an understanding of complex systems is 
deconstructing the elements parts of these into smaller, more manageable pieces. 
Consequently, examination of the characteristics of its parts and their interactions results 
in understanding of the whole. This typically describes a reductionist approach; reducing 
the unwieldy whole to its component parts in order to enable analysis. However, the use 
of a similar scheme when dealing with complex nonlinear systems is inappropriate and 
subject to significant limitations.
Waltz argues, “If we follow the reductionist route, we can deal only with pieces of 
problems.”50 Similarly, Jervis contends, “seeking to understand the system by looking 
only at the units and their relations to each other is not appropriate.” 51 Supporting this 
viewpoint and providing a historical perspective, Beyerchen adds “Traditional analysis 
that is aimed at breaking the system into simpler parts fails now just as surely as it did in
50. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 4. While reductionism historically has been a major 
component o f  scientific exploration, he contends that its effectiveness “rests on nothing more than faith.”
51. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 573. He also cautions, “Because 
o f  the prevalence o f  inter-connections, we cannot understand systems by summing the characteristics o f  the 
parts or the bilateral relations between pairs o f  them.” See also Jervis, System Effects, 5 1.
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Clausewitz’s time, and for the same reasons.”52 A leading proponent in the development 
of complexity theory, Murray Gell-Mann, also cautions, “It is not sufficient to think of 
the system in terms of parts or aspects identified in advance, then to analyze those parts 
or aspects separately, and finally to combine those analyses in an attempt to describe the 
entire system.”53 It is helpful to consider some historical illustrations.
Examples where the sum of the parts was different from the whole abound within 
the context of assessments of national power. An appraisal of the relative economic and 
military strengths of the seventeenth century Spain provides but one. The gold obtained 
from its conquests in the western hemisphere made Spain a major economic power. 
However, this wealth was of little value if the transshipment was vulnerable to British 
privateers. Their economic power allowed Spain to build a powerful Armada. The naval 
power it represented in turn allowed her to protect the gold shipments and enabled further 
exploitation of American resources. Hence, the components of economic power 
(characterized by gold and silver bullion) and military power (manifested by naval 
frigates and ships of the line) were mutually supporting. It is not possible to develop an 
accurate assessment of the overall national power of Spain through mere addition of the 
components.
As observed earlier, the economic and military components of a nation’s power 
are intertwined, interactive, and interdependent. Unless there is a benefactor or sponsor 
nation that will provide the instruments of military power, the ability to develop, man, 
and equip a robust military force is dependent upon economic assets. Similarly, a nation
52. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War,” 82. The reasons for this 
failure are “interconnectedness and context, interaction, chance, complexity, indistinct boundaries feedback 
on effects and so on, all leading to analytical unpredictability.”
53. Murray Gell-Mann, “The Simple and the Complex,” in Complexity, G lobal Politics, and National 
Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 
1997), 19.
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that cannot protect its economic wealth from military threats will not possess these for 
very long, as was the case o f Spain’s American colonies. Therefore, the relationship is 
synergistic, i.e., the mutually supporting nature of the components makes the whole 
different from the sum of the parts. As a result, analysts must undertake any 
decomposition into smaller units with great care and discipline.
Decomposition efforts must utilize a firm grasp of the potential contributions, as 
well as what it can and cannot offer. Beyerchen articulates this concern: “The purpose of 
theory is to untangle confusion by creating distinctions, but to do so in order to 
understand the whole better, not for the sake of pedantic analytical 
compartmentalization.”54 Despite these limitations, the reductionist approach continues to 
be applied, even if not explicitly, to attempts to understand complex systems. Although 
several explanations exist, among the most plausible is the natural desire for simplicity. 
This emerges because, as Langdon Winner observes, “The systems in which we live are 
far too complicated as yet for our intellectual powers and technology to understand.”55
The decomposition of large systems into more manageable sub-elements need not 
be a binary, yes or no,. In some instances, reductionist techniques may be advantageous. 
Ian King sees a role for some use of reductionism and cautions against “Throwing out the 
baby of micro-level analysis with the bathwater of a rigidly reductionist mechanism.”56
54. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War.” 59-90. Although he allows 
for some use o f  compartmentalization for analysis, he warns o f  its dangers, p. 82. He adds, “Theorists must 
not be seduced into formulating analytically deductive, prescriptive sets o f  doctrines that offer poor hope 
and worse guidance” (ibid., 87).
55. Langdon Winner, Organized Social Complexity, ed. Todd R. La Porte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), 40. Attributed to C. West Churchman. Although human intellectual powers remain 
relatively constant, unarguably there have been significant advances in technology since that time that 
reduce the impact o f  this observation.
56. Ian T. King, Social Science and Complexity (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2000), 
xii. He argues against the Newtonian-positivist-behaviorist worldview and a “horizon-narrowing, 
rigidifying mechanistic reductionism,” which he defines in terms o f  a worldview. “The universe is 
essentially mechanistic, processes in the universe and relations between entities are reductionistic, the
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Waltz, Beyerchen, Jervis, Gel-Mann, et al, have clearly articulated the dangers 
inherent with the use o f a reductionist approach. These are not to be discounted. 
Therefore, the methodology presented in Chapter V seriously considers this aspect of 
reductionism. While inappropriate for many purposes, decomposition into components is 
a worthwhile analytical tool, as long as one acknowledges its limits. With this 
examination of reductionism complete, it is now time to move on to the next common 
error and threat to effective analysis.
Inappropriate Uses of Linear Analysis
If systems of power are complex, and complex systems are typically nonlinear, it 
does not necessarily follow that no aspects o f the system include some linearity. The 
danger to the analysis is not the result of the use of linear techniques; rather, it is their 
inappropriate utilization. Linear solutions at times are applied to nonlinear situations.
The result has been incomplete, inaccurate, and unsupportable analysis and the inability 
to explain the effects of actions. This condition is particularly problematic in assessment 
of national power. Recognizing this, Beyerchen contributes, “Linearity is excellent for 
the systems we design to behave predictably, but offers a narrow window on most natural 
and social systems.”57 Despite these limitations, the use of the linear approach is not 
universally discredited, and there may be cases where its employment is appropriate.
When utilized correctly, and with effective measurement criteria, linear analysis 
provides part of, but not all of the solution. Any analysis of national power that did not 
include tangible and quantifiable factors would revert to entirely subjective judgments.
whole is reducible to its foundational parts, basic units are discrete and isolatable, and causation is direct, 
local and concrete” (ibid., 7).
57. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War,” 162.
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Assessments of power usually involve some degree of capability analysis. Atkins 
describes this as partly an “inventory of relative strengths and weaknesses as measured
c o
by a state’s military, economic, political, and other resources.”
Certain elements of power may be accurately depicted using linear means. 
Compilations o f numbers o f tanks, aircraft, missiles, and ships provide an input into the 
equation of military power. Similarly, natural resources, population, and education level 
are subject to empirical analysis and comprise an important part of any economic 
assessment. However, as Nye contends, even “economic power cannot be measured 
simply in terms of tangible resources.”59 The problem becomes more acute when other 
elements of power are considered. Development of quantifiable measures of soft power 
components such as culture, religion, and ideology is exceptionally difficult. The most 
deleterious effects result not from use of linear methods, but from the over reliance upon 
and misuse of these techniques.
Despite these serious limitations, linearity should not be totally absent from the 
consideration of national power. Aware of this potential for use in the economic arena, 
Bearce provides, “Linear statistics may be useful to infer broad relationships, but the 
approach obscures any nonlinear patterns that may be hidden in their (mostly ordinal 
level) sanctions data.”60
There is a temporal aspect also to be considered. Cederman contends, “As long as 
the analyst studies sufficiently short periods of time, the linear approximation is likely to
58. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System , 11. While acknowledging the impact o f  
environmental factors, he urges skepticism o f  theories o f  environmental determinism.
59. Nye, “The Changing Nature o f  World Power,” 180. Factors such as relative costs and vulnerabilities 
are also essential components o f  economic power.
60. Bearce, “Economic Sanctions and Neural Networks,” 272.
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be helpful even in the presence of nonlinearity in the real world.”61 However, in the 
assessment of systems of national power, a longer-term view must be taken, particularly 
when examining the potential for secondary effects. Hence, the result is that most, but not 
all, linear solutions must be rejected.
This is particularly true in the understanding of the secondary effects of actions. 
While it is possible to predict the impact of a single action, the additional effects that 
result from that action are far more difficult to ascertain. For example, a naval enforced 
embargo may produce the desired effect of reducing a nation’s ability to import strategic 
materials that are vital to an armament industry; however, it also may produce unintended 
effects that run counter to the initial objective of the embargoing nations. While the 
constriction of vital materials may negatively affect economic and military power, 
increased domestic political support for the targeted regime also may be a repercussion of 
the embargo. This is because of the linkage of one element o f power (the general 
population) with the element influenced by the action (vital imported commodities). The 
disbanding of the Iraqi Army after the 2003 Gulf War provided the desired effect of 
removing a military threat. However, because of the complex linkage between the 
military and the political elements of power in Iraq, the action produced the unintended 
effect of leaving the nation without a viable internal security apparatus.
In these illustrations military and economic actions had unforeseen political 
effects due to the complexity of the environment. This dilemma resulted from the 
connections (or linkages) within and across elements of power in a complex environment. 
The consequence was the emergence of secondary effects that could not be satisfactorily 
understood completely using linear models.
61. Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics, 43.
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As in the case of the use of reductionism examined in the previous section, we 
should not totally reject utilization of linear analysis techniques. In assessments of 
national power, some relationships will be linear, and their use is appropriate and can 
benefit the analysis. However, due to the complexity that exists in most systems of 
national power, the occurrences of purely linear relationships are likely to be few. With 
this caution against an over reliance upon and the misuse of linear techniques established, 
the discussion may now proceed to the issue of how the condition of nonlinearity affects 
the ability to foresee the effect of actions.
Expectations of Predictability
While not always an essential product of academic inquiry, especially in the 
social sciences, the ability to transform an understanding of events and outcomes into 
practical extrapolative tools is potentially valuable to the decision-maker. Some argue 
that development of an ability to forecast outcomes is an essential objective for a 
scientific endeavor. Michael Young contends, “If political science cannot generate 
predictive theory, then any capacity for intervention in the world, for good or evil, is 
lost.”62 While he acknowledges that there is value in understanding why a particular 
person acted in a certain way, the goal should be higher. James Voss views prediction as 
“a rather lofty positivist goal,” and contends, “prediction and control have been the 
watchwords o f being ‘scientific.”63 The objective should be to acquire at least a modicum
62. Michael D. Young, “Representing Problem Representation,” in Problem Representation in Foreign 
Policy Decision Making, ed. Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 244. His essay attempts to provide an answer to, “can the “effectiveness o f  economic 
sanctions be forecast using the currently available case study data?”
63. James F. Voss, “On the Representation o f  Problems: An Information-Processing Approach to 
Foreign Policy Decision Making,” in Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. 
Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23. He
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of predictive power that would provide some ability to intervene in processes to influence 
outcomes. Although this goal is a worthy one, it remains elusive.
Nye sees an inverse relationship between complexity and predictability resulting 
from a density of networks that are “increasingly complex, and their effects are therefore 
increasingly unpredictable.”64 Due to its simplicity and apparent explanatory power, at 
times an understanding of linear relationships is extended in order to provide predictions 
of future results. Pure deductive reasoning is applied. If action A repeatedly produces 
effect B, then it may be expected to do so in the future. And if action C is similar to A, 
then C also is likely to produce B. In conditions of linearity, this is a reasonable 
conclusion. However, in dealing with the application of power, the limitations of this 
logic are apparent. In relations between nations, especially in those involving applications 
of coercive power, few actions are repeated precisely, and the environments in which 
they occur vary considerably.
A basic tenet of American foreign policy in the second half o f the twentieth 
century was the professed lesson from Chamberlain’s 1938 capitulation in Munich and 
the discredited policy of appeasement. While the predicted outcome of a dictator being 
emboldened by acquiescence to threats and demands may have been valid when applied 
to Nazi Germany, this conviction often was applied incorrectly in diverse regions and 
under political conditions that did not fit. That is not to say that domino theories are 
always incorrect, only that they are not universally applicable.
acknowledges, “prediction is quite difficult in any subject matter domain and only possible under highly 
controlled circumstances.”
64. Nye, The Paradox o f  American Power, 86. He refers to the density o f  the networks o f  
interdependence as part o f  a “thickness o f  globalism.”
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Warfare represents the ultimate application of coercive power. The inability to 
predict accurately the outcomes of armed conflict has long been recognized. The 
nineteenth century strategist, Karl Von Clausewitz, recognized the limitations inherent in 
our ability to predict the outcome of a conflict and described war as, “inherently a 
nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct of which changes its character in ways that cannot be 
analytically predicted.”65 Despite the technological transformations in warfare, the 
capability to predict the consequences of actions in conflict has not improved 
dramatically since the days of Bismarck. The critical element that is missing is an ability 
to determine when reasoned inferences may be properly utilized and when the level of 
understanding is attained that is sufficient to provide at least some minimal predictive 
capability. Complexity and nonlinearity have an impact on the ability to relate effect to 
cause.
Bearce identifies limitations in the ability o f some economic actions to provide 
even the primary intended effect: “Past efforts to explain and forecast the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions using traditional linear statistical methods have been remarkably 
unspectacular.”66 In modern societies, it is exceptionally difficult to segregate economic 
elements from those in the political and social spheres. Hence, it is particularly hard to 
assess or predict the resultant secondary effects of actions taken against economic nodes.
The primary explanation for the failure of linear solutions to provide a sufficient 
level o f understanding and predictability is that in applications o f coercive power the 
equations typically are complex and nonlinear. The elements of power are not isolated
65. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War,” 82. He adds, “linear 
relations and the predictability they offer are the exceptions in the real world.”
66. Bearce, “Economic Sanctions and Neural Networks: Forecasting Effectiveness and Reconsidering 
Cooperation,” 269.
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and do not exist in a vacuum; they are interrelated and interconnected. Therefore, an 
action taken upon one is likely to produce an effect on the elements to which it is 
connected. Simple cause and effect relationships are rare and, as some argue, nonexistent. 
Jervis contends, “the effects of actions are always multiple”67 This condition applies 
across all elements of international politics and is particularly evident is the uses of 
power.
The application coercion to change the behavior of an adversary may produce its 
intended effect in the near term, but may also produce an unintended effect in another 
area. Because of the geographic linkages, threats may also result in driving a neighboring 
state into a larger adversary’s camp. A power relay station may be a legitimate military 
target; however, since it may also provide electricity to a civilian hospital, its destruction 
or incapacitation may have far-reaching effects on the population’s willingness to resist 
and on world opinion.
In another illustration, if the desired effect is to reduce the funding available to 
insurgents, then the destruction of an opium processing facility may temporarily disrupt 
the trade in heroin that supports them. However, if  the revenue obtained by the poppy 
cultivation is the sole source of income of a tribal group, the action may also generate 
economic, social, and political effects that run counter to overall objectives.
Because of the linkages and the resulting complications, complexity is the rule 
rather than the exception. Consequently, understanding and predictability in a macro 
sense has proven elusive. If concentration on the whole is not productive, then perhaps a
67. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 570. In System Effects, 2, Jervis 
cites multiple examples across the spectrum o f human interaction: welfare can decrease the incentives to 
work; providing housing for the homeless may draw additional homeless to that locality; subsidized flood 
insurance encourages building in areas prone to flooding; and increased defense spending sometimes 
results in making the adversary more belligerent.
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focus on the connections between individual elements may provide an option worthy of 
consideration. The danger of falling into a reductionist trap is apparent. However, 
decomposition into more readily examined components to determine the linkages within 
and across systems can provide some useful insights— if applied carefully and with 
awareness of the limitations.
Summation
This chapter provided a basic review of terms and definitions and a suitable 
lexicon for use in the development o f the methodology. This required a brief examination 
o f power, its theoretical foundations, and components, and how it may be applied to 
influence the behavior of other actors. Despite the lack of a universally accepted 
definition, I referred to this type of application of power as coercion.
This led in to a brief consideration of the principal factors in decision-making. I 
determined that decision-makers employ a synthesis of rational and cognitive techniques 
in the use of coercive power. However, regardless of the intellectual domain selected, 
knowledge is an important factor in effective decision-making related to the employment 
of coercion.
While the overall system of power is most critical, this macro view is not 
receptive to analysis. Hence, some decomposition into components is justified. The 
elements of power were deemed not be universally fungible, however, they are 
characteristically interconnected. The first task in the hypothesis statement was to 
determine if systems of national power are nonlinear and complex. In response, based on 
the evidence presented, the conclusion is that these conditions of nonlinearity and
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complexity do indeed exist. Illustrations of linkages within and across systems provided 
substantiation. These multiple connections between elements make the overall system of 
power complex.
Although some linearity exists within these subsystems, due to the existence of 
interrelated components and subcomponents, the conclusion presented is that the 
relationships are not universally amenable to linear analysis. This condition makes 
understanding of potential secondary effects exceptionally difficult. This problem has 
confounded those who must make decisions regarding the exercise of power. Multiple 
examples of deleterious unintended effects are evident. Some of these will be examined 
in the case studies to follow. If the only available tools are reductionist techniques and 
linear solutions, the worthy goal of a consistent ability to predict outcomes remains 
unattainable.
This leads to the conclusion of a need for an improved method of assessing 
complex nonlinear systems. However, even in the physical sciences, development of 
adequate explanations of nonlinear phenomena is embryonic; and these are near non­
existent in the realm of international relations and foreign policy analysis.68 This is the 
primary reason why a fresh approach to the problem is worthy of pursuit. An initial step 
must be to examine the work in other disciplines with the objective of determining if 
there are applications to the assessment of national power. An investigation into 
approaches to nonlinearity in other academic disciplines is, therefore, important to this
68. Among the exceptions to this generalization are: Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences', 
Alvin Saperstein, “Chaos: A Model for the Outbreak o f  War,” Nature, 24 May 1984: Alvin Saperstein, 
“War and Chaos,” American Scientist 83 no. 6 (November-December 1995); Keith Warren, “New  
Directions in System Theory: Chaos and Complexity,” Social Work, July 1998; and, Nicanor Austriaco, 
“Causality within Complexity,” The Journal o f  Interdisciplinary Studies XI (1999).
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discussion. The overarching concepts are contained in complexity and chaos theory, 
which is the focus of Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III 
THE ANALYSIS OF NONLINEAR SYSTEMS
A conclusion reached in the previous chapter was that national systems of power 
are complex and nonlinear. The significance of that condition is that development of an 
effective understanding of the effects of coercive actions and the secondary consequences 
resulting from those acts requires utilization of some form of nonlinear analysis. The 
objective of this chapter is to begin to respond to the second question in the hypothesis 
statement, i.e., can approaches recently developed in mathematics and the physical 
sciences contribute to enhanced understanding of nonlinear systems?
While scholars have long recognized the challenge of understanding the 
consequences of actions when nonlinear relationships exist, it was only in the mid­
twentieth century that scientists attempted to discover order out of the apparent disorder 
of nonlinearity.1 Two broad paradigms represent the vast majority o f academic discourse 
in this area. Hence, chaos and complexity will be the central focus of the exploration of 
nonlinear systems presented in this chapter. This will require an analysis and assessment 
of their potential for their application to the understanding of the effects of actions.
Some argue that there is nothing new here, and that chaos and complexity have
'y
always existed, albeit “sometimes obscured to many, but always recognized by some.” 
Others see chaos-complexity as an “overdramatized fad,” “too vague or cult-like,” or
1. In the late 1800’s, French mathematician Jules Henri Poncaire was frustrated in his attempt to predict 
the behavior o f  as few as three interacting spheres.
2. Alvin Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools?” in 
Complexity, G lobal Politics, and National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997), 104.
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“just another conceptual spin around the block.”3 Despite the lack o f a clearly defined 
and firmly established academic discipline of chaos-complexity, or widespread 
acknowledgement of the potential for its extension into the social sciences, there are 
examples of attempts to apply the principles of chaos and complexity into realms beyond 
mathematics.
Samir Rihani contends, “Assimilation o f nonlinearity is now well established 
within the natural and life sciences,” and has begun to “spill slowly into the social 
sciences.”4 Voicing a similar view, T. Irene Sanders offers that the “science of chaos 
theory and complexity is providing us with information about the dynamics of change in 
the real world.”5 Concurring with this outlook, historian Roger Beaumont states, “Interest 
in nonlinearity, chaos, and complexity has intensified since the mid-1970s.”6 Hence, 
application of these principles into the social sciences has precedent.
While possessing some similarities, chaos and complexity have several important 
differences. Consequently, I will examine each separately. The assessments of both chaos 
and complexity will follow a pattern of: (1) definition and explanation, (2) presentation of 
characteristics of each that may have practical application to the task of understanding 
secondary effects, and, (3) identification of limitations and hindrances to their 
incorporation into the process. Both chaos and complexity are expansive concepts, with a 
sizeable amount of research and analysis already applied to them. As with the 
examinations of national power, coercion, and linearity provided in Chapter II, these
3. Roger Beaumont, War, Chaos and History (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 3, 10, and 185.
4. Samir Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice (New York: Zed Books Ltd,
2002), 7.
5. T. Irene Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 5.
6. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, 3. He credits advances in information technology with enabling 
the enhanced exploitation o f  nonlinear phenomenon. In a later work he observes that historians and social 
scientists “have turned to chaos-complexity for images and metaphor” See Roger Beaumont, The Nazi's 
March to Chaos (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 5.
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sections will drill only deep enough to support the concluding evaluation of the potential 
for application of the principles of the theories. However, evaluation of relevance 
requires an establishment of a fundamental level of knowledge and familiarity with the 
terminology. Additionally, it is important for those whose expertise is outside the realm 
of mathematics and the physical sciences to develop at least a basic understanding of the 
lexicon and foundation of these approaches. Hence, I dedicate some time to extant views 
on both chaos and complexity. However, the primary objective remains to determine the 
existence of a concept or way of looking at organization, structure, and function that may 
be relevant to assessments of national power.
The chapter will conclude with a return to the hypothesis question and will 
address the potential for applying the principles o f nonlinear analysis to the primary 
objective of the proposition, i.e., the development of an understanding of the secondary 
effects of actions. The objective here is not to condense the whole host of volumes of 
sometimes very technical material into a restricted number of pages. Rather it is to probe 
into these theories to determine if there is any realistic potential for incorporation of some 
of the principles contained within chaos-complexity into the process of determination of 
the effects of coercive actions.
Before proceeding further, a brief divergence from the chapter outline is 
appropriate in order to provide some qualifying remarks. Much of the work in chaos and 
complexity theory has been accomplished in mathematics, meteorology, physics, and 
biology. Consequently, the lexicon, processes, and subject area content might be 
unfamiliar to those whose background, experience, and interests are in political science or 
international studies.
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The intended users of the methodology proposed by this dissertation are national 
security analysts and decision-makers, many o f whom, while capable and intelligent, may 
not possess formal schooling in higher mathematics, physics, or engineering. This 
requires conducting this investigation into chaos and complexity at a level that is 
generally understandable to an educated person regardless of academic discipline.
There is no condescension here. Some of the more distinguished figures in the social 
sciences have admitted their struggle with some of the concepts and equations contained 
in chaos and complexity theory.7 Indeed, this is professed as a reason why there has not 
been an abundance of application of these theories into the social sciences. Hence, I 
present this analysis from the perspective o f a non-mathematician.
Nevertheless, the concepts and mathematics associated with the study of 
complexity, and particularly with chaos, are complicated enough so that a few readers 
will find even this simplified presentation challenging. The qualification statement is 
complete. The focus of the outline may now return to the central topics and issues.
What possible benefits could accrue from examination of nonlinear systems? Are 
the skeptics correct, and are chaos and complexity merely vague and loosely constructed 
and coupled concepts without any serious potential for exploitation? Diana Richards 
would not agree. She argues, “The ramifications of nonlinearity have not been 
sufficiently realized,” and believes that “one can gain explanatory power by considering
7. Among these are Robert Jervis. The list includes myself, not as a notable in the field, but as a 
national security analyst with limited exposure to advanced mathematics or expertise in the physical 
sciences. Certainly, there are multiple exceptions to this broad generalization. For instances where these 
concepts have been applied outside o f  the hard sciences, see David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the 
Social Sciences (New York: Routledge, 1998). Among his relevant observations: “Chaos theory is founded 
on the mathematics o f  nonlinear systems. Economists and political scientists have applied chaos theory 
with considerable mathematical rigor and success to the temporal dynamics o f  a variety o f  phenomena in 
their fields” (ibid., 2-3).
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endogenous interactions and relationships.”8 That acquisition of illuminating capability is 
the primary goal of the proposed methodology. The vital undertaking for this chapter is to 
explore the possibility: “If chaos-complexity theory enhances our ability to identify 
patterns and steer the crafting of history only a point or two closer toward absolute truth, 
that might put it ahead of the other models of the past.”9 With the chapter outline and 
objectives presented, and the necessary qualifying explanation provided, the discussion 
may now directly address the first of the nonlinear theories for consideration—chaos.
Chaos
Chaos is also known as dynamical instability. Some view it somewhat 
conservatively as “a new mathematical approach that allows scientists to study the 
behavior of nonlinear systems.”10 Others are more generous in their outlook. In 1990, 
Heinz-Otto Peitgen observed, “For many, chaos theory already belongs among the 
greatest achievements in the natural sciences in this century.”11 While this assertion is 
controversial, certainly the emergence of theories of chaos has provided an impetus to 
discussions within the scientific community across a wide range of disciplines.
Its most notable popularizer, James Gleick, views chaos as an expansive idea. 
“Chaos has become not just a theory but also a method, not just a canon of beliefs but
8. Diana Richards, “Nonlinear Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Stability in International 
Environmental Agreements,” in Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models o f  Politics, ed. Diana Richards 
(Ann Arbor: The University o f  Michigan Press, 2000), 2.
9. Beaumont, N a zi’s March to Chaos, 186.
10. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 61.
11. Heinz-Otto Pietgen, “The Causality Principle: Deterministic Laws and Chaos,” in Chaos: The New 
Science, ed. John Holte (Lanham, MD: University Press o f  America, Inc., 1990), 35.
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also a way of doing science.”12 Care is required in dealing with this term, since its 
meaning varies depending upon its context. The word has a broad definition in its general 
usage, and a more constrained and precise elucidation when used in connection with 
modem paradigms aimed at the understanding of nonlinear systems.
First, I will address the more common connotation of chaos. Most widespread 
usages conform to the dictionary “extreme confusion or disorder.” Integrating a set of 
definitions, Beaumont proposes, “an order of infinite complexity: intricate, turbulent, 
multicomponent processes, beyond effective monitoring and reasonable approximate
i ■)
depiction or prediction; cannot be precisely duplicated or simulated;” Chaos implies 
randomness, instability and unpredictability. While these characterizations are suitable 
for non-technical discussion, the genesis of the new theories of chaos requires a more 
precise description.
A vital preliminary task is to differentiate between social chaos and mathematical 
chaos. The former term describes a condition, and is commonly used to indicate a total 
lack of any controlling mechanism, resulting in the absence of social order and the 
emergence of anarchy. It may result from a multiplicity of factors including a variety of 
natural disasters, or by societal upheavals as the result of interstate war or revolution.
In the mathematical usage, chaos is declared by some to be a “new science;” by 
others as “a heterogeneous amalgam of different techniques of mathematics and 
science.”14 Mathematical is the type of chaos that I will examine initially. However, the
12. Gleick, Chaos, 1987), 37. The essential question that an investigation into chaos may provide some 
insight into is how “in a universe ruled by entropy, drawing inexorably toward greater and greater disorder, 
how does order arise” (ibid., 5)?
13. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, xiv.
14. A. B. Cambel, Applied Chaos Theory, 14. The “new science” moniker is used by Gleick, Sanders, 
Holte, et al.
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phenomena are similar in many ways, and the limited transfer o f the principles of 
mathematical chaos to conditions where social chaos is the issue is the central rationale 
for this examination of chaos.
In the 1970’s, some scientists who were not content with the reductionist 
approach considered new models that would provide an enhanced view of the whole and 
could serve to overcome some of reductionism’s perceived limitations. These efforts 
would be loosely combined under the umbrella of Chaos Theory}5 James Gleick, in his 
popular 1987 treatise, Chaos: Making a New Science, provides an excellent entry-level 
overview of this new approach.16 This employment of chaos refers to a much narrower 
understanding of the term, and carries with it its own supporting concepts and lexicon.
Under the more restrictive rubric of Chaos Theory, additional precise definitions 
are provided: Phillip Holmes, “The complicated, aperiodic, attracting orbits of certain 
(usually low-dimensional) dynamical systems; Hao Bai-Lin, “A kind of order without 
periodicity;” H. Bruce Stewart, “Apparently random recurrent behavior in a single 
deterministic (clockwork-like) system;” and, Roderick V. Jensen, “The irregular,
17unpredictable behavior of deterministic, nonlinear dynamical systems.” The field of
18mathematics contributes, “Stochastic behavior occurring in a deterministic system.”
15. Gell-Mann, Quark and the Jaguar, 27, cautions against careless utilization o f  the term, which is 
often incorrectly used as a “catchall expression for any sort o f  real or apparent complexity or uncertainty.” 
For clarity, James, Chaos Theory, 17, suggests the use o f  Chaos to refer to the term in the context o f  the 
paradigm or theory, and the use o f  the lower case chaos in the general use o f  the term. James believes that 
“a Chaotic system must be bounded; nonlinear; non-periodic; and sensitive to small disturbances.” Also see 
Cambel, A pplied Chaos Theory, 16, for a discussion o f  what he considers to be the confusion between 
“chaos” and “chaos theory.” The latter he defines as “a collection o f  mathematical, numerical, and 
geometrical techniques that allows us to deal with nonlinear problems to which there is no explicit general 
solution.” In subsequent references I will use Chaos Theory to describe the most restrictive use o f  the term.
16. Chaos Theories have also been described as “nonlinear dynamics literature.” See Chris C.
Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” esp. 224-26.
17. Gleick, Chaos, 306.
18. John Holte, Chaos: The New Science (Lanham, MD: University Press o f  America, Inc., 1990), viii. 
This statement is seemingly oxymoronic. The system is simultaneously random, but with direction. He
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Douglas Kiel argues, “Chaos is typified by behavior that can, over time, appear 
random and disorderly. However, it occurs with definable parameters or mathematical 
boundaries.”19 Williams offers, “Sustained and random-like long term evolution that 
satisfies certain special mathematical criteria and that happen in deterministic, nonlinear, 
dynamical systems.”20 Deterministic in the sense that behavior follows a rule, and a 
dynamical system being one that changes or evolves over time.
While a review of a selection of contributions is worthwhile, laboring further over 
development or identification of generally accepted descriptions of Chaos does not 
represent the most effective line of attack in development of this analysis. Within the 
context of this study and the objective of this chapter, an acceptable definition is that 
chaos is a condition o f  system nonlinearity that displays apparent disorder and 
randomness, but may also provide some detectible order. Although there is not universal 
acceptance of the precise definition of Chaos, the more important issue to this discourse 
remains the potential applications of the theory. Therefore, it is more productive to focus 
on what its proponents argue it can do, and what its detractors argue that it cannot.
Potential Uses of Chaos Theory
Proponents believe that Chaos Theory could be applied across a wide range of 
disciplines. As the most widely known advocate of the application of Chaos Theory
argues that disagreement abounds among scientists on the definition o f  the term. Gleick, in Chaos, 307, 
describes this phenomenon as “a delicate balance between the forces o f  stability and the forces o f  
instability.
19. Douglas L. M. Kiel, Managing Chaos and Complexity in Government (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers, 1994), 28, provides clarification: “Chaotic does not mean random; nonlinear does not mean 
chaotic.”
20. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 9. Emphasis in original. He defines random as behavior that is 
“based strictly on a chance mechanism, with negligible deterministic effects” (ibid., 12). Citing alternative 
views, he echoes that some consider chaos a mathematical curiosity and that a large group contends, 
“Nobody has yet conclusively found it in the physical world” (ibid., 13).
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contends, “In our world, complexity flourishes and those looking to science for a general 
understanding o f nature’s habits will be better served by the laws of chaos.”21 Supporting 
this view, John Holte believes that “the range of applications of chaos theory is awesome: 
Information processing in the brain, protein formation, cardiac arrhythmias, epidemics,
99  •fluctuations in wildlife populations, business cycles, [and] the arms race.” Also having 
detected applications beyond the mathematical sphere, Kathleen Alligood contends, 
“Chaotic behavior can be observed in experiments and in computer models of behavior in 
all fields o f science.”23 However, due to the relative novelty o f the approach, at this point 
in time there may be more potential than progress toward practical applications in the 
social sciences. From the field of public administration comes the contention that Chaos 
Theory is a “misnomer” and is more properly, “the study of complex, dynamic systems 
that reveal patterns of order out of seemingly chaotic behaviors.”24
Indeed, some contend that Chaos Theory is not a theory in the commonly 
accepted understanding o f the term, “but rather is a frame of reference or a way of 
thinking about complex phenomena.”25 An essential element of Chaos Theory is that 
there is order within apparently totally random and unstructured systems.26 Supporting 
this view, Beaumont contends that there exists within Chaos Theory, “a degree or order
21. Gleick, Chaos, 308.
22. Holte, Chaos, ix. His explanation for the wide range o f  areas that may benefit from applications o f  
chaos theory is that they have a common language, i.e., mathematics.
23. Kathleen T. Alligood, Tim D. Sauer and James A. Yorke, Chaos: An Introduction to Dynamical 
Systems (New York: N ew  York: Springer Verlag New York, Inc., 1996), viii. While this collection 
concentrates on the physical sciences, the authors argue that chaos is a phenomenon that is common 
throughout science.
24. Overman, “The New Sciences o f  Administration,” 487.
25 Kathleen A. Bolland and Charles R. Atherton, “Chaos Theory: An Alternative Approach to Social 
Work Practice and Research,” Families in Society: The Journal o f  Contemporary Human Services 80, no. 4 
(July-August 1999): 367. This article provides an excellent summary o f  the application o f  the new sciences 
to areas beyond mathematics.
26. Gleick, Chaos, 15. Lorenz described this as a “pattern o f  disturbances and orderly disorder.”
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that lies buried within what at first glance looks like random turbulence.”27 The existence 
of evidence to support this order out o f disorder proposition, and the possibility o f 
detecting some type of self-organizing pattern, shape, or structure in a seemingly random 
entity, represent the most contentious aspects of Chaos Theory.
This order within disorder is centered on the existence of an attractor, or “the end
9R •state or final behavior toward which a dynamical system moves.” Alternative 
definitions view attractors as a way to describe the long-term behavior of a system. These 
centers of attraction provide the emergence of patterning within a system. The simplest 
systems reach a fixed-point attractor. However, in complex systems a variation of these, 
known as strange attractors, emerge that “may take the form of events, interactions, or 
developments that coalesce energy and focus attention.”29 Equilibrium and steady states
TOcorrespond to fixed point attractors .. .and chaotic states to strange attractors. The 
mathematics and the resulting models that support the existence of these attractors are 
themselves immensely complex, and acknowledgement o f their occurrence must be more 
of a matter of faith than an acceptance of proof for those whose education, experience 
and interests are in other areas.
Cambel provides an elucidation of attractors that is useful for the non­
mathematician. The following illustration is an adaptation of his explanation. He uses the 
examples of a child’s swing or a clock pendulum that at some point will come to a stable 
vertical position once the force (the parent’s pushing or the effect of gravity on a weight)
27. Beaumont, N a zi’s March to Chaos, 5.
28. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 66.
29. Ibid. She adds, “Strange attractors may also be viewed as “chaotic systems that never settle into a 
predictable end state” (ibid., 74).
30. Peter Coveny and Roger Highfield, Frontiers o f  Complexity (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1995), 
Glossary.
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ceases to be applied. The points where the swing or pendulum comes to rest are the fixed- 
point attractors, which were addressed in a previous paragraph. The issue important to 
this discussion is whether the system is stable at the equilibrium state. In both the swing 
and pendulum examples, and assuming the absence of external forces, the response 
would be yes; the systems are stable.
The next test is determination of the durability of system stability: Is it possible 
for any disturbances o f the system to change the arc or orbit o f the objects? If changes 
produce consequences that are highly irregular, then the previously identified 
phenomenon of strange attractors is said to exist. Returning to the pendulum example, 
assume a small change in the arc. If that motion remained stable and predictable, fixed 
attractors remain the dominant equilibrium state. If however, a wild oscillation that defies 
predictability results, strange attractors may be evident. Since strange attractors exhibit
31bizarre and unpredictable motions, they are also called chaotic attractors. This 
condition of random and unpredictable behavior is most relevant to an assessment of the 
secondary effect of coercive actions. The existence of attractors is important to a basic 
understanding of Chaos Theory, but in isolation, it provides but one piece of the puzzle. 
Further investigation is required in order to develop some useful insight.
The study o f Chaos Theory may be subdivided into various schools or 
approaches. N. Katherine Hayles notes that there are two major branches of emphasis in 
the study of Chaos Theory. One, dubbed the order-out o f  chaos branch, accentuates chaos
31. Cambel, Applied Chaos Theory, 13-17. While the terms chaotic attractor and strange attractor are 
commonly used interchangeably, this is not true in all cases. “Strange attractors are not necessarily chaotic” 
(ibid., 70). For those who wish to examine this concept in more depth, his Chapter 4 provides illustrations 
and a much more detailed explanation o f  attractors. The abbreviated explanation provided here represents 
only the most cursory excursion into the phenomenon. It should be noted that in mathematical models the 
chaotic behavior is not caused by outside sources, but rather by exponentially close trajectories within a 
bounded system.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
as “order’s precursor and partner,” rather than as its antithesis; the other, the strange 
attractor branch, emphasizes the ability o f chaotic systems to generate new information 
and the “hidden order that exists within chaotic systems.”32 Providing a similar analysis 
and acknowledging that there are subtle but important differences between the American 
and European outlooks regarding Chaos Theory, David Byrne cites contentions that the 
US view is to find the “order that lies hidden in chaos,” while the more common 
European focus is on “order that emerges from chaos.” This deterministic chaos, 
generated by fixed rules, is a key discovery upon which the behavior within a chaotic 
system may be understood.34
The presence of attractors is less contentious than is the potential for applications 
of this characteristic of chaotic systems. The element most important to all of these 
perspectives is agreement that systems that display apparent completely random behavior 
contain some type o f pattern. The existence of a pattern suggests at least a basis for 
understanding, and perhaps even for some level of predictability. Since deterministic 
chaos involves nonlinear systems that conform to dynamical laws, then an understanding 
of these laws and the initial and present state o f the system may provide some ability to 
project into the future. If this perspective is valid, and predictability is possible, then 
decisions regarding the use of power could benefit immensely from the incorporation of 
Chaos Theory into the process.
32. N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 9-10. Emphasis in original. She acknowledges Ilya Prigogine 
as the leader o f  the first school, and associates Edward Lorenz, Mitchell Feigenbaum, Benoit Mandelbrot 
and Robert Shaw with the second.
33. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 16.
34. Pietgen, “The Causality Principle: Deterministic Laws and Chaos.” 36. He identifies other 
significant achievements o f  Chaos Theory, including development o f  methodologies that will evaluate the 
presence o f  chaotic behavior. However, Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,”
108, cautions, “Determinism does not imply predictability,” and that prediction requires knowledge o f  the 
present state.
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Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart believe that an important element of Chaos Theory is
35that “simple laws can have very complicated—indeed, unpredictable— consequences.” 
Ian King contends, “Chaos theory builds on Newtonian world view” and that “chaos is a 
dialectical, incorporating seeming contradictions within a nonetheless unified, coherent, 
yet dynamic framework.” He adds that this can provide “a subtle, yet powerful form of 
order.”36 James offers, “When we construct an attractor we construct an image o f  the 
system‘s global dynamics. ” This condition “allows us to predict short term trajectories 
and long term trends for pattern recognition.”37Adding their support for the potential 
contributions of the study of Chaos Theory, David Peak and Michael Frame assert,
10
“Fortunately, deterministic chaos does allow some prediction.” The general consensus 
of this sampling of scholars and authors is that this order and framework do, at minimum, 
indicate some potential for an ability to envisage concealed order within apparently 
chaotic systems.
An important question is whether the concept of attractors presents any practical 
uses. An earlier section addressed the distinction between social and mathematical chaos. 
It is conducive to understanding to present an illustration of how the emergence of 
strange attractors in mathematical chaos may provide some insights relative to social 
chaos. This potential for transforming the end-state of a stable system into one that is 
chaotic is pertinent to considerations for the application of coercive power. If overall 
system stability were an objective, then it would be valuable for those planning such
35. Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart, The Collapse o f  Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World 
(New York: Viking, 1994), 2.
36. Ian T. King, Social Science and Complexity, 51.
37. James, Chaos Theory, 33. Italics in original.
38. David Peak and Michael Frame, Chaos under Control: The Art and Science o f  Complexity (New  
York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1994), 151. For those with the background and interest, this volume 
provides an abundance o f  mathematical equations, graphs, and illustrations to further an understanding o f  
Chaos.
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actions to be able to predict that a specific action may result in the emergence of strange 
attractors that could possibly send the system into unpredictable chaos.
For example, if  removal of a particular political leader results in the collapse of 
the internal political system and destroys any ability to further influence that system, that 
action may run counter to overall objectives. The danger of inadvertently creating a 
chaotic situation through coercive actions should be a concern of those who must 
undertake such decisions. If the contentions o f its adherents are accepted, then Chaos 
Theory, or at least the condition of deterministic chaos, may provide some degree of
IQ
predictability. However, there are other complicating factors.
Another component o f chaotic systems is sensitivity to initial conditions, which is 
described as “The propensity o f non-linear systems to change properties far out of 
proportion to the scale of forces changing their original state.”40 That is, even minute 
changes in the point of origin can result in large changes to the outcome, or as Gleick 
describes “Tiny differences in input could quickly become overwhelming differences in 
output—a phenomenon given the name ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions.’”41
The discovery o f this phenomenon is popularly credited to Meteorologist, Edward 
Lorenz.42 Although the logical presumption is that the future should be determined from
39. Any transfer o f  elements o f  mathematical chaos to examples o f social chaos is fraught with danger, 
and a mathematician could find this analogy weak, since an outside force caused the chaotic behavior and 
not the internal dynamics o f  a chaotic system. The important point is that if  a system is on the critical point 
or edge o f  chaos, then even very small changes can push a system into chaotic behavior, or alternatively, 
lock it into a fixed state.
40. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, xiv.
41. Gleick, Chaos, 8. For a clear explanation o f  the relationship, see James, “Chaos Theory,” 31-33. He 
professes, “The presence o f  sensitivity to initial conditions (SIC) will not always result in chaos; however, 
a system without SIC will not be Chaotic” (ibid., 32).
42. Lorenz is credited with the discovery o f  the Butterfly Effect,” which has been widely misinterpreted 
to suggest that the movement o f  the wings o f  a single insect could produce a miniscule change in airflow 
patterns that eventually causes a major meteorological event. His important lesson, rather, is that in a 
chaotic system even the minutest perturbation (as represented by the butterfly’s wing flapping) could result
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the past, Lorenz discovered that minute changes in measurement are amplified over time 
and can lead to unpredictability in the long term. Therefore, although the behavior o f two 
systems may be identical, very small changes in their point o f origin, when amplified, 
could produce dramatically different results. Herein resides the major limitation on 
applying the principles o f Chaos Theory to the understanding of effects. There are no 
agreed criteria for determination of whether or when this condition exists.
James proposes that if  a system is sensitive to initial conditions (SIC), then “any 
two initial states that deviate by the slightest amount must deviate from each other 
exponentially.”43 He adds “If a system is SIC, you are not guaranteed to find Chaos; if, 
however, a system is not SIC, it cannot exhibit Chaos,” and that SIC is a “necessary but 
not sufficient cause for Chaos to occur.”44 Hence, the most obvious indicator of 
sensitivity to initial conditions is the presence of a chaotic system.
In Cambel’s view, this sensitivity to initial conditions causes the system to be 
unstable; and this instability leads to uncertainty. “Deterministic chaos in not just 
arbitrary randomness; there is order involved.”45 However, the presence of deterministic 
equations that have unpredictable results may be an indicator o f chaos. Therefore, 
whether or not a system is sensitive to initial conditions could be an indicator of its 
potential for becoming chaotic. While this may be of value to the decision-maker, there 
are significant problems in determining the existence of sensitivity to initial conditions.
in abject failure in predictions. See Peak and Frame, Chaos under Control, 146-150, for a more detailed 
explanation along with illustrations.
43. James, Chaos Theory, 30. In his definition, for a system to be chaotic, it must be bounded; 
nonlinear; non-periodic; and sensitive to small disturbances.
44. Ibid., 32.
45. Cambel, Applied Chaos Theory, 14.
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Although the theory provides a tool that may assist understanding o f chaotic systems, its 
practical applications appear to be limited.
Chaos Theory is concerned with finding underlying order in data that appears to 
be disordered and random. Proponents of the application of the principles of Chaos 
Theory to disciplines beyond pure mathematics acknowledge the relative immaturity of 
the concept and the difficulty in grasping many of its components. Some have observed, 
“Since formal chaos theory is primarily a mathematical construct, the nonmathematical 
use o f it is primarily as an analogy.”46 However, some argue that a total understanding o f 
Chaos Theory or of the system under examination is not a prerequisite for its use. James 
contends, “Chaos theory can provide an idea of behaviors and dynamics to expect 
without knowing anything about the workings o f the system.”47 If this is correct, then 
Chaos Theory offers significant improvement to analyses related to the effects of actions.
However, skeptical observers see this as at best a possibility in the future. 
Additionally, they consider the determination of the presence of attractors and sensitivity 
to initial conditions, and the finding any of this alleged order out of chaos, as 
problematic. Therefore, any ability to predict behavior is unlikely at the current state of 
development of the theory. I will next consider a sampling of the recognized limitations 
and problems associated with the use of the principles of Chaos Theory.
Limitations on the Use of Chaos Theory
Saperstein presents a piercing but essential question regarding Chaos Theory and 
other “fashionable” approaches and asks, do we gain anything “besides some new, exotic
46. Bolland and Atherton, “Chaos Theory,” 370.
47. James, Chaos Theory, 21.
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descriptive metaphors?”48 Some consider chaos a mathematical curiosity; a large group 
contends, “Nobody has yet conclusively found it in the physical world.”49 Dismissing 
commonly expressed examples of its applicability, in Beaumont’s view of Chaos Theory, 
“Rational assumptions and simple stratagems align with reality only by coincidence.”50 
Most damaging to the conclusions of its proponents is the reality that practical 
applications of Chaos Theory have not been abundant, even in the field of mathematics 
where much of the previous and ongoing research is conducted. While I have identified 
multiple problems, the determination of the existence of sensitivity to initial conditions, 
and the appropriate use o f this information if detected, provide the major obstacles for 
analysis and understanding.
Sanders argues, “It is important to recognize a system’s initial conditions before 
they erupt as a strange attractor.”51 Going beyond this declaration, Gell-Mann affirms that 
successful exploitation of Chaos Theory requires precise knowledge of initial conditions,
i.e., near perfect knowledge of the extant conditions of the system, so that any predictions 
may be made as to the system’s future conditions.52 Unfortunately, this perfect 
knowledge remains unattainable even with the most sophisticated information gathering 
equipment and analytical processes. Saperstein believes that perfect knowledge is not
CO
possible, that there will always some measurement errors. If this is challenging in the 
hard sciences, some deem it unattainable in matters concerning relationships between
48. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security,” 101.
49. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 13.
50. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, 10.
51. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science,” 74.
52. Gell-Mann, Quark and the Jaguar, 26. Poincare observed in 1903 that because we can only know 
initial conditions approximately, prediction becomes impossible. Expanding on this, Gell-Mann contends, 
“Since nothing can ever be measured with perfect accuracy, chaos gives rise to effective indeterminacy.”
53. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,” 108. He contends that when dealing 
with chaotic systems, “prediction is difficult or impossible.”
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states. Therefore, if  the value of predictive capability relates directly to the quality of 
knowledge of present conditions, and our ability to obtain this perfect knowledge is 
limited, then Chaos Theory may not provide much potential for practical use.
Byrne contends, “If we can deal with robust, determined, organized chaos, then 
we may be able not to predict, but to act so that some things happen and others don’t 
happen.”54 For those responsible for foreign policy decisions, a methodology that can 
provide for prediction would be a most welcomed, albeit an elusive capability. If we 
could predict the precise effect of an action, as well as secondary effects of that act with 
any degree of accuracy, this would simplify the task of meeting foreign policy objectives. 
Others assert, “Any system that obeys rules—even if the behavior is chaotic—can be 
controlled once the rules are known.”55 While the statement in itself may be supportable,
when dealing with chaotic systems there is inadequate evidence to sustain the assumption 
that the conventions are recognized and accepted.
Saperstein observes, “It is not evident to me that a single metaphor/tool—like 
chaos— is available or useful to us in dealing with a world system characterized by 
‘complexity.’”56 Based on this limited analysis, and focusing on the use intended for the 
application of principles of nonlinear analysis, I conclude that while Chaos Theory 
provides some interesting perspectives, and apparently has proven useful at least in the 
field of mathematics, the potential contributions for its use in the development of 
understanding o f secondary effects is extremely limited.
A supposition made earlier was that the detection of chaos might be an indicator 
of sensitivity to initial conditions. If the reverse were true, and if there were some
54. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 26.
55. Ibid., 26. Claim is attributed to Peak and Frame.
56. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,” 120.
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mechanism, other than the presence of chaos, for determination of when sensitivity to 
initial conditions exists, then the theory would be more useful. If Chaos Theory could 
provide some ability to define when a system is on the edge of chaos, that knowledge 
could enable better decisions regarding actions that could influence the movement of the 
system toward or away from the precipice.57 With such a potential capability, its 
application would be extremely useful. However, in its current state of development, 
Chaos Theory does not provide such contributions.
This assessment of Chaos Theory resulted in a negative response to one part of 
the hypothesis question. Can approaches recently developed in mathematics and the 
physical sciences contribute to enhanced understanding of nonlinear systems? I presented 
arguments to support the conclusion that application o f the principles of Chaos Theory 
will not appreciably facilitate prediction of the ramifications of actions, or enhance 
description of the systems of power. However, reaching this conclusion does not justify 
discontinuation of the quest. Further examination is required to reveal models of 
nonlinear processes that may be more appropriate for application to the problems 
presented by secondary effects. To that end, I will now address the other major 
perspective on the nature and operations o f nonlinearity.
Complexity
Since both provide a means of understanding nonlinear systems, and because 
many of their principles are similar, the terms chaos and complexity are frequently
57. For a detailed description o f  this critical point, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging 
Science a t the Edge o f  Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 12. “This balance point—  
often called the edge o f  chaos— is where the components o f  a system never quite lock into place, and yet 
never quite dissolve into turbulence, either.”
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confused. Consideration of several offerings of definitions helps to alleviate some of this 
misunderstanding. A good place to begin is to regard complexity as “a characteristic of 
systems made up of two or more elements, suggesting intricacy of structure and process, 
but not randomness, sometimes with a high degree of regularity in their dynamics up to a 
point o f transition; usually implies a reasonable degree of predictability and 
controllability.”58 This rather lengthy description provides a basis upon which to compare 
and contrast chaos and complexity.
Among the available alternative definitions that may be appropriate for use in this 
discussion, complexity is “a type of dynamical behavior in which many independent 
agents continually interacting in novel ways.”59 As with Chaos Theory, the more limited 
scope o f the term that is germane to theoretical discussions should be distinguished from 
the more general usage of complexity. As the antithesis of simplicity, complexity 
commonly is used along with similar terms such as complication, intricacy, convolution, 
and entanglement. While the use of the word in the scientific community is more precise, 
this same direct contrast with simplicity applies.
The lack of explicit definitions for either term makes comparison exceptionally 
difficult. Indeed, in some treatments “chaos theory, the nonlinear and complexity are 
treated as a single paradigm.”60 Chaos Theory and complexity share some characteristics. 
Cohen and Stewart describe as a basic tenet of complexity theory that “complex causes 
can produce simple effects” and they contend, “simplicity in nature is generated from
58. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, xiv.
59. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 449.
60. John Urry, Global Complexity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 17.
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chaos and complexity”61 The connection is between the simplicity emerging from 
complexity and the order within disorder believed to result from chaos.
Adding to the difficulty in understanding the differences between these 
phenomena is a certain degree of overlap, or fuzziness, resulting in a state of complexity 
that is not wholly random or chaotic. Seeing similarities in the two models, at least in a 
temporal sense, Byrne contributes, “Chaos and complexity are not time reversible.”
That is, both involve a continuum of time that is not repeatable, because the conditions 
have changed irreversibly. These similarities exacerbate the difficulty in clearly defining 
the boundaries between chaos and complexity. However, a brief look at characteristics 
provides a means for enhanced understanding o f the ways in which the two are alike, and 
therefore, difficult to differentiate.
Rosenau proposes four underpinnings of complexity theory: (1) self-organization; 
(2) adaptation and co-evolution; (3) the power of small events; and, (4) sensitivity to 
initial conditions. Self-organization refers to the characteristic of complex systems to 
generate “some type of pattern or structure from a (usually) orderless dynamical 
system.”63 This is not too distant of a departure from the order out of disorder 
characteristic of Chaos Theory. Adaptation is “The capacity of the agents to cope 
collectively with the new challenges.” The power of small events results in the “often 
massive disproportionalities between causes and effects,” and “unpredictable and yet 
irreversible patterns seem to characterize all social and physical systems.”64 Sensitivity to 
initial conditions explains “The quality whereby two slightly different values of an input
61. Cohen and Stewart, Collapse o f  Chaos, 2.
62. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 15.
63. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 467. For added clarity, consider, Cambel, Applied Chaos Theory, 
20. “Not all complex systems are self-organizing, but all self-organizing systems are complex.”
64. Urry, Global Complexity, 7.
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variable evolve to two vastly different trajectories.”65 Hence, there is commonality 
among many of the characteristics of Chaos Theory and complexity. However, the two 
models are distinct in several aspects, and it is possible to identify lines of demarcation.
Axelrod and Cohen propose a concise answer to the common question regarding 
the differences, asserting, “chaos deals with situations such as turbulence that rapidly 
become highly disordered and unmanageable. On the other hand complexity deals with 
systems composed of many interacting agents.”66 The inference obtained from this 
observation is that there is little potential for successful prediction or influencing of 
behavior in chaotic systems. The important difference in their view is that in complex, 
but not chaotic systems, there is some possibility o f altering the systems through 
“thoughtful interventions.”
In Beaumont’s opinion, chaos is random and not directly predictable, whereas 
complexity is complicated, but “reducible to a high degree of predictability and precise 
numerical expression.”67 According to Axelrod and Cohen, complexity is a way of 
thinking and it “indicates that the system consists of parts which interact in ways that
(LO
heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of later events.” The important 
distinction is that complexity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for chaos. 
However, not all complex systems are chaotic. Further examination of definitions of 
complexity will help to emphasize these distinctions.
65. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 496. James, “Chaos Theory,” 30, views this divergence in 
trajectories as exponential. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, xiv, describes SIC as the propensity o f  
non-linear systems to change properties far out o f  proportion to the scale o f  forces changing their original 
state.”
66. Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, Harnessing Complexity (New York: The Free Press, 1999),
xv.
67. Beaumont, War, Chaos and History, 12.
68. Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complexity, 1.
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Adding the temporal aspect, Covey and Highfield describe complexity as “the 
study of the behavior of macroscopic collections of such units that are endowed with the 
potential to evolve in time”69 Others advocate consideration of the situation and 
environment in any description of the term. Gell-Mann offers, “Complexity, however 
defined, is not entirely an intrinsic property of the entity described; it also depends to 
some extent on who or what is doing the describing”70 While insightful, this observation 
does not bring us any closer to development of a consensus on terminology.
As with the often-cited Supreme Court opinion on obscenity, complexity is 
sometimes described as an “I know it when I see it concept.” Cambel contends, “There is 
no agreed-upon definition of complexity, because it manifests itself in so many different 
ways,” and he proposes four basic characteristics for consideration: purpose and function; 
size and configuration; structure; and, type of dynamics.71 Size is not a criterion for 
determination of the existence of complexity. The interaction of the parts is the critical 
element, not the number of parts. Gell-Mann also contends that there are several different
79  • •kinds of complexity and “any definition is context dependent.” Hence, the definition of 
complexity is a function of the purposes for which it is employed.
Since agreement on a definition is difficult, a means of determining when a 
system is complex is useful. King provides such a guide. In his view, several factors 
indicate the presence of a complex system. Detection of the following conditions 
indicates that a system is complex:
69. Coveny and Highfield, Frontiers o f  Complexity, 7.
70. Gell-Mann, “The Simple and the Complex,” 4. He later adds, “randomness is not what we mean by 
complexity.” 7.
71. Cambel, Applied Chaos, 2. Description being more readily achieved than definition, he provides 15 
statements that can be applied to complexity in systems. Among the most valuable is “The system is neither 
completely deterministic nor completely random, and exhibits both characteristics.” pp.3-4.
72. Gell-Mann, Quark and the Jaguar, 17.
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1. Large number of elements, whose interactions defy description by differential 
equations
2. Interacting elements; the interactions are dynamic and nonlinear
3. Loops in the interactions, positive and negative
4. Operations in conditions far from equilibrium, and
• * 735. Complexity emerges as a result of patterns of interactions between the elements
Caution must be exercised in the use of these conditions. These factors are some 
indicators of complexity, and not an all-inclusive list for determination of its presence.
Presentation of a means of quantification can be useful in understanding when it 
exists. Demchak offers factors for measurement of complexity:
Complexity (C)
C = / (N, D, I),o in operation at time zero 
Where N = number of components 
D= differentiation among components 
1= interdependence among components 
to = initiating time period zero74
The important elements are multiple, varied and interacting components. The degree of 
complexity is a function of those factors. Her listing includes consideration of 
differentiation, which King does not include in his inventory o f factors provided earlier.
As with the discussion of Chaos Theory, it is more productive to look at the 
consequences of complexity than it is to struggle with definitions. H. A. Simon avoids 
presenting a definition of complexity, preferring to “regard a system as complex if it can
73. King, Social Science and Complexity, 77-78. Several factors were combined from the author’s more 
extensive list.
74. Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” 246.
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be analyzed into many components having relatively many relations among them, so that 
the behavior o f  each component depends on the behavior o f  others.”75 This interaction 
between elements represents the essence o f complexity as it relates to this study. Since it 
is behavior and the product of complexity that is most critical to this assessment, it is 
prudent to shift focus to the potential uses of an understanding of complexity.
Potential Uses o f Complexity
As a precursor to any utilization, an imprecisely defined condition such as 
complexity requires some type of framework for development of understanding. The 
emergence of organizations dedicated to the study and advancement of complexity theory 
is an indicator o f the belief that that there may be promise in this area. The Santa Fe 
Institute in New Mexico, the Center fo r  the Study o f  Complex Systems at the University 
of Michigan, The Ilya Prigogine Center fo r  Studies in Statistical Mechanics and Complex 
Systems at the University of Texas, and the Center fo r  Social Complexity at George 
Mason University are a few of the educational and research structures that focus on
7  f \complexity theory and are dedicated to its advancement. Refereed journals such as 
Complexity International and Complexity Digest complement the work and products of
• 7 7these institutions.
In its most basic sense, complexity theory provides a basis for investigating the 
properties of nonlinear systems. However, its proponents see a larger role. Coveny and
75. H. A. Simon, “Near Decomposability and Complexity: How a Mind Resides in a Brain,” in The 
Mind, the Brain and Complex Adaptive Systems, ed. Harold. J. Morowitz and Jerome L. Singer (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1995), 26. Emphasis added.
76. O f these, the Santa Fe Institute is the best known. See Waldrop, Complexity, for an engaging 
narrative o f  the origins and workings o f  this organization.
77. The Complexity in Social Science site, http://www.irit.fr/COSI.html (accessed 11 October 2004), 
provides an excellent introductory tutorial into nonlinear systems as well as multiple links to related sites.
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Highfield contend that the science of complexity is “the quest to see the forest through 
the trees, distill unity from diversity, and seek an account of the emergence of 
organization.”78 Urry adds, “Complexity theory generally analyzes systems as unstable, 
dissipative structures.”79 Providing a connection to more focused studies of this 
phenomenon, Rihani asserts, “Complex and Complexity refer to certain systems that have 
large numbers of internal elements that interact locally to stable, but evolving, global 
patterns.”80 Nicolis and Prigognine prefer to consider complex behavior, rather than 
complex systems, since in their view, “simple systems can display complex behavior.”81 
Even the most cursory review of the activities of the academic and scientific disciplines 
to which complexity theory has been applied confirms that the theory is wide-ranging. 
However, escape from the current confines of research institutes requires consideration of 
its potential practical applications.
James Rosenau poses the question: Can complexity theory “point the way to 
policies which can ameliorate the uncertainties inherent in a fragmegrative world?”
In his search for applications of complexity into the social sciences, Byrne presents a 
bold assertion: “Complexity theory can be used as a technique that allows us to
78. Coveny and Highfield, Frontiers o f  Complexity, 2. “This complexity is intrinsic to nature; it is not 
just a result o f  the combination o f  many simple processes that occur on a more fundamental level.”
79. Urry, Global Complexity, 28.
80. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 6. He adds, “Complex behaviour is 
defined to a large extent by local interactions between their components” (ibid., 7).
81. Gregorire Nicolis and Ilya Prigognine, Exploring Complexity (New York: W. H. Freeman and 
Company, 1989), 8. The objective o f  an analysis o f  complex behavior should be the determination o f  
“common characteristics among different classes o f  systems.”
82. James N. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity and Theory in World 
Affairs,” in Complexity, G lobal Politics, and National Security, ed. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. 
Czerwinski (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997), 73. Fragmegration  relates to 
globalization pushing and pulling in complex and conflicting ways. He concludes, “complexity theory does 
have insights to offer,” but cautions that their potential benefits may have been exaggerated, (ibid., 74).
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understand the changing social world.” Extending this theme of a search for
knowledge, Sanders argues, “while it may not be possible to solve or predict the future of
nonlinear systems, it is possible to provide a qualitative description of its characteristics
and behavior as a whole over time.”84 Adding a British perspective, Urry believes that the
complexity sciences may be emerging as a potential new paradigm for the social
sciences, and also may provide “concepts and methods that begin to illuminate the global
as well as a system or series of systems.”85
While achieving understanding is a worthwhile goal in itself, the ultimate
objective is some type of prognostic capability. The potential for using the principles of
complexity theory for prediction emerges as a desirable trait; however, debate continues
over whether this is a realistic aspiration. Cohen and Stewart assert, “Complexity may be
86unpredictable in detail, but its general course may be comprehensible and foreseeable.” 
Rihani supports this view: “Within a complex regime, some global patterns are 
predictable.”87 Although skeptical of what he considers to be exaggerated claims by the 
proponents of chaos-complexity, Saperstein concedes, “Complexity theory may be useful
o n
in modeling how real-world situations get out o f control.”
Precise prediction, while desirable, is not mandatory for a model to provide 
benefits. “If you have a truly complex system, then the exact patterns are not repeatable. 
And yet there are themes that are recognizable.”89 However, the ability o f complexity 
theory to deliver even the more restricted product of recognizable themes remains
83. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 71. The key to this understanding is the 
“individual interactions may constitute the source o f  changes in the social order itself.”
84. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 60.
85. Urry, G lobal Complexity, 7.
86. Cohen and Stewart, Collapse o f  Chaos, 3.
87. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 9.
88. Alvin Saperstein, “War and Chaos,” 548.
89. Waldrop, Complexity, 332.
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contentious. This, and other perceived limitations of the use of complexity theory is the 
topic for the following section.
Limitations of the Use of Complexity Theory
Earlier discussions concluded that a complex system consists of many interacting 
parts, many of which are interacting nonlinearly. The existence of interrelationships 
between the components of a system and the nonlinearity of these relationships is 
commonly accepted. However, recognition that a complex system exists and that linear 
solutions are not applicable, does not provide much practical assistance. The utility is in 
being able to use the principles of complexity theory to provide, at minimum, a level of 
understanding that could contribute to some predictive capability.
Addressing the optimistic views of the proponents of complexity theory, Axelrod 
and Cohen counter, “it can still be very disquieting to act on the ‘fiction’ that we have a 
reasonable prediction of the consequences of a particular event in a complex system.”90 
The problems associated with assuming a predictive capability that does not exist are 
obvious. Although he discerns some potential for further study, Rousenau cautions, “For 
despite the strides, there are severe limits to the extent to which such theory can generate 
concrete polices.”91 He expresses concern that in searching for a panacea for the 
shortfalls in understanding nonlinear systems, some proponents have overstated the 
potential benefits of complexity theory. Based on his analysis he concludes that 
complexity theory “cannot presently— and is unlikely ever to—provide a method for
90. Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complexity, 13.
91. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 74.
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predicting particular events and specifying the exact shape and nature of developments in 
the future.”92
Eve Mitleton-Kelly cautions against “adapting the widespread practice of using 
complexity as a metaphor or analogy” and advocates developing an understanding of the 
nature of complex social systems.93 Misunderstanding and misuse of the analogies 
represent the major weakness in the arguments of advocates of complexity theory. 
Demchak observes a poor system fit in attempts by many nations to modernize their 
militaries, due “in large part to the widespread misunderstanding of complexity and 
surprise among defense leaders.”94 The errors are not in assertions that complexity can 
provide useful insights; rather it is the exaggerated and unjustified claims for its 
predictive capabilities. While these may evolve in some point in the future, the current 
offerings are more limited. Theory and animated discussion are abundant; practical uses, 
less so. Richards believes that much of the difficulty in applying nonlinear methods, 
including complexity, is that there is “no template for nonlinear modeling.”95
Complexity theory attempts to describe the operation of complex systems, but is 
not helpful for those who must make decisions and operate within multifarious systems. 
Previous attempts at utilization of complexity theory in the realm of relations between 
nations have not been helpful because they often only acknowledge that complexity 
exists, without providing guidance on how to make decisions when dealing with a
92. Ibid., 89.
93. Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Systems, 5.
94. Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” 222. The author uses the term 
“surprise” which is roughly equivalent to “unexpected” or “unintended.” Sensing a proportional 
relationship between knowledge, system complexity and the potential for unintended effects, she contends, 
“Increases in complexity are inextricably linked to increases in surprise, unless accommodated” (ibid.,
225).
95. Richards, Political Complexity, 10. It follows that “the ramifications o f  nonlinearity have not been 
sufficiently realized” (ibid., 2).
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complex system. The critical shortfall is that if theory is considered to be a set of 
interrelated propositions, then a true theory of complexity does not exist. Hence, it is 
preferable to consider complexity as a condition rather than as a theory. If treated as a 
condition for further analysis, then the potential remains for development of propositions 
for methodologies with utility to the decision-maker.
Summation
This chapter provided a brief examination o f the two most predominant 
approaches to the problems presented by nonlinearity. Chaos Theory describes a situation 
where system nonlinearity displays apparent disorder and randomness, but may also 
provide some detectible order. While displaying some similarities, complexity is less o f a 
theory or concept, and I concur with its more accurate depiction as a characteristic of 
systems that contain interacting components. Complexity was determined to be a 
requirement for chaos, however, not all complex systems are chaotic.
The potential benefits and the limitations of the use of these approaches were 
presented, and I concluded that chaos-complexity theory provides some interesting and 
challenging paradigms. These insights can provide a description of the inner workings of 
interrelated elements of systems. Hence, their major contribution to this effort lies in the 
presentation of models of system behavior. As Beaumont contends, chaos-complexity 
theory “may give us new metaphors and make us more sensitive to its intricacy and to the 
possibility that the range of possible outcomes may be greater than common sense or 
linear thinking leads us to believe.”96 Metaphors and models have value; however, they
96. Beaumont, Nazis ’ March to Chaos, 36.
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can provide only limited practical applications, especially when based on emerging, 
unrefined, and largely unproven scientific concepts.
At their current level of maturity, Chaos Theory and complexity approaches do 
not provide a practical means to understand the elements of national power or a viable 
ability to anticipate the nature of secondary effects of actions. Additionally, there is no 
credible evidence that these approaches can provide much prognostic capability. This is 
largely due to the need for near perfect information upon which to base any predictions of 
behavior. Beyerchen concludes that the knowledge required to anticipate effects is 
unattainable: “Due to our ignorance of the exact initial conditions, the cause of a given
• 07effect must, for all intents and purposes, often be treated as unavoidable chance.” 
Demchak concurs: “Knowing all the possible outcomes of a dynamic system is 
theoretically impossible, and thus there remains a final subset of unknowns that are 
simply unknowable.”98 If a high degree of predictability is the objective, then clearly 
chaos-complexity approaches fall short.
However, even this limitation does not signify that there is no value in 
consideration of these approaches. Saperstein agrees that chaos-complexity can provide 
no more than metaphors, but identifies possible benefits from their use: “Instead of 
specific new tools, these metaphors can contribute to the development o f the new 
attitudes required for the more complex modem world.”99 Rosenau notes that the lack of
97. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability o f  War,” 77.
98. Demchak, “Complexity and Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” 226.
99. Saperstein. “Complexity, Chaos and National Security Policy,” 120. See also Saperstein, “War and 
Chaos,” 548. “Complexity theory may be useful in modeling how real-world situations get out o f  control.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
an ability to predict “is not a serious drawback” and urges the adoption of a complexity 
perspective.”100
This leads to the response to the hypothesis question that is the focus of this 
chapter: Can approaches recently developed in mathematics and the physical sciences 
contribute to enhanced understanding of nonlinear systems? Based on the evidence 
examined the response would be a qualified yes. Plainly, Chaos Theory and complexity 
can provide some degree of enhanced understanding. However, that level of awareness is 
limited. The principal benefit is an appreciation o f the exceptional difficulties, and some 
argue impossibility, associated with prediction of behavior in nonlinear systems.
The brief examination of chaos provided in this chapter introduced the lexicon 
and provided a non-technical overview of the theory. This excursion led to the conclusion 
that Chaos Theory does not represent the most advantageous approach to nonlinearity 
that could support development of a useful instrument for assessments of national power 
and the determination of effects of actions. In this context, Chaos Theory can provide 
little beyond interesting analogies and metaphors. Claims for its application in this 
context that extend beyond this contribution should be viewed with skepticism.
The examination of complexity produced a fundamentally different conclusion. 
Complexity, considered as a condition rather than a theory or paradigm, could provide a 
foundation for further development of useful methodologies.
Despite a wide range of academic backgrounds and viewpoints, the cited authors 
concur that complexity studies are nascent. Nevertheless, attempts to advance beyond 
mere recognition of complexity should be taken at this time, and not await maturation of 
existing theories of nonlinearity. Supporting this view, Cederman contends,
100. Roseneau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 92.
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“Policymakers cannot afford the luxury of a wait-and-see attitude, and neither can 
theorists. Conceptual innovation is needed now and not after the action has already taken 
place.”101
Nonlinear approaches, and particularly complexity, have potential for 
exploitation. However, they have not yet advanced to a stage where they provide any 
immediately useful tools to the decision-maker. Rosenau contends, “We do not have 
techniques for analyzing the simultaneity of events such that the full array of the 
interconnections and feedback loops are identified.”102 This statement of existing 
limitations does not mandate the discarding in their entirety ideas emerging from studies 
of complexity. The essential tasks are to take advantage of the existing immature 
conceptual principles and to attempt to discover the requisite skills and techniques.
Waltz succinctly describes the problem facing the decision-maker: “The same 
causes sometimes lead to different effects, and the same effects sometimes follow from 
different causes. We are led to suspect that reductionist explanations of international 
politics are insufficient and that analytic approaches must give way to systemic ones.” 
Arguing for new methodologies, Jervis states, “When we are dealing with systems .. .we 
have to understand complex interactions, and these present a series of challenges to 
standard comparative methods.”104
101. Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics, 4. A worthwhile goal is to develop “new heuristic 
devices that deal directly with complexity and change in world politics” (ibid., 5).
102. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 89. “For despite the strides, there are severe 
limits to the extent to which such theory [complexity] can generate concrete polices they lessen the 
uncertainties o f  a fragmegrative world” (ibid., 7).
103. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 39. A systems approach will be needed “if  outcomes are 
affected not only by the properties and interconnections o f  variables but also by the way in which they are 
organized.”
104. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 582. He also offers, “Actions 
often interact to produce results that cannot be comprehended by linear models” (ibid., 574).
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Herein resides a potential course for further exploration. The system emerges as 
the key ingredient for enhanced understanding; for as Byrne contends, chaos-complexity 
is “inherently systematic.”105 While other potential solutions may have merit, the 
integration of perspectives on complexity with a systems approach appears to be a 
promising path toward enabling advancement beyond mere acceptance of complexity as a 
nearly universal condition.
The existing work regarding nonlinearity and complexity described in this chapter 
provides the underpinning for continuation of the search for an effective methodology. 
However, further progress toward this objective requires additional resources. Systems 
theory can supply the framework to build upon this foundation. At its center is the 
concept of a complex adaptive system, an approach that affords the structure required for 
the proposition. However, adaptation of systems theory to the objective of this 
proposition requires further development. Therefore, an examination of the potential of 
the complex adaptive system to serve as a basis for a methodology that can lead to 
understanding of secondary effects of actions is the subject of Chapter IV.
105. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 51.




Preceding chapters examined the impact o f nonlinearity when considering system 
behavior. I determined that when dealing with systems with multiple interrelated parts, 
linear approaches were not adequate for the task of developing an understanding of the 
effects o f coercive actions. Two o f the more frequently studied approaches to 
nonlinearity were selected for more detailed examination, and a conclusion was reached 
that one of these, Chaos Theory, provides little potential for practical application in this 
context. However, complexity treated as a condition rather than a theory, and teamed 
with another approach, offers some promise.
Systems have been described as “instances of organized complexity.’'’1 Hence, the 
linkage of systems to complexity does not represent a radically new pairing. However, 
further development requires a firmer theoretical underpinning. A premise essential to 
exploitation is that the potential for the enhanced understanding of the effects of actions 
emerges when complexity is coupled with the framework of systems theory. Recently, 
significant effort has been made in this area, resulting in a complex adaptive system 
(CAS) model that provides this necessary connection. Consequently, the complex 
adaptive system may provide an appropriate structure for further development of the 
proposed methodology. I will expand on this supposition later in this chapter.
Earlier sections captured the essential elements of complexity; however, the 
defining and establishing of boundaries of systems require some additional examination
1. John W. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, Administration and Architecture (New York: Van Nostrand 
Reinhold Company, 1975), 7. Italics in original.
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to support arguments for the application of a systems approach. A notable advocate of the 
systems approach argues: “Although we all know that social life and politics constitute 
systems and that many outcomes are the unintended consequences of complex 
interactions, the basic ideas of systems do not come readily to mind and are often 
ignored.”2 Therefore, an essential step in the development of this proposition and 
methodology is the rectification of this condition through the establishment of systems as 
the core o f further analysis.
This chapter initially will examine the concept of systems and the associated 
terminology. This will be followed by an appraisal of some of the relevant elements of 
systems theory. Since the field is expansive, the focus will be on the central theme of the 
proposition, i.e., the interaction of units (actors) within and across systems. Since the 
complex adaptive system has been selected as the model, a review of the most insightful 
and directly applicable studies on CAS will be conducted. Concentration will be on the 
principles that are relevant to an examination of the effects of the application of national 
power. The concluding argument is that national power may be properly described 
through utilization of a complex adaptive systems model.
Three key questions were presented in the Introduction to the dissertation. The 
objective of this chapter is to present additional evidence with which to respond to the 
first of these: Can the sources o f  national power be examined and understood through 
utilization o f a systems approach? Moving beyond that query, the system o f  systems 
construct will be introduced and shown to be an effective way of portraying interactions 
of elements across system boundaries. That is, how a holistic approach can help to 
overcome the analytical problems associated with reducing large complex systems into
2. Jervis, “Complex Systems,” 45.
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manageable parts. The goal is to begin to respond to the second vital question: Can the 
interaction between elements (actors or entities) within a system be determined using a 
system o f  systems model? While steps leading to an answer will be taken, a complete 
response to this query must be deferred until the presentation o f the methodology in 
Chapter V.
Elements of a Systems Approach
Although the term system appeared in earlier chapters, it was used in a very 
generic context, as a regularly interacting or interdependent group o f  items forming a 
unified whole, under the influence o f related forces. While that portrayal was adequate 
for those excursions, further development of the utility o f the complex adaptive system 
model requires more rigor and specificity in terminology. Therefore, prior to embarking 
upon a discussion o f the application o f systems theory, boundaries must be established 
and a set of adequate definitions must be provided.
Waltz supplies a simple yet practical characterization of a system as “a set of 
interacting units.” However, more importantly, he observes that the system also includes 
structure, which makes it more than simply a collection o f units and the interaction 
between these units. The aim of systems theory is to show how the levels operate and
-j t
interact, and that requires marking them off from each other.” Similar definitions are 
provided: Williams, “an assemblage of interacting parts;” Atkins, “the interaction 
between two or more units and the functions o f that interaction;” and, Lorenz, “collection
3. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 40. Although the focus o f  this seminal work is the 
international system, not specifically national systems o f  power, his insights on system theory are 
particularly useful to this examination. He further expands on this distinction between structure and 
interaction o f  units: “Any approach or theory, if  it is rightly termed “systemic” must show how the systems 
level, or structure, is distinct from the level o f  interacting unit.” An important element is how structure 
affects unit interactions, and vice versa.
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of parts along with some recipe for how those parts move and change.”4 Raymond 
DeCarlo describes systems as “some physical process which generates outputs, finished 
products, desired behaviors, etc. in response to input stimuli.”5
Other attempts at defining a system include a “set of objects together with the 
relationships between the objects and between their attributes.”6 Dictionary entries 
provide, “a functionally related group of elements; a set of objects or phenomena grouped 
together for classification or analysis.”7 Morton Kaplan offers: “A system consists of a 
set of variables related by one or more functions.”8 While even a cursory investigation of 
the concept o f systems will reveal an abundance o f characterizations, the terms that 
appear most consistently in definitions of systems, and those that are most important to 
this analysis—structure and function.
While there is a range of acceptable definitions of the term, this examination of 
the elements of national power will expand on the generic definition and regard a system 
as a set o f  interacting parts with a common function, purpose or utility. That 
characterization represents a good place to start; however, as with attempts to grasp what 
is meant by complexity, it is useful to look at when a system is extant as a means of better 
understanding the concept.
4. Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 3. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, 4. 
Definition attributed to Meteorologist Edward Lorenz in James, Chaos Theory, 28.
5. Raymond A. DeCarlo, Linear Systems (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), 2. These 
stimuli “activate the operation o f  some process to produce some result or response.” p. 1.
6. David Berlinski, On Systems Analysis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1976), 3, crediting A.D. 
Hall and R.E. Fagen with the view that objects are “parts or components o f  the system;” attributes are 
“properties o f  objects;” and relationships are those things that “tie the system together.”
7. The American Heritage Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “system.”
8. Morton A. Kaplan, M acropolitics (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 26.
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Determination of when a system exists is not precise. Indeed, as J. David Singer 
argues, “a system exists largely in the eye of the beholder.”9 Although perhaps accurate, 
this characterization is not particularly conducive to further development. Jervis provides 
useful input: “We are dealing with a system when a set of units or elements are 
interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in 
other parts of the system, and the entirety exhibits properties and behaviors that are 
different from those of the parts.” 10 A Sociologist, Daniel Metlay, offers, “Two 
components are part of the same system if they are involved in reciprocal exchanges of 
resources.”11
Most depictions concur that a system may be viewed as a collection of interacting 
parts that share common characteristics. However, the important common theme in the 
criteria for determining the existence of a system is that it must be more than merely a 
collection of interacting units. The key element is that the whole is different than the sum 
of the parts. In earlier discussions this was observed to be an essential element of 
nonlinearity. Since most systems, almost by definition, are nonlinear, an understanding of 
the principles of nonlinearity is critical to any employment of a systems model. This is 
the rationale for the brief introduction to nonlinearity provided in Chapter III. Having 
briefly described a system, identified means for determination of its presence, and 
restated the connection between systems and nonlinearity, it is now possible to attach 
some theoretical vigor to this concept of systems.
9. Singer, “The Global System and Its Sub-Systems,” 22. Singer contends that when examining a 
cluster o f  groups or individuals and determining patterns o f  interaction between these, “the researcher may 
legitimately label as a system that which he observes.”
10. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 570.
11. Daniel Metlay, “Social Systems,” in Organized Social Complexity, ed. Todd R. La Porte (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press), 1975), 27.
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Systems Theory
A basic tenet o f systems theory is the existence o f a set o f near universal 
conditions that provide a framework for explanatory thought. That is, there are common 
characteristics in systems across a wide range of disciplines, and that explanatory models 
may be derived from these. As Sutherland argues, “Certain concepts, principles, and 
methods have been shown not to depend on the specific nature of the phenomenon 
involved. These can be applied, without any modification to quite diverse areas of 
science.”12 The implication is that the systems model need not be the exclusive domain of 
the mathematician, physicist, and engineer.
If, as Weltman contends, system theory is “an approach to an underlying structure 
of reality,”13 then the potential emerges to apply the work accomplished and ongoing in 
mathematics, the physical sciences, and biology, to other disciplines. The supposition is 
that models derived from the hard sciences may be useful in other fields.
The connection, and potential for application to this methodology, is that if we 
can understand systems in a mathematical context, and if national power may be viewed 
as a system, then there may be extant models that can provide enhanced understanding of 
political, social, and economic systems. These must include the key components of the 
systems and their interactions within and across categories. Hence, the search for a 
general theory of systems, elements of which may be applied to the problem of 
determination of the effects of actions, becomes a meaningful quest and an endeavor 
worth undertaking.
12. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 4.
13. John J. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1973), 14.
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Ludwig von Bertalanffy is one of the earliest, and among the most often cited, 
proponents of the existence of general systems laws that apply regardless o f system type 
or elements. An advocate of a wide-ranging theory, he argues that some abstract 
generalizations that are applicable to all systems may be made, and asserts: 
“Independently of each other, similar problems and conceptions have evolved in widely 
different areas.”14 Therefore, a “basic re-orientation of scientific thinking,” represented 
by adoption of a systems approach becomes necessary. This requires integration of a 
more expansive and inclusive range of sources. He observes that academic disciplines 
tend to become inwardly focused and are often protected by “cocoons” that provide 
impenetrable membranes that stifle intellectual progress. This protective sheath must be 
removed so that knowledge may be shared, synthesized, and advanced.15
Bertalanffy’s search is not necessarily for direct application of mathematical 
models to social and political systems, but rather he seeks certain paradigms, principles, 
and laws, “which apply to generalized systems irrespective of their particular kind, 
elements, and the ‘forces’ involved.”16 He views systems as “complexes of elements 
standing in interaction,” and refers to these common structural similarities between 
systems as isomorphisms. If properly understood, these similarities may be exploited and 
potentially applied to fields beyond those in which they were discovered.
14. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, Revised ed. (New York: George Braziller, 1969),
30.
15. Richards, Political Complexity, 339-40, opines, “Just as early political science could not be 
understood without incorporating both politics and economics, a political science based on dynamic 
complexity arising from interaction and learning would need to rely on close association with fields such as 
cognitive science or biology and from computational tools from fields such as computer science.”
16. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, 33. Recognizing the extreme difficulty o f  this task, he readily 
admits the limits o f  current models. However, “A verbal model is better than no model at all” (ibid., 24).
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The essential principle, and that which is critical to this study, is that systems are
• • • 17“not understandable by investigation of their component parts in isolation.” Rather, 
insight and understanding may be better achieved through looking at the interactions 
between elements and the wholeness of the system. This strategy is applicable across a 
wide range o f scientific endeavors. A cross-matrixed, interdisciplinary approach can 
provide an opportunity to incorporate the work conducted in one field into the problems 
of another. To pursue the validity of this assumption, it is necessary to briefly expand on 
the use o f systems as a model.
The Systems Model
A system may be seen as causal sequence, which finds a stream of inputs being 
transformed by some process into a flow of outputs. Therefore, we can view a system as
1 X“an ordered combination of inputs, outputs and process.” A characteristic common to 
all systems is that they include some level of input, which undergoes a process, and 
subsequently provide output. The exact nature of this process may vary significantly and 
is not always precisely understood. Indeed, it is often described and depicted as a “black 
box” suggesting the mystery o f the process contained within. The Figure 2 provides a 
simplified depiction of this relationship. This simplified diagram, common to all systems, 
displays the progression from inputs, through a process, and subsequently to outputs. The 
environment is the domain in which the system operates.
17. Ibid., 37. He rejects the notion that we can reduce social elements down to the lowest levels o f  the 
construct o f  physics, but contends that we “can find constructs, and possibly laws within the individual 
levels” (ibid., 49).
18. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 24.




Figure 2. A Generic Systems Model
In a closed system, such as the energy generation component o f a simple steam 
engine, the input is heat. In the process (boiler) this water in transformed into steam, and 
the output is energy. Since the boiler can receive inputs from one source, and the only 
output is the steam, this may be described as a closed system. In the closed system model, 
there are no interactions external to the boundaries of the system; outputs are isolated 
from and have no influence on inputs. Noting of course that closed is a relative term. No 
engine has achieved 100% efficiency, and total isolation from the environment is not 
possible.
In a classical closed system, the Second Law of Thermodynamics prevails. That 
is, increased movement toward a state of positive entropy where equilibrium is achieved 
and movement would stop. Another example o f a closed system are stable atoms, which 
normally do not exchange energy with their environments; “they arrest entropy within
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their own structure.”19 A simple depiction of a closed system is provided for illustration 
in Figure 3.20
X1 ___„ 01
INPUT  ------------------------   OUTPUT
Figure 3. A Closed System Model
The obvious advantage of a closed system is that it may be controlled precisely or 
regulated through manipulation of the input. The output of a closed system becomes very 
predictable since, “In any closed system, the final state is unequivocally determined by 
the initial conditions.”21 Again using the exceedingly simple steam engine analogy, the
19. Ervin Lazio, The Systems View o f  the World: A Holistic View fo r  Our Time (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton 
Press, Inc., 1996), 33. Although the atoms may be affected by high energies and heat, in this type o f  
system, the degradation o f  energy predicted by the Second Law o f Thermodynamics is effectively 
withstood. See Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, 124-32, for additional examples and illustrations. 
“Entropy: derives from second law o f  thermodynamics in a closed system, entropy increases until a 
maximum state o f  equilibrium is reached. Eventually a closed system reaches a state where there is no 
organization, just randomness or some other variant o f  chaos.” Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 43.
20. Diagram adapted from Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 42. Readers with an engineering background 
may find this analogy overly simplified and a poor explanation o f  the true operation o f  a steam engine. I 
acknowledge that limitation, however, the importance is in the model, not in the engine design. See Pierre 
Faurre and Michel Depeyrot, Elements o f  Systems Theory (New York: North Holland Publishing Company, 
1977). Chapter 1 provides an introduction, which includes the basic mathematics for those seeking a more 
precise technical exposure to systems theory.
21. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, 40. He refers to this principle as equifinality.
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primary input is heat. As it increases, the level of output (steam) should show a 
commensurate change. Here we have a predictable and controllable linear system. 
However, this model provides little utility to this study in that the systems that comprise 
national power are never closed. Even systems and societies that are sometimes referred 
to as closed, e.g., North Korea, are in fact forced to deal with outside inputs. Despite its 
inward focus the DPRK must deal with and respond to neighbors, e.g., China and Japan, 
and international organizations such as nuclear regulatory regimes. Hence, a better 
paradigm is required.
Open systems take in, as well as release, energy into the environment. Figure 4 
provides a simple depiction o f an open system.
O ,  o u t p u t sINPUTS x.
Figure 4. An Open System Model
22. Diagram adapted from ibid., 99.
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Such a system may be defined as one that displays “exchanges of matter with its 
environment, presenting import and export, building up and breaking-down of its 
material components.”23 Most natural systems fall into this category. The openness lies in 
their need to absorb energy in order to maintain their steady state or stability. In the world 
in which coercive power is employed the system is open and dependent on interchanges 
with the environment. Indeed, the environment is a critical element in understanding the 
functioning of the system24
As shown, the open system is influenced by multiple inputs, and these affect the 
process, resulting in multiple and indeterminate outcomes. “The study of open systems 
becomes the study of interactions, resonations, concatenations, and complex causal 
sequences”25 Since the system is open to the environment; any ability to control or to 
regulate the input is diminished. It follows that even if the process is fully understood, 
development o f an ability to manage or to predict the nature of multiple outputs becomes 
exceptionally problematic. Returning to the discussion of Chapter III, the open system 
displays nonlinearity and presents the same challenges to effective analysis and 
prediction. Hence, open systems are, by their definition and nature, complex. With this 
basic premise established, the next issue for consideration is how these complex systems 
respond to stimuli from their environment.
The principle means by which systems retain their stability is through feedback. 
Although a system may be properly described as open, it may have a closed loop 
feedback system for regulation. The governor or regulator on a steam engine is a readily
23. Ibid., 141.
24. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 41. Since open systems are highly dependent upon external events, 
we are unable to regulate interfaces with precision.
25. Ibid., 46.
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understood means of effecting control on a system. 26 Figure 5 provides a depiction o f a 
simple feedback scheme.
STIMULUS MESSAGE MESSAGE RESPONSE
EFFECTORRECEPTOR CONTROLAPPARATUS
FEEDBACK
Figure 5. A Simple Feedback Model
A common example of an open system with a closed-loop feedback mechanism is 
the thermostat, where the system becomes self-regulating by making adjustments based 
on inputs (feedback) from the environment. The sensor (receptor) detects a change in 
temperature (stimulus) and sends a signal (message) to the regulating device (control 
apparatus), which adjusts the system by sending a voltage (message) to alter the output to
26. In Thomas Watt’s steam engine regulator, two pendulums with balls on the end rotate around an 
axle attached to the engine. As engine speed increases so does the speed o f  the balls, which move upward 
due to the centripetal force. This in turn reduces the supply o f  water, which results in the engine slowing 
down. This provides the classic example o f  self-regulation. Attempts at transference o f  this principle and 
making political and economic systems self-regulating have met with varied degrees o f  success. The 
Federal Reserve Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission are examples o f  regulators o f  
economic systems.
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the heating or cooling equipment (effector). This provides feedback to the receptor in the 
form of altered room temperature and the process starts or stops heating or cooling based 
on this feedback.27
Feedback may be negative, i.e., the system detects a shortfall or anomaly and 
forces some type of change; or positive, in the sense that it supports a self-reinforcing 
process. This implies some type o f internal, and in some cases naturally occurring, 
effective organization. If a system is able to maintain stability through time, it is 
considered to be homeostatic or one that “allows a constant feedback between system and 
environment.”28 Discovery of any self-regulating mechanisms within systems would be 
of immense value to their understanding, and perhaps to prediction or even control. One 
effort at applying this principle across a wide-range of disciplines that emerged in the 
latter half of the twentieth century is cybernetics.
The new science of cybernetics attempts to show that feedback is the basis for 
purposeful behavior in natural as well as social systems, and it may be utilized to explain 
internal organization. Cybernetics presupposes a mechanism of self-regulation that results 
in equilibrium. This form of automatic control that occurs within natural systems, e.g., 
perspiration as a temperature regulating process in humans, may also be applied to
90economic, political, and social issues. System theory looks more at structure; 
cybernetics is focused primarily on function.
27. Illustration adopted from Bertanlanffy, General Systems Theory, 43.
28. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 69.
29. Cybernetics, first articulated in 1948 by mathematician Norbert Wiener, has experienced cycles o f  
popularity and neglect. More recently, elements o f  cybernetics, notably automatic control, have been 
extended to the development o f  artificial intelligence. See Oskar Lange, Introduction to Economic 
Cybernetics (New York: Pergamon Press, 1970), 1-10, for a brief tracing o f  the antecedents and early 
applications o f  cybernetics. Written in then communist Poland, the critique o f  bourgeois economics and 
comparison o f  it to scientific socialism  provide an interesting perspective on how politics can influence 
science.
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While interest in cybernetics ebbed and flowed, it fell short o f being regarded by 
most as a new science. Examples of practical applications are not abundant; effective 
thermostat-like devices for complex social systems have evaded development. However, 
the notion that at least some level of automatic control may exist in social, economic and 
political systems should not be totally disregarded. Therefore, any analysis of these 
systems should include an assessment of any internal regulating mechanisms.
A contribution from the field of management that dates back to the early 1960’s is 
System Dynamics, which its most noted proponent, Jay W. Forrester, describes as “the 
study of information-feedback characteristics of industrial activity to show how 
organizational structure, amplification (in policies), and time delays (in decisions and 
actions) interact to influence the success of an enterprise.”30 Its applications are 
widespread, and its adherents have applied concepts developed in engineering to social 
systems. System Dynamics emphasizes the study of the whole system and its feedback 
loops. Feedback, where output becomes an input, is the critical element in System 
Dynamics. This feedback may be positive or negative, and the internal structure 
determines the manifestation of changes in the system. Importantly, System Dynamics 
acknowledges that an action taken to influence A, may have an effect on B, which will in 
turn have an effect on A. Hence, both influences must be considered. This is the complex 
relationship described in earlier chapters, and the dilemma that provides the major 
challenge to an understanding of system behavior.
30. Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1961). The approach 
initially used this title, but in later writings, Forrester introduced the more expansive, System Dynamics, 
which is the commonly accepted term to describe this model. His Chapter 1 provides an excellent 
introduction to systems and the importance o f  feedback. See also, Jay W. Forrester, The Collected Papers 
o f  Jay W. Forrester (Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen Press, Inc., 1975) for a more detailed appreciation o f  
the evolution o f  the model and some o f  its practical applications.
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A more recent endeavor is the agent-based modeling approach. Less developed 
and more loosely defined than System Dynamics, agent-based models focus on the 
individual parts that comprise the whole. This perspective also has also described as 
bottom-up modeling. Its basis is that understanding of the parts and their interactions can 
provide insights into global behavior. Macro-level system behavior is the result of the 
interactions of the individual agents. Hence, comprehensive knowledge of relationships at 
the global aggregate level is not necessary. This results in models that are easier to 
maintain. Some exploration of the use of agent-based modeling in the social sciences is 
evident. Robert Axelrod, uses it to overcome some limitations of his prisoners ’ dilemma 
model, and explains that the purpose of agent-based models is “to understand the
*5 1
properties o f complex social systems through the analysis of simulations.” The 
principles of agent-based modeling, and its focus on the individual elements (agents) as a 
tool to understand the whole, provide an intellectual foundation for the assessment 
methodology that follows in Chapter V.
This cursory examination provided the necessary foundation for further analysis. 
While critical to this discussion, a basic understanding of systems does not in itself 
adequately respond to the essential question: Can a systems model, that may be 
appropriate for engineers and physicists, provide any advantages to the understanding of 
political, economic, and social systems? Any response is dependent upon the level of 
acceptance of the principles of general systems theory.
There is no universal acknowledgement of the existence of a general theory of 
systems suitable for application across multiple disciplines. In a highly critical essay on
31. Robert Axelrod, The Complexity o f  Cooperation  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997),
3. He argues that agent-based approach is neither induction nor deduction, but rather a third-way o f  doing 
science, and that its purpose is to aid intuition.
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what he believes to be erroneous extensions of mathematical principles, David Berlinksi 
finds “fundamental obscurities in its overall conception,” describes this approach as a 
“triviality,” and contends that the theory is so inclusive that it becomes little more than 
extension of the laws of logic.32 Weltman cautions that the operation of systems “cannot 
be explained solely through consideration of the interrelation of its elements,” for it is the 
extrasystemic environment and the interactions with the system that are critical to 
understanding.33 Even advocates, such as Kaplan, caution against overextension and 
assert that there is no general theory of all systems and that “different kinds of systems 
require different theories for explanatory purposes.”34
While many of the arguments that question the very existence, or much less the 
potential for effective utilization, of a general theory o f systems are intellectually sound, 
they represent more of a case for the appropriate use of the relevant principles of the 
premise than they do a denial of the soundness of a general system theory. Critics such as 
Berlinski fall into the trap that Bertalanffy, Weltman, Jervis, and others warn against, that 
is taking an overly parochial and purest approach to systems. Clearly, there exists a lack 
of precision in our understanding of social systems. However, it does not follow that the 
lack of a mathematical formulation precludes adoption and adaptation of a useful model. 
Hence, utilization of the systems model in the pursuit of understanding o f secondary 
effects remains a valid scheme. However, a paradigm being valid does not necessarily 
presage usefulness.
32. Berlinski, On Systems Analysis, 4. In a particularly pointed comment, he contends: “General 
Systems Theory marks what Scientologists, I believe, call a point o f  minimal adequacy. This is a movement 
that is all craving without content” (ibid., 179).
33. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations, 3.
34. Kaplan, M acropolitics, 62, contends that a “completely general theory would lack explanatory 
power,” and advocates “movement away from general to comparative theory.”
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This is not a theoretical treatise. Rather, the objective is to consider the previous 
work done in this area and to exploit the tenets of apposite theory in order to provide 
some practical applications. John Weltman concludes that if system theory means nothing 
more than interrelations between elements, then as a method o f analysis o f social events 
the concept of system is “both irrefutable and useless.” An essential premise of this 
study is that application of principles of system theory goes beyond the mere acceptance 
of interconnections, and that the wisdom of the adoption of a systems approach is 
constructive as well as indisputable. However, further exploitation requires that this 
assertion be supported.
Why a Systems Approach?
If the application o f systems theory is to move beyond the acknowledgement of 
interrelated elements, then it is important to accept the other critical premise, i.e., systems 
have structure, pattern and function, and that there are structural as well as functional 
relations between units.36 The conduct of a proper analysis o f systems requires 
simultaneous consideration of both structural and behavioral properties. While the 
previously presented definitions of systems theory included references to examinations of 
structure and function, the discussion must proceed beyond mere description and attempt 
to focus on the process and the behavior of the system as a whole. However, this
35. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations, 80. Taking a minimalist view o f  systems 
theory, which he describes as a “framework for explanatory thought,” he views systems thinking as 
essentially the acknowledgement o f  interrelationship between components. He considers this statement o f  
interrelationships is a matter o f  faith that students o f  system theory must subscribe to before conducting 
further investigations.
36. Michael Pidwirny, “Fundamentals o f  Physical Geography," http://www.physicalgeography.net/ 
fundamentals/4b.html (accessed 16 November 2004).
37. Structure is an essential part o f  Bertanlanffy’s theory and se t o f  interacting parts with a common 
function, purpose or utility has been established as a working definition o f  a system. Weltman, Systems
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requires moving beyond the confines and valid debates of systems theory and toward 
examination of practical applications. Therefore, it is useful to consider the utilization of 
a systems approach that incorporates the appropriate principles of systems theory.
This is not the first consideration o f such an approach. The intellectual foundation 
for a practical application of systems theory as an organizing device responds to three 
essential questions:
What is it? “An approach, paradigm, or quasi-theory; a conceptual or analytic 
framework... A grouping of organized assemblies of resources, methods, and procedures 
regulated by interaction or interdependence”
What does it do? Enables the analyst to present methodically the selected data in a 
coherent and logical manner
Why should an analyst use it? A systems approach facilitates the orderly comparison of
•JO
related sets of phenomena.
Coherent, logical, orderly and organized: If a systems approach can bring these benefits 
to the analysis, then it clearly is worth adoption.
A basic premise of a systems approach is the presence of a set of characteristics 
and properties that are common to all systems regardless of the specific domain. 
Additionally, the existence of some level of organization in the world, with patterns 
concepts and principles, must be accepted if the approach is to be applied to political and
Theory in International Relations, provides an excellent tutorial on the basic elements o f  systems theory in 
the IR context in Chapter 1.
38. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, 3. He prefers analytic fram ework  to 
organizing device. A systems approach would conform to either term.
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social processes. If so, then, “A systems analysis promises a more expansive, inclusive 
and flexible theoretical structure.”39
Conducting an analysis of national power from a systems perspective provides 
several specific advantages. Advocates o f such a stratagem contend, “The systems 
approach to political theory amounts to an attempt to theorize about political bodies and 
political events in terms of precisely specifiable structural and dynamic characteristics.”40 
A systems approach emphasizes not only the interactions between elements, but also how 
the interconnections between units define the whole. Through a systems approach 
examination of interrelated variables and their response to environmental disturbances 
may be achieved. With the potential value of a system approach established, further 
concentration on national power from a systems perspective may now be undertaken.
This first requires confirmation that we are, in fact, dealing with systems in assessments 
of national power.
Sources of National Power as Systems
Anatol Rapoport provides the following criteria for the determination of the 
existence o f a system: (1) a set of identifiable elements; (2) among at least some of these 
are identifiable relations; (3) certain relations imply others; and, (4) a complex of 
relations at one time implies complex of relations at another time.41 This provides a 
useful guide to test the premise that national power may be considered to exist and be 
employed as systems. While seemingly intuitive, provision o f some brief examples is
39. Anatol Rapoport, General Systems Theory: Essential Concepts and Applications (Cambridge, MA: 
Abacus Press, 1986). Cited in David Easton, Varieties o f  Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1996), 47.
40. Easton, Varieties o f  Political Theory, 141.
41. Ibid., 129-130.
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warranted. Table 1 provides an illustrative depiction of the U.S. system at the macro 
level.
Table 1. Sample Elements
System Identifiable Elements
Political President
Secretary o f  Defense 
Secretary o f  State 
Cabinet level agencies 
Congress
State and local governments 
National political parties






Military Armed Services 
Defense industries 
Bases
National Guard and Reserves 
Intelligence Agencies





(1) A set o f  identifiable elements. Using the systems of power of the United States as an 
example, the existence of identifiable elements within the systems is apparent. In the 
discussion o f the elements o f power in Chapter II, four categories were identified: 
political, economic, military, and social. I noted that this classification is somewhat
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arbitrary and the number of systems may be greater.42 However, for purposes of this 
analysis and the proposed methodology, the number of categories is less important than 
the framework they provide. If the overall system of power is segregated into these four 
broad categories, determination of identifiable elements within each o f these groupings is 
not a difficult task.
In an observation that I will expand upon later, the categorization is somewhat 
arbitrary, and entities could be included in multiple systems. For example, defense 
industries could reasonably be placed in the Economic or Military blocks. While some of 
these, e.g., the President, represent an element that is not amenable to additional 
reduction, others such as Congress may be further broken down into party and regional 
blocs, committees (and subcommittees), and eventually to individual members. Hence, 
the first criterion for a system has been met.
(2) Among at least some o f  these, are identifiable relations. Again, meeting this 
requirement is not problematic. Although the President, in his role as Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces, may employ military power, he acts through his Secretary of 
Defense, who will in turn task the regional commanders, who then will task their Service 
component forces. However, the power of the President is not unlimited. Through the 
constitutional powers to declare war, and more practically their ability to appropriate or 
withhold funding, the Congress clearly interacts with the Executive Branch.
(3) Certain relations imply others. Assuming the existence of this President-Congress 
relationship within the political domain, and if a relationship between the Congress and
42. The concept development and experimentation efforts o f  the U.S. Joint Forces Command 
(USJFCOM) and NATO’s Allied Command Transformation use these four, but add Infrastructure and 
Information. Most infrastructure elements could also be categorized as military or economic; and 
information is a broad area that can be included in social or political. This study will limit the numbers to 
four in order to simplify the illustration.
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the defense industries has been established (normally through defense related activity 
within the districts of members), then a relationship between defense industries and the 
President exists.
So based on Rapoport’s criteria, the structure and function of power within the 
United States may be regarded as a system. Using the conclusions reached in earlier 
sections of this chapter, this may be best described as an open system, i.e., multiple inputs 
and outputs from and into the environment, including some ability to respond to 
feedback. These inputs and outputs are broadly defined. The former include “any event 
external to the system that alters, modifies, or affects the system in any way.”43 In the 
case of political systems, outputs may be in the form of decisions or actions. While 
critical to this proposition, this conclusion is hardly momentous. Therefore, this premise 
requires further development to become more than a blinding flash of the obvious.
Having established that sources of national power operate as systems, the next step is to 
consider structure and function in more detail and to provide more granularity to the 
model. This may be achieved through consideration of the sources of power as complex 
adaptive systems.
The Complex Adaptive System
Prior to an examination and assessment of its potential, the concept of the 
complex adaptive system (CAS) must be defined. This requires a return to some of the 
principles of complexity and nonlinearity provided in Chapter III. Sanders describes 
complex adaptive systems as “Open nonlinear systems that are constantly processing and
43. Easton, Varieties o f  Political Theory, 151. Effects transmitted across a boundary are outputs o f  one 
system and inputs to the other.
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incorporating information.”44 This means that CASs change and evolve in reaction to 
external stimuli, as well as to feedback within the system. Gell-Mann offers that a CAS 
“acquires information about its environment and its own interaction with that 
environment.”45 These are not isolated entities. “A complex adaptive system (CAS) may 
be an integral part of another CAS, or it may be a loose aggregation of complex adaptive 
systems, forming a composite CAS.”46
Most o f the essential components of modem societies may be depicted as systems. 
Sophisticated communications, transportation infrastructure, information management, 
manufacturing, distribution of resources, and health systems are but a few. An example is 
warranted to reinforce the premise that elements of national power display the 
characteristics of a CAS outlined above.
CASs change and evolve in reaction to external stimuli. In capitalist economic 
systems the law of supply and demand predominates; securities prices reflect this 
condition. The environment provides the primary stimulus to the system. In order to 
preclude the system from descending into chaos, control mechanisms have been 
incorporated to suspend trading in specific circumstances.
A CAS is constantly processing and incorporating information. Due to advances 
in information systems technology, transactions in large stock exchanges occur near 
instantaneously and prices fluctuate at the same rate.
44. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 69. These systems “exist at the boundary between 
chaos and order.” Waldrop, Complexity, 330, observes that in a CAS “agents are constantly adapting to 
each other and things are always in flux.”
45. Gell-Mann, Quark and the Jaguar, 17. The result is the determination o f  regularities in that 
information that condensed into a “schema” or model that influences actions. CAS’s are not static, or 
limited to a specific purpose. “Complex adaptive systems ...have a general tendency to generate other such 
systems” (ibid., 19).
46. Gell-Mann, “Simple and the Complex,” 10.
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A CAS may be an integral part o f  another CAS. The economic system, as are the 
political, social, and military systems, is one of the fundamental elements of the larger 
complex adaptive system that represents the overall system of power. Accordingly, based 
at least on the criteria established above, sources of power may be regarded as operating 
as a CAS. However, additional outlooks should be considered.
Czerwinski identifies several basic attributes o f the CAS. Among these are 
properties: aggregation, nonlinearity, flows and diversity; and, mechanisms: tagging, 
internal models, and building blocks47 Rihani assigns the following traits to CAS:
(1) Active internal elements that furnish sufficient local variety to enable the system to 
survive as it adapts to unforeseen circumstances
(2) System’s elements are lightly but not sparsely connected, and
(3) Elements interact according to simple rules to provide the energy needed to maintain
• • 48stable global patterns, as opposed to rigid order or chaos
Again, fulfillment of these criteria may be provided by an example, this time using the 
U.S. military system. Using the above-delineated traits:
(1) The doctrine o f centralized control and decentralized execution is fundamental to the 
U.S. military and provides the individual assigned on scene leadership, from squad and 
platoon leader to battalion commander, with guidance; but, also delegates to them the 
authority to make decisions based on evolving local conditions.
47. Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs 
(Washington, DC: The National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 14.
48. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 81. He later adds, “The process by 
which CAS evolve, survive, and gather information is a slow activity that involves the gradual assembly o f  
successive layers o f  elaboration” (ibid., 87).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
(2) The American military’s adoption of jointness, i.e., the full integration of Service 
combat capabilities, while maintaining autonomy for personnel and procurement, is an 
example of this type of connectivity.
(3) Joint doctrine is purposefully kept at a low enough level to avoid deleterious rigidity, 
and a sufficiently high level to prevent unnecessary disorder, confusion, and battlefield 
anarchy.49
Based on these traits, we may characterize national power as being exercised 
through complex adaptive systems. However, that recognition, while useful for 
understanding, does not reveal universal truths, or in itself provide tangible benefit to the 
decision-maker. Several issues remain unaddressed.
Sanders provides: “CAS are open nonlinear systems that are constantly processing and 
incorporating information and exist at the boundary between chaos and order.”50 Any 
new patterns that emerge in a CAS do so because of adaptation. Variations in prevailing 
conditions result in many minor changes and a few mutations, but it is not possible to 
predict the outcome in advance. The complex and dynamic environment in which 
systems of power operate rules out a precise control function. Therefore, acceptance of 
the CAS model may enhance understanding; however, it cannot completely solve the 
problem of the prediction of effects of actions. So if the potential for accurate prediction 
is remote, what benefits can the adoption of the o f the CAS model provide?
49. Defense Technical Information Center, “Joint Publication 3-1, Doctrine for Joint Operations, ” 
http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/jel/ new_pubs/jpl_01_ l.p d f (accessed 22 March 2005) provides the 
essentials o f  joint doctrine for the U.S Armed Services. “It addresses the translation o f  national strategy 
into assigned missions and military objectives, capabilities, and concepts o f  employment for component 
forces in joint operations. It also details the principles o f  command organization for all aspects o f  joint 
force operations.”
50. Sanders, Strategic Thinking and the New Science, 69.
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Advocates of the CAS model suggest a paradigm shift that “treats nations and 
their evolution as CASs.”51 They contend that we need devices and models that can 
contend with complexity and change in international affairs. While not elegant, the CAS 
provides a suitable model or metaphor upon which to base assessments. Support for its 
adoption includes the argument that “the flexibility of the CAS approach facilitates
• • • 59modeling states and nations as emergent phenomena rather than reified entities.”
Some observe that a CAS can have lever points and can exhibit coherence under 
change. Knowledge o f these critical points could produce guidelines for development o f 
applications that can enhance the understanding of systems operation. Mitleton-Kelly 
views theories of complexity as providing a conceptual framework and a thought process 
and prefers the term Complex Evolving Systems (CES), which she describes as broader 
than the common understanding of CAS.54 While the operation of the system at all levels 
may not be possible, “globally the system exhibits an orderly pattern.”55 The common 
theme is that the CAS model is the best available depiction of the manner in which 
organizations operate and respond to their environment. However, designation as best 
available does not necessarily connote that the use of CAS principles is appropriate. Even 
those who are strong advocates o f the use of CAS as an analytical model acknowledge its 
limitations.
51. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 234.
52. Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics, 7. He contends that the CAS provides a suitable 
model or metaphor upon which to base assessments.
53. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds, 13.
54. Mitleton-Kelly, Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Systems, 23-26. This CES 
includes additional characteristics o f  complex systems and emphasizes interrelationships and 
interdependence. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 7, believes that this ability 
to evolve is an inherent characteristic and when systems are capable o f evolution, they become CAS. This 
is a slow and iterative activity.
55. Rihani, Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice, 7.
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Rihani accepts that evolution, constant adaptation, and accumulation of 
regularities represent the causes of the chronic state of unpredictable flux that 
characterizes all CASs. He identifies critical factors that conspire to make 
unpredictability a standard component of CASs: “even infinitesimal disturbances in 
initial conditions can be magnified by positive feedback to induce large global 
changes.”56 He does not conclude that these phenomena would, in theory, be 
unpredictable, but massive computing power is necessary to provide the knowledge upon 
which to base any viable prognostications. The conclusion must be that while the CAS 
concept does not in itself resolve the problem of predictability of outcomes, it may 
provide a useful model for understanding the employment of national power.
This exceedingly condensed and restricted examination o f systems was necessary 
to respond to the key question: Can the sources o f  national power be examined and 
understood through utilization o f a systems approach? By any accepted definition and 
criteria, power may be viewed as being employed as a system with inputs, processes and 
outputs. While the specific processes may vary between systems, the structure and 
function of these systems have many characteristics in common. Although feedback may 
be provided thorough a closed loop system, these open systems interact and respond to 
stimuli from the environment. Therefore, examination through a systems approach can 
contribute to enhanced understanding of both the structure and function of national 
power. That said, every model has its limitations.
It may be that a systems approach may be no more than a tool for examination of 
a large number or interrelated entities. However, if  it can achieve this objective, systems 
theory can make significant contributions to the understanding of the effects of actions. If
56. Ibid.
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a systems approach and the complex adaptive system model can provide only partial 
progress along this path, then additional means must be devised in order to reach the 
objective. The key is to drill deeper into one of the fundamental characteristics of 
systems, i.e., the interrelationships between entities, and to explore the possibilities for 
understanding the whole through study of its elements. Accordingly, a system of systems 
approach may be able to provide this essential holistic methodology. The section that 
follows, therefore, will begin to respond to the second key question presented in the 
introduction to this chapter: Can the interaction between elements (actors or entities) 
within a system be determined using a system o f  systems model?
Assessment through a System of Systems
Further progress toward understanding requires an organized and effective 
analytic framework for examination of the elements of national power. The nonlinear 
nature of relationships between elements within the overall system of power mandates 
this type of approach. The task becomes more daunting, since these interrelationships 
occur within and across system boundaries. However, adopting a different perspective 
can mitigate the degree of difficulty.
A statement on terminology must be made for clarity. Although the political, 
economic, military, and social categories could be designated as sub-systems of the larger 
system of national power, the term system will continue to be applied to them since they 
display all the previously identified characteristics of systems and should not be 
considered merely as parts o f the larger system.57 The critical issue here is not the number
57. The analogy is to the human body. Although the endocrine, circulatory and respiratory systems 
cannot function independently o f  the larger human system, they are commonly referred to as systems due to
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or limits of these systems; it is the fact that the systems overlap and elements in one 
system interact with elements in others. Consequently, actions can alter the behavior o f 
those systems as well as the overall system as a whole. Hence, the proper depiction of 
national power is a system o f systems.
If national power is viewed as a collection o f subsystems, then a decomposition of 
these into smaller parts, which are more amenable to comprehension, emerges as an 
option. In a reductionist approach, these sections would be examined independently and 
the results would be brought together to form the entirety of the system. The following 
illustration depicts the overall system of power as being comprised of independent 
subsystems. The barriers between these are rigid and impermeable. Figure 6 depicts 
system from a reductionist approach.
Political Military
Economic Social
Figure 6. Reductionist Approach
their structure, function, and interconnectedness o f  elements. Hence, the human body is an ideal example o f  
a system o f systems. The methodology that I provide in Chapter V will use this convention, and refer to 
divisions below the level o f  political, military, social, and economic systems as subsystems.
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The oval represents the overall system of power; the rectangles, the four sub-systems 
described earlier. Predicting the effects of actions that are designed to influence this 
system would be possible, since the whole is merely the sum of the parts. An action, for 
example, against a military entity, would not be expected to have an effect on a social or 
economic element. However, this type of linear model is not representative of the 




Figure 7. Systems Approach
Since these systems float and overlap, and the relationships are nonlinear and multiple, 
prediction o f the effects o f actions becomes exceptionally difficult, since an action taken 
to influence one system will have an impact on the others. Herein resides the critical 
dilemma.
Chapter II examined how nations, alone or as part of alliances, attempt to 
influence the behavior of other nations. While the defeat, or deterrence, of the military 
forces of an adversary is the principal and most visible manifestation of coercive power,
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other entities may also be targeted. An embargo or blockade, with the intent of 
influencing the economic or social systems, was shown to be a common instance o f this 
strategy. Part of the rationale for the Allies’ strategic bombing campaign against 
Germany in World War II was to damage the factories providing material support for the 
Wermacht, as well as to diminish civilian morale in the attacked cities. Hence, this 
interrelationship across systems is not a totally new concept. While the existence of these 
linkages between elements has been recognized previously, exploitation of this condition 
has been irregular and disjointed and has lacked practical tools and doctrine for 
employment.58
An earlier discussion ascertained that the placement of an entity within a specific 
system of national power was relatively arbitrary. That is, an individual, organization, or 
physical element could reside within several systems. For example, in a theocracy a 
religious leader could be an element of the social, political and/or economic systems. 
Indeed the number and boundaries of these systems themselves may vary. Four systems 
were utilized in earlier illustrations. However, it was noted that there could be more or 
less. A lack of precision in placement is not fatal to the analysis because it is the 
interaction between elements and their impact on the system of power as a whole that is 
most critical.
Singer advocates a systemic and holistic approach and warns against 
inappropriate segmentation and rigid boundaries between systems. Additionally he 
provides the rationale for concentrating on the interactions between entities. “We observe
58. See Edward J. Felker, Airpower, Chaos and Infrastructure: Lords o f  the Rings (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998), 3. In the mid-1980’s U.S. Air Force Checkmate group studied 
Soviet fuel systems, and the link between these systems and Soviet military doctrine. Examining these 
linkages, he contends, “The vulnerability o f  an entire system (the adversary’s operational and doctrinal 
culture) is determined by the vulnerability o f  nodes linking the system together.”
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structural, cultural and physical properties of a system in order to describe it in being; we 
observe the rates and direction of change of such properties in order to describe or predict 
what it is becoming; and we observe their propensities to interact with each other and to 
respond to external inputs in order to predict, and partially explain, the system’s modes of 
behaving.”59 Hence, the objective continues to be the elusive ability to anticipate system 
behavior in response to external stimuli and the environment.
The limited predictive capability o f the CAS model has been established. Since 
there do not appear to be technological solutions in the near term to provide the requisite 
level of knowledge to greatly alter this condition, a remaining option is to look at the 
elements of these systems as a source of information about effects of actions. Again, an 
illustration is useful. Table 2 provides some examples o f various high level entities that 
could be included within the four selected systems.
The existence of connections between entities within each system was briefly 
introduced in Chapter II and is both readily evident and of great importance to this 
approach. Linkages between the media and the political leadership; factories and the 
military forces; and, universities and political parties are common in most societies 
(although the nature of these relationships will vary greatly). Earlier arguments 
established that nations employ power through systems that are complex, adaptive, and 
open. The basic open system model depicts multiple inputs being processed by the 
system with multiple outputs produced. Any ability to predict the nature of these outputs 
requires near perfect knowledge of the inputs and the processes of the system. A degree 
of knowledge o f the operation of a complex system is a requirement for prediction of
59. Singer, “The Global System and Its Sub-Systems,” 7, warns against “Horizon-narrowing, 
rigidifying mechanistic reductionism.”
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future behavior. Since that level of information is not currently available, an alternative 
means must be employed. Linkages between entities may provide some utility.

























An example directly related to the application of coercive power from the Balkans 
follows. A stated U.N. objective was to prevent the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the 
ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If described from a systems perspective, specific 
elements and nodes could be categorized as in Table 3.60
60. Specific military objectives included forcing the withdrawal o f  Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from 
the 20-kilomenter total exclusion zone around Sarajevo. See Robert C. Owen, Deliberate Force: A Case
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Table 3. Categorization of Elements
System Generic Element Targeted Node
Political Elected officials Slobodan Milosevic
Economic Seaports Port o f  Dubrovnik
Military Air Forces MIG-21 interceptors
Social Media Yugoslav Television
U.N. sanctioned actions targeted each of these, whether through the actual downing of 
aircraft, to enforcement o f embargoes, to implementation of information campaigns. 
Clearly there are connections within systems, e.g., rail lines to seaports used for export; 
radar facilities for fighter aircraft; and, between political parties and the elected officials. 
However, due to the connections between the President, the military forces, economic 
interests, and the press, actions taken against one of these also resulted in effects within 
the other systems. As Jervis observes, “We can never do merely one thing.” 61 That is, an 
action taken is likely to have effects that are either unanticipated, undesired or both.
For example, while the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb military forces may have 
had the desired effect of disrupting their ethnic cleansing campaign, the result was also 
that the Yugoslav press resented this intervention and worked to influence public opinion 
to back the political leadership. Similarly, the UN imposed economic embargo served for
Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University 
Press, 2000), for an excellent collection o f  studies related to the employment o f  air power as a coercive 
force.
61. Jervis, Systems Effects, 10. He attributes the statement to Garret Hardin, “The Cybernetics o f  
Competition,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 7 (Autumn 1963), 79, who argues that there is not “a 
highly specific agent which will do only one thing.”
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a time to enhance the popular support for the political regime.62 Optimization of these 
coercive acts required near perfect information; hence, any prediction as to the change in 
behavior of the political leadership resulting from the embargo was at best informed 
conjecture. This resulted from the multiple linkages of entities within and across system 
borders.
There is a need for an approach that can provide some insight into this 
phenomenon of secondary effects. This requires a means of employment of the complex 
adaptive systems model, one that focuses on elements within and across systems. A 
methodology based on the system of systems construct, with concentration on linkages 
within and across system boundaries can fulfill this requirement.
Summation
This chapter evaluated the potential for a systems model to contribute to an 
understanding of the sources of national power. Since the term is broadly utilized, this 
initially required synthesis of definitions of systems to establish one that is best suited to 
this task. This effort produced a set o f  interacting parts with a common function, purpose 
or utility. An examination of indicators of when a system exists concluded that a system 
must be more than interconnected parts; it must also produce a whole that is different 
than the sum of its elements.
The rationale for the excursion into the principles of nonlinearity conducted in 
Chapter III was that systems, in the context of this study of national power, are nonlinear. 
Hence, an understanding of the principles of nonlinearity is critical to any analysis of
62. These examples are utilized for establishing familiarity with the potential for unintended effects. I 
will examine the secondary effects o f  actions in significantly more detail in the cases studies.
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systems. Some systems were shown to be capable of self-regulation, and study of these 
systems should include an assessment of any internal controlling mechanisms.
A basic tenet of general system theory is that there is a set of near universal 
conditions that can provide a framework for understanding across a wide range of 
disciplines. Through a systems approach, examination of interrelated variables and their 
response to environmental disturbances may be achieved. Despite the limitation inherent 
in any paradigm, utilization of the systems model in the pursuit of comprehension of 
secondary effects remains a legitimate design.
Upon establishment of the requisite theoretical foundation, the analysis turned to 
focus on the potential for exploitation of systems theory to determine if examination 
through a systems approach can contribute to enhanced understanding of both the 
structure and function o f systems of national power. When compared to previously 
established criteria, sources of national power were recognized to operate as systems.
Investigations in pursuit o f a more directly applicable model determined that 
national power may be characterized more accurately as being exercised through 
complex adaptive systems, and that the CAS model is the best available depiction o f the 
manner in which organizations function and respond to their environment. Therefore, the 
response to the first question is yes. The sources o f  national power can be examined and 
understood through utilization o f  a systems approach.
An objective of this chapter was to confirm that systems could be the core of 
further analysis related to development of this proposition and methodology. To this end, 
the complex adaptive system emerged as a likely model. Although the CAS may provide 
a constructive model for insight into the effects resulting from the employment of
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national power, it in itself does not resolve the dilemma of predictability o f outcomes. An 
ability to predict the behavior of a complex adaptive system requires near perfect 
knowledge of the initial conditions, the structure and functioning of the system, and the 
environment. That degree of information is not currently available, nor is it likely to be in 
the near term. Therefore, additional methods of analysis must be employed.
I determined that systems of national power overlap and that an individual entity 
could be properly placed within different categories. The assignment of elements within a 
particular system is not critical, since the connections between entities and the impact on 
the entire system o f power are most important. Finally, I explained how the system of 
systems construct provides an appropriate basis for a methodology that can contribute to 
the understanding of the secondary effects of actions.
The introduction to this chapter stated that I could provide only a partial response 
to the question: Can the interaction between elements (actors or entities) within a system 
be determined using a system o f  systems model? While the theoretical underpinnings and 
assessment of the complex adaptive system model and the system of systems construct 
support this contention, I have not yet provided sufficient evidence that these may be 
exploited and transformed into some useful tools for the decision-maker.
The discussions contained in the two previous chapters framed the problem of 
secondary effects and examined some intellectual efforts that may contribute to its 
mitigation. Since the dilemma inherent in determination of the ancillary consequences of 
actions does not fit neatly into any one existing academic domain, I selected the concepts 
that may offer elucidation from multiple disciplines. The next tasks are to draw upon
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these ideas, propose a practicable methodology, and illustrate its potential in a series of 
case studies. Those are the objectives of the next four chapters.
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CHAPTER V
A METHODOLOGY FOR ANTICIPATION OF SECONDARY EFFECTS
I asserted in Chapter II that employment of coercive power was likely to continue 
as an element o f foreign policy and that these coercive actions would produce ancillary as 
well as the desired primary effects. This is due to the linkages between elements within 
and across the systems of power and the nonlinear nature of the relationships between 
them. The lack of an adequate means of determining the nature of the consequences of 
actions led to the conclusion that an investigation into various approaches to nonlinearity 
in multiple academic disciplines was fundamental to further analysis.
This was accomplished through the examination of nonlinearity that was 
presented in Chapter III. Complexity, if  viewed as a condition and not a theory, emerged 
as the most appropriate model to pursue. However, the mere acceptance of a condition 
lacks sufficient structure for fruitful examination. This situation severely limits practical 
applications. Hence, a linkage of complexity to another approach, i.e., systems theory, 
was determined to be a rational path. After the subsequent discussions related to the 
systems approach in Chapter IV, I contended that the complex adaptive system provides a 
satisfactory model for future analysis and that a system of systems construct affords a 
means for the assessment of power.
Since an ability to predict system behavior requires near perfect knowledge, and 
that level of information is not likely to be available, then attainment o f a total 
understanding of system operation and behavior is not a realistically achievable goal. 
While the potential for the secondary effects of actions is not contentious, workable
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methods to contend with this phenomenon have not yet been provided. Therefore, some 
means to overcome the predicament generated by the existence of complexity is required. 
The linkages between entities (actors) with the systems that comprise a nation’s overall 
system of power surfaced as a likely foundation upon which to base a methodology.
With the requisite intellectual groundwork and a basic understanding of the 
theoretical underpinnings now provided, the proposal o f a workable scheme with which 
to confront the challenges provided by the phenomenon of secondary effects of actions 
may now be undertaken.
This chapter initially will restate and strengthen the rationale for development of 
such a capacity. Next, I will address the goals and objectives, i.e., what capabilities a tool 
should provide. Following that presentation, I will describe the expected outcomes of the 
process and explain how these can contribute the identified goals and objectives. This 
will segue into a delineation of the steps required to produce this increased awareness of 
ancillary effects. Since there is no pretense that this methodology can precisely meet all 
the needs of the decision-maker in this environment, I will also address its limitations.
Richards succinctly delineates the rationale for this effort: “Nonlinear models will 
get nowhere by merely presenting more and more complex information. The challenge is 
drawing inferences from the complex dynamic output.”1 The overall purpose of the 
aforementioned steps is to provide additional evidence to support the contention that the 
interaction between elements, actors, or entities within a system can be determined using 
a system of systems construct; and, that this effort can provide a metaphor for increased 
understanding of the secondary effects resulting from coercive actions. Moving beyond
1. Richards, Political Complexity, 16. She adds: “The challenge is to think about how one moves from 
merely presenting an example to actual scientific inference.”
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the consequential goal of developing increased understanding of system behavior, this 
chapter will propose a practicable scheme for the assessment o f power and anticipation of 
secondary effects through a system of systems construct.
Rationale and Objectives
Nations have long been engaged in the quest for effective means with which to 
examine and assess the power resources of potential adversaries. I argued in Chapter II 
that there are no practical models currently available to decision-makers that focus on the 
unintended, unexpected, or undesired effects resulting from actions designed to influence 
the behavior o f other actors. This is because existing methodologies cannot provide the 
requisite holistic knowledge of the relationship between elements within and across 
complex systems. Traditionally, assessments are based on treating the sources of power, 
independently, and consequently do not provide an accurate portrayal of the adversary. If 
employing an attrition-based model, this shortcoming is manageable. However, if the 
focus is on effects, rather than targets, a holistic view of the adversary is required. This is 
the key shortfall that this methodology is intended to meet.
Observing shortfalls in the Kosovo operation, Joseph Nye contends that American 
foreign policy should “Develop potential rules that allow the United States to meld its 
strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests into an effective foreign policy.” While 
that is a laudable and probably uncontroversial proposition, the execution of such a policy 
requires knowledge of the systems upon which those power assets will be employed. 
Historically, the focus has been on military capabilities, with other areas considered only
2. Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Redefining the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999):
35.
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for their contributions to military operations, e.g., the industrial might of Krupp industries 
in Wilhelmian Germany. However, the nature of conflict in the twenty-first century 
suggests that this approach is no longer appropriate. As a former senior U.S. military 
commander observes, “Future military operations will be overlaid with political, 
humanitarian and economic considerations.”
Nations behave and operate as complex adaptive systems, with interconnected, 
and at times interdependent, elements. The number and nature of these connections can 
be immense and the knowledge management task, insurmountable. Hence, the problems 
facing the decision-maker related to the determination of effects are considerable.
Robert Jervis identified a most important reason for the inability to formulate 
policy effectively. That is, any attempt to alter one element of a system will result in 
changes in the other components with which it interacts. Consequently, it is extremely 
difficult to distinguish between “causes” and “effects,” since initial behaviors influence 
subsequent ones. Therefore, outcomes do not always conform to intentions.4 The 
resultant quandary is that even if we can predict with an exceptionally high degree of 
certainty that action A, will result in effect B, the problem of what other events will occur 
remains unaddressed. As affirmed earlier, we can never do only one thing.
In conditions of linearity, if an action is taken against a component in the system, 
the effect of that action could be understood and possible secondary effects predicted. 
Because systems of national power are complex adaptive systems, and relationships 
between elements are nonlinear, we can recognize only that one element is related to
3. Anthony Zinni, “A Commander’s Reflections,” Proceedings 126, no. 7 (July 2000): 34.
4. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 582. He notes, “in a system, 
actions have unintended effects on the actor, others, and the system as a whole, which means that one 
cannot infer results from desires and expectations, and vice versa” (ibid., 578).
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another, that interactions are likely, and that secondary effects may emerge; even if their 
nature is not determinable.5 Hence, prediction of every effect that may result from an 
action is not possible. That condition is accepted. However, the premise that recognition 
of this situation must lead to the conclusion that there is no feasible way to generate 
insight into secondary effects is not.
The stratagem is to attack this condition of complexity with simplicity, i.e., to 
present the dilemma and a possible contribution to resolution in an uncomplicated 
manner, using a readily understandable and generally applicable technique. This is not an 
unprecedented approach; decomposition of the complex into smaller and more reasonably 
understood segments is central to scientific methods. However, the danger o f regressing 
into a reductionist approach described in Chapter II is apparent. Therefore, care will be 
taken to abide by Rapoporf s admonition, “Embrace simplicity, but distrust it.”6 With that 
warning firmly in mind, I will turn to a more detailed explanation of the extant situation 
facing the decision-maker. The objective is to identify the most critical shortfalls that 
currently confound analysis. Only then may I move on to presentation of a process that 
may provide a contribution to the resolution of the problems of secondary effects.
5. Axelrod, Complexity o f  Cooperation, 1997), 3. Complexity theory involves the interactions o f  
multiple actors. Acknowledging that managing the interactions between numerous actors and interactions is 
too difficult for mathematical solutions, he advocates use o f  computer simulation as a primary research 
tool.
6. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 23, credits Rapoport with the warning. Sutherland adds: “Abstractions 
properly applied, become engines o f  stability.” Supporting this approach, Cohen and Stewart, Collapse o f  
Chaos, 3, contend, “complexity may be unpredictable in detail, but its general course may be 
comprehensible and foreseeable. Simplicity o f  form, function or behavior emerge from complexities at 
lower levels because o f  the action o f  external constraints.” They have introduced the term simplexity, or the 
“tendency o f  simple rules to emerge from underlying disorder and complexity, in systems whose large 
scale structure is independent o f  the fine details o f  their substructure.”
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The Need for Enhanced Understanding
This is an appropriate time to introduce the use o f the term node, which will serve 
as an inclusive term for elements, actors, and entities of the system. Hence, nodes are 
fundamental to the process. Nodes are tangible, and represent persons, places, or things 
upon which actions may be taken in order to influence system behavior. Examples 
include government officials, religious leaders, transportation infrastructure, financial 
institutions, and military command and control facilities. A point that is important to the 
proposed methodology is that not all elements, actors, and entities are nodes. 
Consequently, determination of when an entity is to be designated as a node is vital to the 
process; and I will expand on the term and its utility later. However, this initial level of 
detail is sufficient for the immediately ensuing discussions. The following illustrations 
provide a simplified view of the problem facing the development o f an understanding o f 
secondary effects of actions.
In a simple linear relationship, as depicted in Figure 8, an action taken against a 
node can be expected to produce an effect. As with all linear relationships, the effect is 
projected to be directly proportional to the intensity of the action.
However, this type of simple linear relationship is rarely exhibited in systems of 
national power. This is because it is exceptionally difficult to identify an element o f a 
system that is not is some way connected to another. Attempts to segregate any individual 
actor within the political system, for example, would meet with frustration, and most 
likely with failure. Similarly, a completely isolated economic, military, or social node 
defies unearthing. Figure 9 provides a case where two nodes are interrelated. For 
example, a military action that is designed to degrade an electrical power production
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facility may be successful in that aim, but if  that facility also is related to a hospital, as 
the only electricity to it, then there will be a deleterious effect on that medical facility.
Effect 1Action
Node
Simple linear: An action applied to Node A will 
produce an effect






Simple nonlinear: I f  there is a direct relationship 
between Node A and Node B, then an action applied 
against Node A may produce an effect on Node B
Figure 9. Simple Nonlinear Relationship
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Adding additional complications to the analysis, if a third node-to-node 
relationship exists, the effects produced by the original action may influence the 
interrelated nodes, which in turn produces effects that may further influence the 
interrelated nodes in other ways. The result is a set of effects that is beyond determination 
or prediction. Although the use of computers may permit an enhanced ability to display 
the relationships, even as few of three objects makes the number of permutations 
unmanageable. Figure 10 provides a simplified illustration of this phenomenon.
Effect 2
Effect 1Action
Effects 3, 4, ...
Node
Complex Nonlinear: If there is a direct relationship between 
Node A and Node B, and between Node B and Node C, then an 
action applied against Node A may produce effects that 
influence Nodes B and C, which results in influences on Nodes 
A and B, and ultimately results in an indeterminate succession of 
effects
Figure 10. Complex Nonlinear Relationship
As illustrated, the interactions between as few as three entities are nonlinear, and 
therefore are not disposed to precise prediction. This is the central problem that is the 
object of this analysis and the main rationale for development of the methodology, and is
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likely to have scores or hundreds of nodes, and the ability to maintain awareness of their 
interactions becomes exceptionally difficult.
Following on from the previous example, assume that the hospital is linked to a 
certain ethnic group by virtue of being the major provider of essential medical services 
for an ethnic minority. Also assume that an action, e.g., destroying an electrical power 
station, is taken that has an effect on the hospital. The level of support of that group for 
the objectives of the nation or nations taking that action is likely to change.
Murray Gell-Mann provided the following illustrations of the many possible 
patterns of connections.7 In View A of Figure 11, the dots represent a collection of eight 
nodes; View B displays a few instances o f connections between nodes. At this point, with 
very few connections, expectations of secondary effects are relatively easily managed.
A B
Figure 11. Few Interconnections between Nodes
In view C, presented in Figure 12, the number of connections and possible 
secondary effects is increased. View D displays all possible connections between nodes. 
The secondary effects of a single action upon a single node become indeterminable.
7. Gell-Mann, Quark and the Jaguar, 31.
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C D
Figure 12. Multiple Connections Between Nodes
The purpose of the above discussion and examples was to reinforce the assertion 
that accurate prognostication of ancillary effects resulting from actions intended to 
influence a complex adaptive system is not feasible. Although precise prediction of 
secondary effects may not be possible, this does not mean that confronting the problem 
cannot provide benefits. There is a valid requirement for methods to assist the decision­
maker in dealing with this condition. Determination of what they should provide, i.e., 
what information can be useful to the analyst, should precede development of such tools.
Capability Needs
Confronting the issue of the effects of actions, a senior military analyst offers that 
an effective strategy must incorporate an understanding of the interests and incentives of 
the political leadership and knowledge of the decision process within that structure. He 
cautions, “efforts to map out the structure of an organization or system are an essential 
precursor to any attempt to exert influence on that system.”8 Rosenau adds, “We do not 
have techniques for analyzing the simultaneity of events such that the full array of the
8. Spencer Abbot, “Airpower Strategy and the Problem o f  Coercion,” in Immaculate Warfare, ed. 
Stephen D. Wrange (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 34.
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interconnections and feedback loops are identified.”9 Byrne observes, “we need 
descriptions of system characteristics which consist of something more that the mere 
addition of the properties of the elements that compose the system.” 10 Demchak contends 
“the goal is to seek out the minimal set of underlying rules that govern the surprising 
outcomes in complex systems and to be able to identify the broad outlines of likely 
outcomes—the “trends”— in advance.11 Therefore, based on these assertions, any selected 
methodology should be able to provide: (1) a view of the structure and functioning of the 
system; (2) an ability to identify key connections between elements; and most 
importantly, (3) a means to do all this while maintaining a holistic perspective.
These are not necessarily mutually supporting tasks. Focus on structure and 
element interrelationships can result in a loss of concentration on the overall systems 
perspective that has been determined to be essential to understanding. Therefore, an 
essential question emerges: Can an intellectual grasp of system structure and functions be 
combined with identification of the interconnections between nodes to provide the 
holistic knowledge that has been identified as the key to a system o f systems construct? 
Structure and Function
An organization’s structure may be depicted through the use of charts and 
graphics that display the hierarchy of elements. This type of a display is a hallmark of 
most any government or commercial bureaucracy. However, formal organization wiring
9. Rosenau, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously,” 82. He believes that the focus should be on 
determining the long-term transitions.
10. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 68. He continues, “The world does consist o f  
things which contain things and we need to know both about the properties o f  the things contained and the 
things containing, and how the one set relates to the other.”
11. Demchak, “Complexity and the Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” 224. She considers unintended 
secondary effects as “surprises,” and briefly discusses a branch o f  complexity studies known as “surprise 
theory.” An important characteristic o f  complexity is that it produces surprise. Surprise is greatest in 
complex systems. Her discussion o f  surprise and “rogue outcomes” is o f  significant value to intellectual 
excursions into this area.
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diagrams rarely provide the total picture. Rather, the informal relationships and networks 
oftentimes surpass the official configuration in importance. As noted earlier, structure is 
normally easier to depict and understand than is function. In addition, as Zeng asserts,
“the exact functional forms of social and political relationships are rarely, if  ever, 
known.”12 However, despite these qualifiers, it is still possible to make some 
determinations about structure and function; hence, determination of these characteristics 
normally represents the initial steps in most assessments.
Analysis of the structure and functioning of a system is a common task in the 
intelligence community. Indeed, recent comments regarding the employment of coercive 
power include: “Any effort to target decision-making processes with air power, however, 
requires a fundamental understanding of not only the characteristics of the targeted actor, 
but of the structure and dynamics of organizations.”13 There is nothing new or 
transformational in recognition of the requirement.
Although an essential part of the analysis, the development o f an understanding of 
the structure and function of the systems is an embedded part of current assessments. 
Included in these are determinations of system inputs and outputs as well as organization 
and role. Even the most basic and unclassified assessments o f power, such as those 
provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, provide this basic data.14 These appraisals 
have an existing set o f processes and methodologies; however, there is no need to
12. Langche Zeng, “Neural Network Models for Political Analysis,” in Political Complexity: Nonlinear 
Models o f  Politics, ed. Diana Richards (Ann Arbor: The University o f  Michigan Press, 2000), 239.
13. Spencer Abbot, “Airpower Strategy and the Problem o f Coercion,” 33. He later adds, “A detailed 
analysis o f  the means by which an opposing leadership structure seeks to accomplish its political, strategic 
ands personal objectives should be made in advance o f  air campaign planning” (ibid., 44).
14. The CIA Factbook, http://www.cia.gov (accessed 1 April 2005), provides this type o f  information 
on essentially every nation. Similar information is available on multiple government and commercial sites. 
Clearly, this is not adequate for a sophisticated assessment as evidenced by the large and expensive 
intelligence agencies in existence throughout the world.
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elaborate on these further. The less developed, but more innovative and important aspect 
of the analysis is the identification of nodes and the connections between them.
Nodal Relationships
It is time to elaborate more expansively on the use of nodes as the basic element 
of analysis. As with many other terms used in this treatise, node has a variety of 
meanings dependent upon context. For purposes of this analysis, a node is a nexus; a 
point o f  connection or a link, at which subsidiary points originate or center. Nodes are 
junctions, intersections and leverage points, and are important due to their connections to 
other nodes and their potential to affect system behavior.
Earlier I asserted that nodes are tangible entities, elements, or actors, but that not 
all of these would always be identified as nodes. Decisions regarding inclusion of an 
entity in the listing of nodes are not totally objective; their basis must be the expertise, 
experience, and judgment of the analyst. While it is possible to promulgate criteria for 
designation as a node, the most useful guidance for discrimination is as follows: Consider 
an entity a node when a change in it can be expected to significantly influence the system. 
While useful, this criterion is still relatively broad and requires additional explanation.
The decision calculus becomes somewhat less daunting when we consider elements 
individually.
For example, a member of congress is clearly an entity within the U.S. political 
system. However, removal or a change in an individual representative’s conduct may not 
produce any substantial impact on the political system. If this were the case, this 
particular representative probably would not be characterized as a node. In an economic
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illustration, it was possible for the vast commercial entity, Enron, to evaporate without 
causing the collapse, or even seriously endangering the overall U.S. economic system. 
Hence, sheer size or occupying a seemingly crucial position within the organizational 
structure in itself does not provide sufficient grounds for classification as a node.
Conversely, a minor cleric in a theocracy may not at first glance appear to be a 
node, but further examination may reveal considerable power within the political and 
social systems. His influence may far exceed his apparent position in the system; 
therefore, he could meet the criteria for a node. Similarly, a small pumping station within 
a complex crude oil distribution system may seem insignificant. However, an action 
taken against it could cause serious degradation of product flow with ensuing impact on 
the economic system. Again, the potential for influence on the system is the principal 
criterion for status as a node.
It should be apparent that the determination of when to characterize an entity as a 
node is rather inexact, subjective, and context dependent. This is the art of the analysis, 
and it provides advantages as well as complications to the assessment. Even with 
sophisticated information processing capabilities, available knowledge of systems of 
power is not unlimited. Hence, the number of nodes will vary with the quality and 
capacity of information gathering, analysis, and retrieval capabilities. Additionally, the 
nature of the objectives will necessitate varied depths of assessments. The knowledge 
requirements for a localized humanitarian assistance mission would be less intensive than 
situations where the aspiration was to collapse, or make ineffective, a nation’s entire 
military system.
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The critical issue is not the number of nodes or the criteria for designation.
Instead, it is the recognition that system entities are interrelated. The number of potential 
individual elements is unbounded. However, information collection, analysis, and 
promulgation assets are finite, so a focus must be on those elements that can appreciably 
influence the behavior o f the system. Those elements are best described as nodes, and 
these become the basis for further development of the methodology. However, noting the 
cautions against regression to an inappropriate reductionist approach, the focus must 
return to the holistic perspective.
The Holistic Perspective
The tasks related to merging the examination o f systems structure and function 
with identification of nodal interconnections may not directly support concurrently 
maintaining a holistic perspective. However, that does not entail that they are mutually 
exclusive. Rapoport observes, “Investigation of a system is frequently directed at 
uncovering the identities of the elements, the nature of the relations, and the dynamic 
laws governing the behavior or evolution of the system in time.”15 Providing further 
support for this contention, Byrne asserts, “we can describe the character of the system as 
a whole and seek to identify what key changes in controlling variables led to changes in 
that character.”16 The premise upon which to base further effort is that the nodes 
represent these controlling variables.
The advantage of focusing on nodes as an essential part o f the assessment of 
power is that as tangible entities they are more amenable to analysis than are esoteric
15. Rapoport, General Systems Theory. Cited in Sutherland, Systems Analysis, Administration and  
Architecture, 130.
16. Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, 72.
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conditions and phenomena such as complexity and systems behavior. Processes that 
concentrate on system elements and their interrelationships are not abundant and most 
have been limited to the military sector. As early as the 1930’s some proponents of air 
warfare argued for a focus on key strategic nodes, which were often described in terms of 
military centers of gravity. The calculus was relatively simple. If an entity was 
determined to be essential to the functioning of an adversary’s military strategy, then 
destroying or incapacitating that target was likely to force capitulation. These nodes 
could be traditional military targets, such as fortresses, or vital industries that propel the 
war machine.
While this level of application may be adequate for a traditional force-on-force 
conflict between relatively comparable militaries, the long-established center of gravity 
model is less useful in other types of conflicts. Contentions that are more recent include 
that strategists must “replace the assumption of pure rationality with sensitivity to the 
psychological, cultural, and political variables that may influence the adversary’s 
behavior”17 Hence, assessments of the totality of the system must consider nodes from all 
of the systems that comprise national power.
Due to their nature as tangible entities, nodes are conducive to scrutiny. Their 
position and function in the system may be determined. Similarly, any connections to 
other nodes are possible through research and examination. The challenge is to ensure 
that the analysis does not fall into a reductionist trap. However, the behavior of 
components and the system are linked. As Singer observes, “system attributes and sub­
system interaction patterns can never be too dissonant from one another;” and that
17. Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in The Limits o f  
Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 20.
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“innovative behavior on the part of one entity or actor can induce changes in the 
reciprocal behavior o f others, producing modified interactions in due course.”18
The key to solving this dilemma is development o f satisfactory models that 
present the relationships while continuing to take a systems perspective. As noted earlier, 
this is not a challenge-free undertaking, for “actions often interact to produce results that 
cannot be comprehended by linear models.”19 Adding to the predicament, as Richards 
notes, there is “no template in nonlinear modeling.”20 However, some endeavors in a 
variety of academic fields may present insights.
Since systems of power involve the connections of multiple nodes, the system 
may be described as a network (an interrelated set, group, or chain). Examination of 
ongoing work in network analysis may provide some benefits. Zeng offers, “neural 
network models are potentially better suited for the analysis of typical political data than 
simple linear models.”21 He advocates development of models that are appropriate for 
handling data with complex functions and from unknown sources. However, he 
acknowledges that these have not received much attention from political scientists and 
their potential has not been exploited. Others see the value in being able to look at 
elements and to determine the functionally important interdependencies among them, but 
noting, “as we move away from the physical systems the conceptualizations become
99progressively less rigorous.”
18. Singer, “Global System and its Sub-Systems,” 40.
19. Jervis, “Complexity and the Analysis o f  Political and Social Life,” 574.
20. Richards, Political Complexity, 10. However, she also contends, “nonlinearity can be combined 
with both rigorous formal analysis and traditional empirical techniques.”
21. Zeng, “Neural Network Models for Political Analysis,” 240. He describes neural networks as, “a 
particular class o f  nonlinear input-output models and as such are applicable to any problem o f pattern 
recognition, prediction or classification.”
22. Demchak, “Complexity and the Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” 231.
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Although the network model works so well in physiology and electrical 
engineering, it is not directly applicable to interactions between nodes, since these 
relationships are far less precise in nature, direction, and intensity. The minute electrical 
charge between synapses in the central nervous system may be described and predicted 
with much more certainty than the relationship between political and religious leaders. 
Therefore, while there are parallels between networks and nodal interactions within a 
system of systems, the network model is not amenable to direct application to this task. 
Hence, there remains a need for a more appropriate process that considers the special 
challenge of secondary effects.
This section has stated the problem in more detail and has focused on the key 
objective, i.e., merging of examinations of systems structure and function with 
identification of nodal interconnections, while maintaining a holistic perspective. It is 
now possible to provide a proposed methodology for commencing to address these 
challenges.
A Proposed Process
As I previously argued, an understanding of structure and functioning is critical to 
the system of systems construct. However, this is not the part of the analysis in the 
greatest need of improvement. Rather, the ability to respond to the second challenge, i.e., 
determination o f the linkages between components is lacking. Consequently, the 
interconnections between elements, and how these may have potential for exploitation, 
will be the principal focus of this section.
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National systems of power represent an immense field for study. Hence, a useable 
assessment demands a mix o f area expertise, e.g., economics, sociology, military, etc., 
and a structure that allows for efficient collection and analysis of information. For 
organizational purposes, the proposed process divides the sources of national power into 
the four categories introduced in Chapter IV: Political, Economic, Military, and Social 
(PEMS).23 However, this sorting is conducted primarily for organizational purposes; the 
objective is to structure the analysis, take advantage o f specialist skills and experience, 
and ensure that all elements of power are considered.
The boundaries between the PEMS areas are flexible and permeable. A basic 
assumption is that very few components must reside exclusively within one grouping. For 
example, a governmental agency may be primarily political, but its responsibilities are 
likely also to have economic and social implications. For that reason, the segregation of 
elements into categories is relatively arbitrary; the essence o f the task is determination of 
relationships between elements, not the placement of the components themselves. These 
are critical aspects that are essential to avoiding a purely reductionist approach.
The division into categories, while a necessary step, does not provide the basis for 
the analysis. Rosenau offers a similar perspective in his advocacy of the aggregation of 
micro parts in understanding the relationship between the components and the whole: “It 
is only for analytic purposes that we separate them out to trace and assess their 
consequences.”24 Establishment of the relationship between elements, within and across
23. As stated earlier, the number o f  categories is relatively unimportant, as long as a provision is made 
for inclusion o f  all possible nodes.
24. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990),
157. “Macro structures and collectives may have a perceived existence o f  their own, but they draw their 
sustenance from their micro components, and, like the system, they eventually have to adapt to the sources 
o f  support if  they are to persist.” See pp. 141-77 for his discussion o f  the micro (element) macro (system) 
linkages. See also Axelrod, Complexity o f  Cooperation, 3. Complexity theory involves the interactions o f
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political, economic, military, and social (PEMS) areas is the key task of those conducting 
a system of systems analysis.
The principal function of the system of systems analysis is first to establish the 
key elements of the systems, then to determine the key components within those 
elements, and finally to identify nodes and the connections between them. While the 
process is continuous and seamless, for simplicity I describe it as a series of steps. 
Sutherland provides a valuable and adaptable framework.
1. Isolate system boundaries and identify the major components of the system.
2. Develop a (spatial) distribution that illustrates where each component resides relative 
to the others.
3. Represent prevailing relationships between components, which potentially interact 
with the others.25
Each of these requires some elaboration:
Isolate boundaries and identify component. The principal rationale for this step is 
to provide guidance for the assignment o f nodes to a particular area. Focus will be on 
structure, and this activity will be the basis for subsequent analysis, since the “structural 
analysis o f a system is roughly equivalent to a geographical map.”26 As stated previously, 
boundaries of the Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) systems are flexible. 
The goal is to draw the borders between PEMS systems to best suit the analysis 
objectives and the available resources.
multiple actors. Acknowledging that managing the interactions between multiple actors and interactions is 
too difficult for mathematical solutions, he advocates use o f  computer simulation as a primary research 
tool.
25. Sutherland, Systems Analysis, 25.
26. Ibid., 25. He adds, “Every system has properties that serve to distinguish it as a unique entity.”
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Develop a distribution'. This task involves placement of nodes within one of the 
PEMS systems. While multiple systems potentially could be the primary locus of an 
individual element, for organizational purposes a decision on placement is required. For 
example, The Federal Reserve Board may be considered primarily either as an economic 
or a political node. Similarly, a religious leader may have political as well as social 
aspects and could reasonably be assigned to either area. While the analysis related to 
making this decision will be useful to ensuing steps, the question of the optimum PEMS 
system to which an element is assigned may have multiple correct answers.
Represent relationships between components. Herein lies the essential element of 
the analysis, i.e., determination of the interconnections between nodes within and across 
PEMS systems. Through knowledge of these interconnections we can begin to address 
the problems presented by secondary effects. Returning to the earlier depictions of node 
connections, if  we know that two nodes are related, and we determine that we want to 
take an action against one of these, then it follows that there may be a derivative effect on 
the second node. Hence, knowledge of the nature, strength, and stability of these 
interconnections becomes a primary focus.
Sutherland provides the basis for a methodology; however, a more precise 
delineation of the steps is required to describe properly the assessment process. The 
progression is depicted in Figure 13. For clarity, I will expand on each of these 
individually:
Step 1. Identification o f  the essential elements within each system. With the broad 
categories that comprise the system of systems (PEMS) already identified, the next step 
in the process is to determine the critical components o f each of these. The identification
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of a person, organization, or segment of infrastructure as an essential element is 






Examine nodes for node- 
to-node linkages
Assign linkages between 
nodes
Determine the essential 
sub-elements
Identify the essential 
elements within each 
system
Figure 13. The Assessment Process
For example, a highly developed industrial nation is likely to have a different set of 
essential elements within its PEMS systems than in the case of a developing nation. Some
97elements were introduced in Chapter IV. Table 4 provides additional refinement.
Step 2. Determination o f  the essential sub-elements o f  each o f  these. Since the essential 
elements are too broad for a comprehensive analysis, further decomposition is required. 
As with the elements, the number and character o f these sub-elements will not be the
27. This listing is neither exhaustive nor universally applicable, and is provided only for illustration. 
While a generic listing could be developed that would apply to the majority o f  sovereign nations, the 
essential elements listing requires adaptation based on the objective o f  the assessment and its environment.
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same universally and the assessment should use those that are appropriate for the ongoing 
assessment.
Table 4. Illustrative Essential Elements
System Essential Elements




Local and regional government officials






Means o f  production
Military Uniformed Personnel 









An illustration will contribute to understanding. If a Persian Gulf nation is the 
object of the analysis and the economic system is being investigated, determination of the 
essential elements may not be particularly challenging. Natural resources become an 
obvious essential element of its economic system. Other elements, such as transportation 
and communications infrastructure, would also exist; however, their relative importance 
would be dwarfed.28 Within natural resources, crude oil reserves and the means of
28. These essential elements would also be subject to analysis and deconstructed further. Since natural 
resources, and especially crude oil, are so important in this specific Persian Gulf scenario, they were 
singled out for illustration.
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production are likely to be essential sub-elements. Within the means of production are 
multiple entities. Among these are drilling platforms, storage and distribution facilities, 
and refining complexes. While this brings us closer to a practicable methodology, further 
refinement is mandated.
Step 3. Determination o f junctions, intersections, and leverage points (Nodes). 
Previous discussions concluded that an entity could be considered to be a node when a 
change in it is expected to significantly affect the system. Hence, the analyst again is 
faced with somewhat imprecise criteria. An effective determination of status as a node 
requires extensive knowledge of the system as well as of the component under 
consideration. Here is an instance where the effort in examining the structure and 
functioning o f the system can have a synergistic effect on the efforts related to 
determination of node interactions. The research and analysis that examines the systems 
will also contribute to the identification of nodal linkages and vice versa.
Following on from the previous example, if  distribution facilities represent the 
segment of the sub-element being examined, then the multiple components that comprise 
it provide the set of candidate nodes. Among these are multiple pipeline intersections, 
pumping facilities, oil terminals, and transfer stations. In this case, determination of the 
nodes would require considerable specialized skills and expertise. However, even a 
knowledgeable petroleum engineer also would require additional information on the 
specific distribution system to complete this task. Consequently, identification of nodes is 
a highly complex and information intensive task.
Step 4. Examination o f  nodes both within and across PEMS areas fo r  
determination o f node-to-node linkages. This step requires adoption of the system of
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systems construct. For as already established, nodes may interact with other nodes within 
and across Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) system boundaries. Due to 
the flexibility and permeability of the edges of the PEMS systems, interactions may occur 
anywhere within the overall system of power. Continuing with the illustration string, if  
pumping stations are being considered as candidate nodes, then the objective of the 
detailed analysis is to determine which individual stations, when acted upon could be 
expected to significantly influence the oil production element of the economic system. 
That is, can actions that would destroy or degrade that specific facility have a 
considerable impact on the system? It is important to note, that a selected action need not 
always be destructive or harmful. If the objective is to preclude disruption of the 
economic system, and if a node is determined to be critical to the functioning of that 
system, then the appropriate action may not be to degrade or destroy, but instead to 
protect that facility.
Step 5. Assigning linkages between nodes when a significant relationship exists. 
These node-to-node linkages provide the basis for determination o f possible secondary 
effects of actions. This in turn will provide insights for further understanding of the 
system as a whole. Concluding the string of examples, if crude oil pumping station A is 
determined to be dependent upon electrical production facility B, then an action against A 
is likely to influence B. Figure 14 illustrates these examples inserted into the sequence of 
tasks outlined in Figure 13.
If a particular official in a government petroleum agency controls the supply of 
critical parts for that pumping station, then that political node is connected to the 
economic node
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Identify the essential 
elements within each 
system
Natural resources 
Means o f  production
Pumping 
Station A








Pumping Station A; 
Power Facility B





Figure 14. Sample Elements and Nodes
. And if that official is a member of a particular religious or ethnic minority, a 
religious leader may also be a node to which it is connected. Additional connections are 
likely. As displayed earlier in Figure 15, the number of permutations is indeterminable.
From a systems perspective the inputs are information about the system of power. 
The analytical process provides outputs in the form of an overview of the PEMS systems 
that comprise an overall system of power, as well as a set of node-to-node linkages that 
can provide an indicator of secondary effects. The question that remains to be addressed 
is: Can these outputs be o f any value to the decision-maker whose current inventory o f 
analytical tools is lacking?
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Benefits
There is no pretense that mere recognition of the linkages between nodes can 
provide precise predictions of system behavior or of the ancillary effects of coercive 
actions. However, awareness of the connections, combined with an understanding of 
system structure and functions, is a powerful tool if  it can allow analysts to focus their 
efforts on a fraction of the immense number of potential secondary effects, which are 
currently beyond comprehension. Even if a full understanding of the behavior of the 
system is not obtainable, an ability to narrow the set of probable outcomes and to focus 
more clearly the search for potential secondary effects is of substantial utility to the 
decision-maker.
Figure 15 reproduces the system of systems depiction used in Chapter IV. Added 
to it is a set of nodes {PI, M l, M2, E l, E2, SI, S2), showing the interrelationships 
between nodes within and across the PEMS system boundaries. Hence, an action taken 
against any of the interconnected nodes has the potential to produce secondary effects. In 
this example, assume that analysis determined that military nodes, M l and M2 are 
related. If so, then an action taken to influence M l can reasonably be expected to also 
have an effect on M2. The nature and severity o f this secondary effect is dependent upon 
the character and strength of the relationship between M l and M2.
Recognition of this situation provides a number o f possible advantages. I offer 
three as the most valuable to the decision-maker.
1. Amplification o f the effects o f actions. An action designed to influence a 
specific node also is likely to have an effect on any nodes connected to it. This can result 
in extension of the effects of actions.





Figure 15. Nodes within Systems
Continuing the illustration with the use of military nodes, if  a particular air 
defense radar is determined to be connected to a specific air interceptor command and 
control facility, that facility may be degraded by destruction of the radar site. 
Furthermore, if  that same radar site is connected to additional command and control 
facilities, then the action to influence it may have cascading effects on those facilities. 
Hence, a single action may produce multiple desired effects. However, in a complex 
adaptive system, the equation is rarely so simple. The final analysis and decision also 
must consider factors such as redundancies in the overall system, e.g., back-up radars or 
other detection capabilities. Nevertheless, the potential for expanding the impact of the 
action due to knowledge o f the connections is readily apparent.
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2. Indication o f possible undesired effects. It is conceivable that an action taken 
against a node in one Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) system will have 
an undesired effect on another. This is the phenomenon o f surprise and rogue outcomes. 
Using another military example, the destruction of a bridge that is being used by 
insurgents to transit to and from a specific geographic area also may be on the primary 
route for the provision of humanitarian supplies to refugees within and beyond that area. 
If that bridge is destroyed, the intended military effect may be achieved. However, the 
unintended reduction in the ability to sustain the refugees could have a deleterious 
influence on the social, economic, and political systems, and run counter to the overall 
objectives of the mission. The recognition of this possible outcome does not rule out the 
destruction of the bridge, but it does provide the decision-maker with additional 
information upon which to select or reject that action. As Demchak contends, “Only
90greater knowledge lessens the effects of rogue outcomes.”
3. Recognition o f alternative actions. In the application of coercive power there 
are likely to be situations where the analysis indicates that an action taken to influence a 
specific node has a high probability of generating the desired effect. However, that action 
may not be possible for a variety of reasons, e.g., proximity to critical civilian 
infrastructure, political considerations, lack of resources, etc. In these cases, knowledge 
of the connections between nodes may allow a node to be influenced indirectly, i.e., 
through exploitation of a secondary effect. Using the illustration in Figure 19, assume 
that node PI is determined the primary node to be influenced, but actions against that 
person are proscribed. Since the analysis indicates that node E l  is linked to that node, it
29. Demchak, “Complexity and the Theory o f  Networked Militaries,” 227. Rogue outcomes are those 
unintended, unexpected and unanticipated results o f  actions.
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may be possible to influence PI though actions taken against El. For example, if the 
owner o f a commercial facility (E l in this illustration) has close ties with a senior 
government official (PI), and action against PI  is prohibited, then an alternative course 
may be to take an action against the economic node (El)  with the objective of influencing 
the political node (PI).
These illustrations describe three potential benefits of the methodology: (1) 
identification of opportunities for extension of the effects of actions; (2) indications of 
likely undesired effects; and, (3) recognition of secondary effects to mitigate targeting 
dilemmas. Even if partially available, such insights can be of immense value to those who 
must consider options in the application of coercive power. However, the limits on 
application of the process must be recognized so that expectations are managed and to 
preclude its inappropriate use.
Limitations
The ability to perform these tasks and to produce the desired outputs is directly 
related to the degree of comprehension of the system and its nodal linkages. The depth 
and breadth of this knowledge is the principal limitation of the methodology since 
“Knowing all the possible outcomes of a dynamic system is theoretically impossible, and 
thus there remains a final subset of unknowns that are simply unknowable.”
Some argue that attainment of even a rudimentary knowledge of the behavior of a 
complex system is a daunting task. King contends: “Parts or elements or individuals 
within a complex system are not isolatable or discrete phenomena,” and “a purely
30. Ibid., 26. She contends that every system has a set o f  “unknowable unknowns.”
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objectivist, mechanistic-reductionist scientific stance is literally impossible.”31 Other 
relevant observations include that causality is holistically relational, and that there are 
“no clear cut dependent and independent variables as such.”32 By extension, this implies 
that precise determination of cause and effect, and an ability to discriminate between 
primary and secondary effects, is not attainable.
While these views should be considered, acceptance of their arguments does not 
preclude utilization of the proposed methodology. Instead, their impact is to limit the 
applications of this model and construct. While not providing a panacea for 
understanding or predicting effects within complex adaptive systems, if used 
appropriately, the insights attained can be of considerable value when decisions regarding 
application of power are undertaken.
The discussions of nonlinearity, complexity, and system effects provided in 
earlier chapters contained one consistent message, i.e., understanding the behavior of 
complex adaptive systems is a most intricate and demanding task. The lack of a 
capability to provide an appreciable level of knowledge and comprehension supports that 
conclusion. However, if the desired complete solution is not possible, a process that can 
satisfy a portion o f that requirement remains worthwhile. The nuclear physicist cannot 
claim to understand completely all aspects of subatomic structure. However, the model of 
electrons in orbit around a set of protons and neutrons, while not perfect and never 
directly observed, was sufficient to lead to the development of nuclear power.
The shortfall in suitable tools for the decision-maker in this context is partially 
due to the unrequited aspiration for a model that can withstand the rigor o f empirical
31. King, Social Science and Complexity, 91.
32. Ibid., 90.
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proof used in the physical sciences. This is not an attainable goal. Models in the social
sciences rarely attain precision. However, “A complex, highly relational system is no less
• . . .
ordered just because raw empiricism cannot appraise it.” The geo-political environment
provides no laboratory for experimentation and there are no means for providing a 
control set with which to test the hypothesis. Therefore, more restricted applications must 
be the objective. We cannot change the nature of the system of systems that comprise 
national power. Nor can the environment in which they exist be significantly altered. 
Therefore, the objective should be for tools that can enhance decision-making and 
anticipation of secondary effects under those conditions.
Czerwinski asserts that a worthwhile goal is to command and manage complexity 
rather than to predict or control.34 Singer adds, “Explanation may not be possible; 
description is a more modest goal.”351 concur with these observations. This proposition 
is designed to provide utility, not paradigmatic exactness. Thus, the desired product of 
this process and methodology is not precise prediction; instead, it is the less ambitious 
objective of providing the decision-maker with a practical, albeit limited, tool.
Summation
This chapter provided a practicable scheme for the assessment o f power and 
anticipation of secondary effects through a system of systems construct. The rationale for 
development of such a design is: (1) actions taken to influence one element of a system 
will result in changes in the other components with which it is connected; and, (2)
33. King, Social Science and Complexity, 89. He adds, “Contingency, systematic error, ambiguity, 
openness, and indeterminacy are therefore, inherent in non-linear holistic systems.”
34. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds, 2.
35. Singer, “Global System and its Subsystems,” 32. He advocates, “developing operational 
descriptions” and “producing data-based empirical solutions.”
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existing methodologies do not provide an understanding of the relationships between 
elements or the requisite holistic knowledge of the system to allow for anticipation of 
secondary effects.
The source of the dilemma is that when more than two entities interact, the 
number of possible resultant effects of an action becomes indeterminable. Since systems 
of national power are comprised of hundreds of possible nodes, precise prediction of 
secondary effects is not possible. However, I rejected the deduction that this condition 
entails that there can be no feasible ways to generate insight into secondary effects.
Development of a means to confront this situation requires a methodology that 
provides a view of the structure and functioning of the system as well as an ability to 
identify key connections between elements while maintaining a holistic perspective. Of 
these, the ability to understand structure and function currently is the most developed. 
Therefore, subsequent discussion focused on the other requirements, particularly the 
interaction between nodes within and across systems.
Although operating as a continuous and seamless process, the proposed 
methodology was presented as a series of steps that: (1) identify the essential elements 
within each system; (2) determine the essential sub-elements; (3) designate nodes; (4) 
examine nodes for linkages; and, (5) assign linkages between nodes. This provides a plot 
of the connections that could be exploited by the analyst and decision-maker.
Accepting that complete understanding of system behavior and prediction of 
secondary effects was not possible, I presented three potential benefits of the 
methodology: (1) identification of opportunities for extension of the effects of actions;
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(2) indication of likely undesired effects; and, (3) recognition of alternative nodes and 
actions.
I acknowledge that the accrued benefits are limited. However, since the nature of 
the systems of power and the environment in which they exist is not alterable, the 
objective should be for tools that enhance decision-making and anticipation o f secondary 
effects under those conditions. This methodology provides the foundation for 
development of that limited but valuable capability.
The lack of a suitable experimentation milieu and mechanisms for controlling the 
behavior of the actors results in an inability to provide empirical data to support the 
hypotheses that interactions between elements within a system can be determined using a 
system of systems construct. Likewise, it is not possible to prove that awareness of these 
interactions can lead to an enhanced ability to anticipate the secondary effects o f actions. 
The quandary is that since this is a proposed methodology that has never been overtly 
employed, there are no examples of its utilization that can provide indications of its 
worth. However, there may be occasions where the fundamentals of this process were 
utilized, and these scenarios may provide some insight into the possibilities for future 
applications. Herein is an avenue for further illustration and examination of the proposal.
The objective is to transform analyses o f past applications o f coercive power into 
the language and process o f the system of systems construct to determine if  there are 
parallels and lessons to be accrued. The means of accomplishment is a set of three ex post 
case studies of attempts to achieve national or alliance objectives. These endeavors were 
conducted by means of coercive actions designed to influence systems of power. Through 
these examples, which experienced varying degrees of success in the attainment of
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objectives, the potential for the methodology may be better understood. These studies— 
Somalia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—are the focus of the following three chapters.




The methodology presented in Chapter V provides the framework of a process for 
assessments of national power that allows some ability to anticipate the primary and 
secondary effects of actions. Since there are no clear examples of overt applications of 
this type of approach, evaluation of its effectiveness is problematic. However, recent 
history may provide illustrations of the application of the basic principles and 
assumptions o f the methodology.
The premise of this contention is that although planners may not have overtly 
employed a systems approach to the planning and execution of their campaign, they did 
adopt and utilize many of the aspects of the systems approach. In some of these instances, 
the selected actions supported the attainment of goals. In other cases, measures designed 
to provide the intended effects produced secondary consequences that ran counter to 
stated objectives. In both circumstances, however, the utilization of a systems approach 
may have been useful in understanding the primary and secondary effects that resulted 
from these actions. The framework methodology presented in Chapter V, combined with 
identification of a number o f primary and secondary effects ex post facto, provides the 
structure for the analysis contained in this chapter.
As will the two that follow, this chapter provides a very brief narrative that sets 
the stage for the conflict. I study the major protagonists to show cases where their 
objectives were conflicting— and where they were compatible. From these, the intended 
effects that were designed to accomplish objectives will be postulated. Following that
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necessary activity, I utilize the process presented in Chapter V to illustrate with actual 
data the potential for employment of the process. I then extract a set o f representational 
nodes from available sources and delineate the actions taken against those nodes in order 
to identify instances where knowledge o f node-to-node relationships may have served as 
an indicator o f subsequent secondary effects.
The United Nations intervention in Somalia during the period from December 
1992 to March 1995 provides an appropriate and relevant scenario upon which to test the 
supposition that the elements and principles o f a system of systems construct were 
utilized by decision-makers who wished to influence behavior within that collapsed state 
at the Horn of Africa. This mission was unique in several ways. The United Nations (UN) 
embarked upon a military action without the specific invitation of the host nation, it 
represented one of the first cases of a multinational response to a humanitarian crisis in 
the post-cold war era, and it explored various models of international actions in response 
to failed states. Additionally, the intervention, which began as a humanitarian relief 
mission, transitioned to the multifaceted aspects of peace operations—from peacekeeping 
to nation building.
In order to provide a clear depiction within the space available, I will focus on the 
period of the most intense interactions, i.e., from the deployment o f the U.S.-led 
multinational Unified Task Force (UNITAF), in December 1992, through the extraction 
of the follow-on second United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOMII) in March 
1995. However, the crisis that generated the intervention did not begin in 1992; therefore, 
any assessment must consider the environment in which the coercive actions were taken. 
Hence, a brief outline of recent history of the region is appropriate.
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As are most African nations, Somalia is an entity created by colonial powers. 
Independent since 1961, the current borders were established when the former British 
Somaliland and the Italian Trust Territory of Somaliland were merged into the Somali 
Republic. The newly independent state established a parliamentary form o f government 
based on European models, with political power concentrated in the former Italian 
occupied area of southern Somalia and the capital of Mogadishu. Despite an 
exceptionally low level of modernization and economic development, Somalia’s initial 
decade of autonomy represented one of the few examples of a successful transition from 
colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. This condition was to be short-lived.
Uniting all Somali peoples under a single nation-state initially was a 
preoccupation of the Somali government. This quest produced friction with its neighbors, 
particularly its ancient adversary, Ethiopia. With little hope of achieving this goal through 
peaceful means, and not possessing the military power to do so by force, Prime Minister 
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal moderated Pan-Somali nationalism in the late 1960’s.
Partly as a response to the rejection of a Greater-Somali state, a revolt of military 
officers led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre ended in a bloodless coup in October 
1969. Political and military power resided within the 20-member Supreme Revolutionary 
Council (SRC) that proclaimed the Somali Democratic Republic. The basis of the newly 
established government was a Somali adaptation of Soviet style communism known as 
“scientific socialism.” Barre became President of the Republic and Secretary General of 
the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. An absolute and dictatorial ruler, Barre 
succeeded in establishing a cult of personality around himself and centralizing power on
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his Marehan clan.1 The regime had close military, economic, and political ties to the 
Soviet Union.
The previously repressed tensions with Ethiopia reemerged in the mid-1970s. 
Taking advantage of the instability resulting from the overthrow of the Ethiopian 
Emperor in 1975, Somalia invaded the contested Ogaden area. Soviet support shifted to 
the Ethiopians, and the two-year Ogaden War resulted in multiple military setbacks for 
the Somali forces and their eventual withdrawal from the region. Somalia turned to the 
West for support and entered into agreements with the United States that granted limited 
access to military facilities in Somalia. By the end of the decade, internal support for 
Barre began to wane.
Although the government mounted a serious effort to discourage and deemphasize 
clan and tribal identities, opposition to Barre was linked to clan association. 
Dissatisfaction with the regime emerged, especially in the north where the Issaq clan was 
foremost. An all-out civil war developed during thel980’s between Barre’s forces and 
those of the Issaq dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) with its power base in 
the former British Somaliland capital of Hargeisa.
Armed opposition to the Barre regime spread from the north to the central and 
southern regions, and he remained in control only in the Mogadishu area. The anti-regime 
forces continued to grow in strength and support, and in January 1991 Barre, fled into
1. For a more detailed examination o f  the massive human rights abuses o f  the Barre regime see Africa 
Watch Committee, Somalia: A Government at War with It Own People, (New York: Africa Watch 
Committee, 1990).
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exile, leaving Somalia without a functioning government.2 The stage for a humanitarian 
crisis was set.
These few paragraphs provide the background necessary to enable a better 
understanding of the systemic conditions in Somalia post 1991. However, any 
examinations of a system must consider the environment and existing state of the system. 
Hence, prior to an examination of actions and their effects, I will address the conditions, 
specifically the systems of power within Somalia.
A Representational System of Systems Analysis
I contend that during the Somalia operation the United Nations and United States, 
in some instances, utilized the principles of a system of systems analysis in the selection 
of actions. In order to support this supposition, and to illustrate the methodology further, I 
will present the framework for a system of systems analysis in 1992-1995 Somalia. The 
steps presented in Chapter V are: (1) Identify the essential elements within each system; 
(2) determine the essential sub-elements; (3) designate nodes; (4) examine nodes for 
node-to-node linkages; and, (5) assign linkages between nodes. Again, a complete 
analysis is beyond the scope of this effort and I will provide no more than illustrative 
examples. I will present only a brief representation of the analysis for each of the 
Political, Economic, Military, and Social (PEMS) Areas, and narrow the focus to the 
selection of only a very few nodes.
2. See U.S. Department o f  State, “Background Note: Somalia,” April 2005, 
http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (accessed 5 April 2005) for a condensed recent political history 
o f Somalia. For a description o f  the evolution o f  Somalia through the pre- and post-colonial periods to its 
collapse into a stateless society, see Maria H. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in 
Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness? (Utrecht, Netherlands: International Books, 2001), 2439-42, 
provides a more detailed introductory survey with a good depiction o f  the political movements and their 
clan linkages.
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A fully developed analysis would be an immense effort requiring myriad research 
assets, people, sources, and knowledge management tools. Hence, the objective here is to 
provide only the minimum amount of information to “fill in the blanks” with actual data 
into the framework presented in Chapter V. Consequently, the nodes selected for further 
analysis and development will be limited to those that were actually acted upon during 
the conflict.
Somalia presents a challenge to conducting analysis from a systems perspective. 
As will be illustrated in this section, only the social system was relatively well developed 
and it was unstable due to the pressures the Barre regime placed upon it and years of 
internal warfare. However, if  the construct is applicable, even to a limited extent, to a 
collapsed state such as Somalia, then its relevance to assessments of more structured and 
developed systems becomes evident. With that premise established, I will now present 
the representational system of systems analysis.
Essential Elements of the Systems
Political. A U.S. Department of State study provides a severe but illuminating 
analysis o f the Somali political system in 1992. Under the heading o f “Government,” the 
assessment states “None,” and continues, “Somalia has had no functioning national 
government since the United Somali Conference (USC) ousted the regime of Maj. Gen. 
Mohamed Siad “Barre” in January 1991.”3 What once was the Somali state no longer 
existed— Somalia had simply collapsed. This condition is more severe than the common 
depiction of a failed  state, where a central government is functioning but is exceptionally
3. U.S. Department o f  State, “Background Note: Somalia,” 2. Additionally, under the headings o f  
“Political Parties and Legal System,” the evaluation is “none functioning.”
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weak and ineffective. Lyons and Samatar contend, “State collapse occurs when structure, 
authority, legitimate power, law and political order fall apart, leaving behind a civil 
society that lacks the ability to rebound to fill the vacuum.”4 This vacuum must somehow 
be filled. In the case of Somalia, in the absence of any legitimate authority, power went to 
those with the weapons. While there was some minimal organization based on clan 
affiliation, the contending factions were in many cases little more than armed thugs, who 
were bereft of a cause beyond their own financial gain.
The connections between the clans, regions, and weakly structured political 
movements are important to any analysis of the political system. The clans, which had 
coexisted in relative harmony for centuries, but whose influence was undermined during 
the period o f scientific socialism, emerged as the nucleus of the major armed struggles. 
Opposition to the Barre regime had been based on three political groups that had clan 
identification as their foundation: Issaq, the Somali National Movement (SNM); Hawiye, 
the United Somali Congress (USC); and, Ogadeni, the Somali Patriotic Movement 
(SPM). Although temporarily allied against a common foe, “These three movements 
loathed each other almost as they did Barre.”5 Alice Bettis Hashim contends that a key to 
understanding the system is that the alliances are formed “between clans and sub-clans 
especially as they are required by the weaker groups.”6 Hence, the means to
4. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, M ultilateral Intervention, and  
Strategies fo r  Political Reconstruction (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995)., 1.
5. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from  Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 1993), 13, contends that while clan rivalry was important, the presence 
o f  large quantities o f  arms— a legacy o f  the cold war rivalries between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.— exacerbated 
the situation.
6. Alice Bettis Hashim, The Fallen State: Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Somalia (New York: 
University Press o f  America, 1997), 36. Important to the study o f  this crisis is that the elements o f  these 
alliances most commonly band together in order to meet an external threat.
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understanding the political system of Somalia resides in knowledge of the political 
movements and their relationship to the clans.
By 1992, the United Somali Congress (USC), which had seized control of 
Mogadishu the year earlier, had split into two major factions: the Aideed led Somali 
National Alliance (SNA); and the Somali Salvation Alliance, headed by Ali Mahdi. The 
struggle for power between these two factions was to represent the principal source of 
armed conflict in Somalia.
The connections between the clans, the geographic regions where its members are 
concentrated, the predominant associated political movements, and the key individuals 
are important to the analysis. For example, rival political movement leaders (nodes) may 
share allegiance to the same clan. Knowledge of these relationships enhances the ability 
to determine the possible effects of actions. Table 5 presents some of the clan, region, 
political movement, and node relationships.
The clans themselves are not unified and homogenous; rather they are comprised 
of multiple subdivisions down to the tribe and family level, and conflicts can arise within 
the clans. Although they were members of the same Hawiye clan, Aideed’s militias were 
primarily from the Ahabir Gedir sub-clan, while Mahdi’s were from the Abgal sub-clan. 
Hence, awareness of identity must go beyond mere clan affiliation.
Assessments of the political systems of most nations would include the structure 
and functioning of organizations within that system. The lack of a functioning political 
system in Somalia during the period under examination results in the need to consider the 
leadership of the armed bands, commonly referred to as warlords, as the most important 
political nodes.
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Table 5. Somali Clan Relationship Examples
Clan Region Movement Node














Issaq Northwest Somali National 
Movement
Abdi Warsemeh Isar
United Somali Front Abd ar-Rahman Dualeh 
Ali
Central/Northeast Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front
Mohamed Abshir Musse
Economic. Somalia in 1992 possessed a basic subsistence economy with minimal 
foreign trade. Historically, its principal exports have been agricultural products, primarily 
livestock. Due to natural and man-made disasters, its primary import remained food.
Most European trade was with the former colonial power, Italy, while Yemen and the 
United Arab Emirates were its major partners in limited regional trade. During the cold 
war years both the U.S. and USSR improved deepwater port facilities at Berbera, 
although these fell into disrepair in the ensuing period. There is no railroad system, and 
the 2,600 kilometers of all-weather roads had deteriorated due to lack of maintenance.7
By 1992, Somalia was almost completely dependent upon foreign assistance. 
Internally, the looting and resale of food shipments became a primary element o f the 
economy. Militias and gangs of drug-hyped teenagers, mooryan, roamed the country in
7. Europa World Yearbook 1992, (London: Europa Publications, Inc. 1993), 2439-47.
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armed trucks known as technicals.8 Protection became a service industry, with gangs 
hiring themselves out to relief agencies to preclude the “defenders” from confiscating the 
supplies.
Without the means to provide even a basic level o f subsistence for the population, 
the single-most important element in the Somali economy in 1992 was the internationally 
donated relief supplies and the non-governmental and private volunteer organizations that 
provided them. The nodes were the port and storage facilities and the lines of 
communication to those desperately in need of the supplies. These are nodes because an 
action taken to influence them is likely to have an impact on the overall system. For 
example, warlord control of the port facilities severely degraded the flow of relief 
supplies with the consequence of severe disruptions to the economic system.
Military \ During the early years of independence, Somalia possessed one of the 
stronger militaries in the region. The Somali National Army combined British and Italian 
training and traditions with modem Soviet equipment. However, its defeat in the Ogaden 
War with Ethiopia weakened its support among the general Somali populace. With the 
overthrow of Barre, the Somali National Army disintegrated into multiple independent 
bands and for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. By late 1992, there were no state 
controlled Somali armed forces. Without a state apparatus possessing a monopoly on 
violence, individual militias became the de facto military force of Somalia.
Although loose allegiance to the leadership existed, the paramilitary units in many 
instances were no more than undisciplined gangs o f roving bandits. This condition 
complicates the identification of specific nodes. While estimates are inaccurate and the
8. The name derived from the status o f  the gangs as “technical assistants” to the relief efforts. Heavy 
weapons were fitted to jeeps, land rovers and small trucks, which became primitive fighting vehicles.
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numbers wide-ranging, General Morgan reportedly could employ over 1,000 former 
Somali National Army troops in his militia. Estimates of the forces loyal to Omar Jess 
were “several thousand strong.”9 An illustration of some of the connections between clan 



























Figure 16. Key Belligerents’ Clan and Political Movement Linkages
The UN and coalition commanders considered Aideed himself, who claimed more 
than 30,000 troops, to be a primary node and went to exceptional lengths to kill or 
capture him. Ali Mahdi, as a powerful militia leader and principal antagonist of Aideed, 
would also be considered a node within the military system.
9. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington: United States Institute o f  Peace Press, 1995), 76.
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The principal protagonists were Aideed, Abdi Warsame, and Ali Mahdi. Morgan 
was connected to Jess through a previous military and political relationship; Morgan and 
Jess were related due to their Ogadeni clan allegiance; hence, the second order 
connection to Aideed. The relationships become complex because Aideed opposes Barre, 
who supports Morgan. Even in this simplified illustration the difficulty in predicting the 
secondary effects of actions is significant.
Social. The people who have occupied Somalia since the first century A.D. are 
ethnically homogeneous. Unique to that part of the continent, Somalia is the only nation 
in sub-Saharan Africa with a solitary ethnic group. Adherence to Islam and a common 
language are the primary forces that join the inhabitants; the vast majority (85 per cent) 
being Somali and Sunni Muslim. Traditionally, this has been a relatively benign brand of 
Islam. Exceptions are radical Islamic groups such as the al-Tabliq and A1 Ittihad who are 
among the main non-clan based groups in Somalia.10 The Somali Nationalist Islamic 
Front (NIF) reportedly received support, including funding and weapons, from Iran and 
Sudan, but their impact proved minimal.11
Most inhabitants are pastoral nomads, with perceptible distinctions between the 
majority rural population and the urban dwellers. Overall literacy is 24 per cent, 
concentrated mainly in Mogadishu. Although relatively uniform, Somali society is not 
static and has been described as “flexible and rich in variety.”12 The social formations are 
characterized by “the intermeshing of economic, production, political life, and culture.”13
10. U.S. Department o f  State, “Background Note: Somalia,” 26. Al-Itthad was the more vocal o f  the 
two in advocating the use o f  violence to achieve their common goal o f  the establishment o f  an Islamic state.
11. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 84. Religious links between northern 
Somalia and Sudan have existed for centuries. 85.
12. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia, 33.
13. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 8.
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In Somalia, the boundaries between the systems of power are exceptionally porous. “Clan 
affiliation is interwoven with social, economic, and political life of the Somali.”14 Hence, 
isolation of the political from the social is not possible.
“For generations, the single-most important factor in Somali society has been the 
clan.”15 Stevenson asserts, that clans “are not for the most part, religiously or ethnically 
based,” and that they “would only band together if  the equilibrium among nomadic 
enclaves was disrupted.”16 The clans make up the largest element o f categorization; 
however, the multiple sub-clans, tribes, and families are the primary groups that define 
one’s identity. Another important element of Somali society is the pan-Somali code of 
heer, which is a binding influence that emphasizes “the values of interdependence and 
inclusiveness and thus formed the basis for social order.”17 The clan/sub-clan/tribe family 
connections are complex. Figure 17 depicts the clan relationships and connections extant 
in 1992.
Since the social interactions in Somalia are so closely linked to clan, sub-clan and 
tribal identity, an understanding of these relationships is critical to any assessment. It is 
this complex and intricate set o f clan, tribe, and family relationships that makes an 
understanding of Somali so difficult, and so necessary. Nodes that could be included in 
the social system would be clan and religious leaders such as Aideed, Ali Mahdi, and 
Mohamed Abshir Musse. I have discussed the first two earlier. Musse is a node due to his 
earlier anti-communist stance. As “a leader in the northeast part of the country, he headed
14, Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia, 98
15, Makinda, Seeking Peace from  Chaos, 18.
16. Jonathon Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia,” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 93), 142.
17. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 10, contend that heer did not eliminate strife but provided a means o f  
dealing with disputes and conflicts. Hashim, Fallen State, 35, describes heer as “social order arranged 
through social contracts,” and that its meaning equates to “agreement, compact, contract or bilateral treaty.”
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armed forces against Islamic fundamentalists in factional fighting there more than a 
decade ago and worked with U.S. officials in setting up nonpolitical police forces in his 
region and in Mogadishu in 1992 and 1993.”18
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Figure 17. Genealogical Chart of Somalia 19
Due to the extent to which clan relationships affect all o f the systems of power in 
Somalia, the analysis must include consideration of interactions across system 
boundaries. These linkages are a key element of the system of systems construct.
18. George Jr. Lardner, “Former Somali General Told to Leave U.S.,” Washington Post, March 17, 
2003.
19. Chart reproduced from ibid., 9.
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Node Linkages -  The System of Systems
The diagrams that depict the overlap between the systems presented earlier used 
ovals of equal size to illustrate the overall system relationships. However, in the case of 
Somalia, the economic and military systems are relatively weak and undeveloped, and the 
political and social systems are nearly identical. Therefore, Figure 18 provides a more 
accurate portrayal of the relative importance and overlap of the four systems o f power.
Political Social
MilitaryEconomic
Figure 18. Systems of Power in Somalia 1992
While all four systems are interrelated, the nearly non-existent economic aspect and the 
diffuse and unstructured military are less of a factor in the analysis than the closely 
intertwined political and social systems. However, it is equally important to consider the 
linkages across systems. This is complicated in Somalia due to the lack of an economic
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infrastructure, and an organized government with a loyal military. Additionally, 
individual nodes, such as Aideed, could reside in multiple areas
A principal task of the analyst is to determine these linkages across systems. For 
example, militias routinely hired themselves out to private volunteer organizations to 
protect the relief supplies. In this case, a warlord, such as Omar Jess, could be linked to a 
relief organization, like Medecins sans Frontiere. Many of the warlords had connections 
to political movements, e.g., Mahdi and the Northern Somali Alliance.
The intent of this very brief excursion is to present only some illustrative 
examples of a system of systems analysis to enhance understanding of the principles of 
the construct. As a further step toward this objective, I will present additional examples 
from the intervention. This first requires establishing the proximate causes for the crisis 
and the decision to intervene.
The Impetus for Intervention
The collapse of the Barre regime “created a vacuum of legitimate institutions that 
was filled in different ways in different regions.”20 Gangs of armed teenagers, whose 
primary motivation was looting and banditry rather than allegiance to any political dogma 
or charismatic leader, filled this void. The competition between groups seeking the 
limited booty available in this impoverished collapsed state resulted in armed conflicts, 
primarily between factions of the United Somali Congress (USC). Faction leaders 
reemerged and exploited the previously repressed clan linkages and rivalries.
Followers of Ali Mahdi Mohamed battled with those of General Mohamed Farah 
Aideed in Mogadishu where a de facto boundary between their areas of influence
20. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 21.
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materialized despite the lack of a formal agreement on a line of demarcation. Between 
November 1991 and the following February, battles virtually destroyed the remaining 
infrastructure o f Mogadishu and produced the human tragedy o f thousands of civilian 
deaths and many more refugees. Outside the capital city, conflicts erupted between two 
factions within the Ogandeni Somali Patriotic Movement, one led by Colonel Omar Jess, 
and the other by General Siad Hersi “Morgan.” Although fighting was less evident in the 
north, armed elements o f the Somali National Movement (SNM) supported the 
establishment of a secessionist Republic of Somaliland in the territory of the former 
British Somaliland.
Aideed’s forces progressively gained the upper hand by late 1991. The near 
continuous fighting and the resulting inability to distribute relief supplies had been 
responsible for civilian deaths and injuries in the tens of thousands. Recognizing his 
inferior military position, Ali Mahdi appealed to the United Nations, which imposed an 
arms embargo in January 1992 and dispatched an envoy. However, the primary objective 
of establishing an agreement for a ceasefire was not attained.
Subsequently, delegates to a conference convened by the Organization of African 
Unity, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of the Islamic Conferences 
appealed for an armistice in order to contend with the increasing humanitarian crisis. The 
principal rival factions eventually joined the conference and agreed to the terms of the 
ceasefire in March. The following month, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
directed the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to 
monitor the agreement.21
21. This UN presence was manifested in a 50-strong observer mission. The UNSC (Resolution 751, 24 
April 1992) also agreed in principle to send a security force to protect UN personnel and supplies at the
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UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali dispatched Algerian diplomat 
Mohamed Sahnoun as his Special Representative. Through proactive engagement with 
the warring parties and an excellent understanding of the Somali culture and political 
concerns and aspirations, Sahnoun was able to broker an agreement to deploy a 500 man 
security force to protect the relief supplies that were arriving in Somalia but were not 
being delivered to their intended recipients due to continuous looting by armed gangs. 
Despite these notable successes, his criticism of UN and national efforts resulted in 
Sahnoun’s replacement with Iraqi diplomat Ismat Kittani. It was not until September that 
500 lightly armed Pakistani troops who represented the military component o f UNOSOM 
arrived in Somalia. Aideed successfully prevented this force from conducting its mission; 
the Pakistani troops essentially never ventured from their barracks while the human 
tragedy around them grew. By November nearly 350,000 (out of an estimated total
00population of six million) Somalis had perished due to malnutrition during that year.
In late 1992, Barre reemerged from exile and attempted to retake the capital. 
Aideeds’ forces successfully countered this offensive and eventually drove Barre’s forces 
from the country. The cost of this conflict was an ever-increasing level o f human 
suffering, exacerbated by disease and famine, described by one U.S. official as “the 
greatest humanitarian emergency in the world.”23 The heartrending images o f starving 
children and an international community apparently powerless to alleviate the suffering
port o f  Mogadishu and to escort supplies to their planned eventual destinations. This required the 
agreement o f  both parties; however, Aideed subsequently refused to accept the presence o f  additional 
foreign military personnel. See Makinda, Seeking Peace from  Chaos, 13, esp. 59-82, and Europa Yearbook 
1992, (London: Europa Publications, 1993), 2440-42 for more detailed presentation o f  the events leading to 
the UN actions.
22. Precise figures are elusive. The International Committee o f  the Red Cross estimated that by the end 
o f 1992 over one million Somalis had perished since the beginnings o f  the conflict. See Stevenson, “Hope 
Restored in Somalia,” 138-39.
23. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 30.
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was ubiquitous in the Western media and served to awaken the consciences of the
audiences. This awareness generated appeals to “do something.”
Although he had recently lost his bid for reelection, U.S. President George H.W.
Bush met with his National Security Council to explore means o f dealing with the
increasingly visible crisis. This resulted in an American proposal to Boutros-Ghali that
became the key provision of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794.
The important specification was the authorization to use “all necessary means to establish
as soon as possible a secure environment for relief operations in Somalia.”24 The manner
in which these actions were undertaken provides the foundation of this case study.
This examination continues from the brief history provided earlier in the chapter
and will commence with the adoption of UNSCR 794 on 3 December 1992. The
resolution expressed alarm at the deterioration o f the humanitarian situation in Somalia
and responded to urgent calls “for the international community to take measures to ensure
the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia.”25 John Hirsch and Robert Oakley
contend that the impetus for additional U.S. involvement came from three major sources:
26(1) the media; (2) international humanitarian relief organizations; and, (3) Congress.
Somalia had become an issue during the 1992 presidential campaign, with the 
Democrats denouncing the failure of the Bush administration to take effective action. 
Direct U.S. involvement had begun in August during Operation Provide Relief, which 
supported humanitarian assistance efforts with logistics assets, primarily airlift.
24. Action authorized under provisions o f  Chapter VII (Enforcement) o f  the UN Charter. Text o f  
Resolution provided in Appendix A o f  Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 180.
25. U.S. Congress, House o f  Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Markup on S.J. Res. 45 
Authorizing the Use o f  Force in Somalia, 23 May 1993, Appendix 3.
26. Hirsh and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 35. See Chapter 3, esp. 35-47 for a more 
detailed examination o f  the events leading to the decision to intervene militarily. The authors observe a 
near complete turnaround o f  the DOD position in the last months o f  the year.
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Lamentably, due to the interception of the food and medicine by the warlords and 
bandits, this effort was not successful in getting the supplies to the starving masses that 
needed it. Jeffrey Clark contends that by November, “80 percent of relief goods in 
Somalia were being looted and famine was claiming in excess of a thousand victims a 
day.”27 Hence, security for the movement of these supplies became a primary objective 
requiring a significantly different force, one that would be combat-capable.
Despite the overwhelming conventional military victory in Iraq in 1991, the 
senior Department of Defense leadership was reluctant to become engaged in operations 
without a clear objective, an overwhelming force, and a strategy for withdrawal.
However, with pressure on the administration for action steadily increasing, these 
concerns were overcome, and Operation Restore Hope began on 8 December 1992 under 
the organizational structure of a multinational, but U.S. led, Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF).
The critical lesson, which UN and American decision-makers understood by 
varied degrees, is that the military conflict could not be adequately addressed without an 
understanding o f the social systems at play. The section that follows will examine the 
events that directly led to the intervention and how those who implemented the policies 
used the knowledge of the interaction of systems in planning and executing the operation.
U.S. Objectives
The U.S. view of the mission was to establish a secure environment to enable the 
safe and efficient movement of relief supplies to the intended areas of Somalia. The 
longer-term objective was an eventual handover to UN forces. Boustros-Ghali had a more
27. Jeffrey Clark, “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Winter 1993): 114.
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extensive mission in mind for the UNITAF, including disarmament of the belligerents.
These dissimilar views of overall objectives between the UN and U.S. were never
completely resolved and led to multiple difficulties with the operation.
UNSCR 794 called for establishment of “a secure environment for relief
operations in Somalia.” The wording was sufficiently vague to allow for multiple
interpretations of the limits of the authorized activities. Brune observes three points of
cardinal importance in the objectives: (1) place Somalia’s heavy weapons under
international control and disarm the irregular forces; (2) establish a secure environment
throughout Somalia; and, (3) assure “close cooperation between UN and UNITAF before
28the U.S. transferred responsibility to UN peacekeepers.”
In the U.S. view, American participation would be temporary, with the role of 
U.S. combat forces to establish this safe environment so that the relieving UN elements 
could continue the protection of the relief efforts. These limited objectives were attained. 
However, the inability to continue the protection throughout the country once the 
UNITAF was withdrawn led to the overall failures of the mission. Cooperation may have 
existed, but was proven insufficient.
Somali Political Objectives
A general long-term objective was the quest for a greater Somalia, i.e., unification 
of all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa. However, this goal was 
deferred while the battles over who would control Somalia itself were fought. For Aideed 
and Ali Mahdi, the objective was to enhance their own personal power. Aideed, a former
28. Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, 
Haiti and Bosnia 1992-1998 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998), 19 and 23.
29. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia, 30.
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ambassador to India who had been instrumental in the overthrow of Barre, believed that 
he had a legitimate claim to the leading role in the future of Somalia. Aideed held the 
greatest power, but not enough to dominate his opponents. For him, international military 
involvement, which could alter the balance, was not desirable.
The reverse held true for Ali Mahdi who needed foreign troops to keep Aideed’s 
forces from crushing his own. The lesser warlords, e.g., Jess, Morgan, Abdi Warsame, et 
al, were not powerful enough on their own, but would attach themselves through 
alliances to one side or the other depending upon how the fortunes of battle evolved. 
While the objectives of the various belligerents varied, personal aggrandizement of 
political and economic power for their factions remained the key objectives.
Effects of the Coercive Actions
The initial U.S. forces landed on 9 December with larger contingents arriving by 
both air and sea within a few weeks. The landings were unopposed largely due to UN 
brokered agreements between Aideed and Ali Mahdi who seemed to welcome an 
opportunity for a hiatus in the near continuous fighting between their followers in 
Mogadishu. The U.S. achieved its precept of overwhelming force. The American Army 
contingent o f the UNITAF alone included nearly 10,000 troops of the 10th Mountain 
Division, including infantry, aviation, artillery, and support units. Coalition elements 
brought the total force available to 38,000 representing 23 different nations.30 This force 
quickly achieved mission success with Somali heavy weapons moved into cantonment 
areas or removed from the city.
30. Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, Center o f  Military History Pub 70-81-1 
(Washington: U.S. Army Center o f  Military History, 1994), 10. This included large contingents from Italy, 
France, Canada, Belgium, Morocco, Australia, and Pakistan.
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The military was effectively conducting their operations, which included 
psychological and civil affairs activities aimed at influencing elements o f the social 
system. This activity displayed the use of knowledge of the connections between system 
elements in Somalia. That is, utilization of alternate actions to achieve the same effect. 
The psychological operations effort included publication of a newspaper (7?pyo~the truth) 
and establishment of a radio broadcast station. Concurrently, Ambassador Robert Oakley 
continued to conduct negotiations with Aideed and Ali Mahdi. This coordination between 
the military and diplomatic actions contributed greatly to the success of the mission.
By late December, the military contingent, which included a U.S. Marine 
Expeditionary Unit and Special Operations Forces, moved out of Mogadishu into the 
countryside. Military forces effectively executed the plan and attained their primary 
objectives. They also expeditiously and efficiently completed the principal humanitarian 
mission. While precise measurements of effectiveness are not possible, Brune claims that 
UNITAF saved 100,000 lives between January and May 1993.31
Crocker agrees that the military mission was successfully completed and that 
“UNITAF’s accomplishments far exceeded the simple, publicly discussed goal of 
creating a ‘secure environment for humanitarian relief.’” A U.S. Army history claims: 
“Despite some setbacks and incidents, Operation RESTORE HOPE succeeded in its goal 
of bringing an end to mass starvation.”33 However, at the end of the UNITAF mandate 
there was still no effectively operating government, police, or national military in 
Somalia. Although reduced in number and scope, incidents of violence continued, as well
31. Brune, United States and Post-Cold War Interventions, 23.
32. Chester A Crocker, “The Lessons o f  Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs 
(May/June 1995), 4. The author is a former assistant secretary o f  state.
33. Stewart, United States Army in Somalia, 14. Capitalization o f  operation in original.
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as the threats to the international assistance efforts. Despite these dangerous conditions, 
the goal of a transition to a UN force became politically imperative and establishment of 
the relieving force, designated United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), 
became the most urgent task.
On 26 March 1993, the Security Council approved Resolution 814, which 
broadened the mandate o f the previous efforts. In addition to the tasking to establish a 
safe and secure environment, UNSCR 814 called for disarmament o f the warring militias, 
seizing unauthorized small arms, continuing mine-clearing, and assisting in repatriation 
of refugees in Somalia.34 The plan was for an operation in four phases: (1) the transition 
of operational control from UNITAF; (2) the effective deployment and consolidation of 
UN operational control throughout Somalia and the border regions; (3) the reduction of 
UNOSOM II military activity and assistance to civil authorities in exercising greater 
responsibility; and, (4) the redeployment or reduction of UNOSOM force.35 Retired U.S. 
Navy Admiral Jonathon Howe was appointed the new Special Representative for 
Somalia, and Turkish Lieutenant-General Cervik Bir assumed command o f UNOSOM II.
The coercive actions were employed in multiple areas. In an attempt to disrupt 
incitement of the population against the UN forces, the military carried out operations to 
preclude propaganda broadcasts from the Aideed controlled Radio Mogadishu. Again,
UN planners employed alternative actions to achieve the effect of weakening Aideed. In 
addition to the military activities, diplomatic efforts continued.
34. United Nations Department o f  Public Information, “United Nations Operation in Somalia II,” 
Updated 21 March 1997, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKP/Missions/unosom2b.htm (accessed 5 April 
2005). The resolution text includes a mandate to “maintain control o f  the heavy weapons o f  the organized 
factions which would have been brought under international control,” and “seizing the small arms o f  all 
unauthorized armed elements.” The paper acknowledges that “UNITAF had a positive impact on the 
security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery o f  humanitarian assistance” (ibid., 2).
35. United Nations, “United Nation Operations in Somalia II,” 3.
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A Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, which included 
representatives of 15 Somali political movements, produced an agreement on 
disarmament, reconstruction, settlement of disputes and mechanisms for transition to a 
Somali controlled authority.36 However, in the Somali culture, agreements are not 
necessarily considered to be permanent arrangements, and incidents of violence 
increased. The most serious of these was on 5 June, when 26 Pakistani troops were killed 
in urban battles with forces, which were allegedly controlled by Aideed.
The reaction was UNSCR 837, which strongly condemned the attacks and 
directed apprehension of the perpetrators.37 After an investigation that implicated Aideed 
in the killings of 5 June, Howe directed the UNOSOM commander to capture Aideed, 
offering a $25,000 reward. These incidents resulted in an alteration of the interpretation 
of UNOSOM’s objectives. The protection of humanitarian assistance mission had now 
evolved into a manhunt.
While not under the command of UNOSOM, the U.S. maintained a Quick 
Reaction Force to support the UN operation as needed. In August, the U.S. established a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), designated Task Force Ranger, with the 
mission of capturing Aideed. American military actions, which included the use of attack 
helicopters, resulted in civilian casualties and increasing popular support for Aideed. 
After one incident, crowds angered by the U.S. actions killed four western journalists.
On 3 October, Task Force Ranger elements commenced an operation intended to 
capture two of Aideed’s key lieutenants. This resulted in the capture o f twenty-four
36. At the core o f  the agreement was a 74-member Transitional National Council (TNC) that “would be 
the bridge to a long term political solution.” Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, 98.
37. The resolution directed a more aggressive stance toward those responsible for the attacks and a 
request for more personnel and equipment. See ibid., Appendix F for the complete text o f  the resolution.
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Somalis, and as preparations were being made to move them via truck convoy, a rocket- 
propelled grenade (RPG) downed a MH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. In the ensuing rescue 
attempt, 18 American soldiers were killed, and television audiences across the world 
watched in horror as the soldiers’ bodies were mutilated and dragged through the streets 
of Mogadishu. This event was to be “a watershed in U.S. involvement in Somalia.”38 
Three days later President Clinton directed the cessation o f all military 
operations, except those required for self-defense, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Somalia no later than 31 March 1994.39 Additionally, he dispatched Ambassador Oakley 
to broker a peace settlement. On 9 October, the United Somali Congress/Somali National 
Alliance (Aideed’s faction) announced its intention to cease military operations against 
UNOSOM. Even though, tensions remained, the situation became generally quiet.
Security Council resolutions in October and November established a Commission 
of Inquiry to investigate the attacks on UNOSOM personnel and extended the mandate 
for UNOSOM II until 31 May 1994.40 Despite some achievements in humanitarian relief, 
Somalia remained without a functioning government, national army, police force, or 
judiciary. Diplomatic efforts continued, and Aideed and a diverse Group o f  12 agreed to a 
Declaration of National Resolution in March 1994.41
UNOSOM forces subsequently reduced to approximately 22,000, and the 
mandate further extended to October 1994. However, it became apparent that only the
38. See Stewart, United States Army in Somalia, esp. 15-23 for a more detailed account o f  the military 
operations and command relationships. The following two chapters will address how this event influenced 
the reaction to subsequent interventions.
39. Bill Clinton, “Somalia: Our Troops Will Leave by March 31, 1994,” Vital Speeches o f  the Day, 1 
November 1993. Speech delivered over national television on 7 October 1993.
40. UNSCRs 885, 814 and 837. See Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future o f  
Humanitarian Intervention,” in Learning from  Somalia, ed. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1995), Appendix A, for an extensive compilation o f  UN resolutions related to the Somalia 
intervention.
41. The Group o f  12 included the smaller factions and generally supported Ali Mahdi against Aideed.
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Somalis could resolve the situation. UNSCR 954 extended UNOSOM for a final period 
until 31 March 1995. This had a positive effect on getting the warring Somali factions to 
negotiate, and on 21 February 1995, Aideed and Ali Mahdi signed a peace agreement. As 
the date for UN troop withdrawal approached, relief agencies were advised to evacuate 
their staffs, and UNOSOM officially ended on 28 March 1995. Initially deployed to 
preclude a humanitarian disaster, the safe extraction of the UN force had become its 
primary goal.
Were the overall objectives o f  the intervention attained? James L. Woods 
contends that the UNITAF phase at least, “ended famine within a few weeks, saved 
hundreds of thousands of lives” and “constituted an incredible achievement.”42 
Additionally, Woods argues that the intervention brought to Somalia some limited hope 
for a future where the factions could work together to rebuild the nation. A less optimistic 
commentator observed, “After the deaths of more than 100 UN peacekeepers here— 
including 36 Americans— Somalia is as unstable and devoid of hope as at any time since 
it collapsed into anarchy in January 1991.”43
While even the most generous and positively biased observers do not assign a 
high degree of success to the Somalia intervention, the debate over why it failed is an 
engrossing topic, and it has been and will continue to be a topic for discussion and 
debate. However, the numerous issues of international humanitarian interventions and 
nation building are beyond the scope of this project. Hence, the focus will remain on the 
effects of actions.
42. James L Woods, “Decisionmaking During Operations in Somalia,” in Learning from  Somalia, ed. 
Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 166. Woods was Deputy Assistant 
Secretary o f  Defense for African Affairs from December 1986 to April 1994.
43. Keith B. Richburg, “Somalia Slips Back into Bloodshed,” Washington Post, 4 September 1994.
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The Secondary Effects
With the deployment of the UNITAF, the humanitarian relief situation improved 
dramatically. The military actions achieved the planned effects and attained the primary 
objectives. However, UN and U.S. actions taken during this period, as well as during the 
UNOSOM missions, inevitably produced multiple secondary effects. Some of these 
supported the overall objectives. Croker asserts that Somalia is better off than it was prior 
to the intervention in that it “knocked a hideously costly stalemated clan war off dead 
center and opened the field for local initiatives.44 The intervention also contributed to the 
ability of the smaller factions to emerge as a political entity as evidenced in the 
establishment of the Transitional National Conference. Although cessation of fighting 
was a primary objective, the inclusive nature of the UN sponsored talks in Addis Ababa 
in December 1993 also provided at least the structure for participation by non-militia 
groups.
Despite the best of intentions, the secondary effects of actions at times ran counter 
to the overall objectives. Although projected as a purely humanitarian mission, Aideed 
and others portrayed the international mandate as a quasi-UN trusteeship and the military 
forces as an occupation army. This perception reawakened Somali pride as an 
independent nation.45 The relative ease with which UNITAF completed it missions 
“helped produce a slide toward a modem version of trusteeship over an ex-colonial 
territory, triggering a violent backlash by a powerful Somali faction.”46
44. Crocker, “Lessons o f  Somalia,” 3.
45. Brons, Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia, 235, contends that the “overall 
record o f  the UN is poor,” and that the UN forces provoked additional violence and added another 
dimension to the conflict. She also cites criticisms that the UN did not adequately use the advice and 
counsel o f  the Somali population.
46. Crocker, “Lessons o f  Somalia,” 4.
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The key nodes in the conflict were the dominant clan leaders. The establishment 
o f negotiations and cooperation were the aim o f the initial actions. This later turned into a 
hostile relationship. The focus on the two major belligerents, Aideed and Ali Mahdi, 
bestowed on them the aura of Somalia’s internationally recognized and legitimate rulers. 
The result was that efforts to control and manipulate their behavior had the unintended 
effect of strengthening their position relative to the other factions. When UN officials 
treated the leaders of gangs of criminals as rightful representatives of the people of 
Somalia, it enhanced the prestige of the warlords at the expense of legitimate political 
and social entities.
The food and medical supplies at staging sites in Mogadishu were nodes. This is 
because they represented the major economic activity in the country during this period as 
well as the major factor in preventing an even more acute humanitarian disaster. One 
supposition was that giving the provisions to those who were stealing them anyway 
would cause the commodities to become so plentiful that the value would drop and 
consequently reduce the incentive to steal the supplies. This method proved to be 
ineffective when the roving bandits merely hoarded the supplies and kept their value at a 
high level.
The unstructured conduct of much of the disarmament activity resulted in 
“perverse and unintended consequences” [that] “reduced the ability of individuals to 
defend themselves without offering them an alternative means to defend themselves.”47 
Hence, the weaker factions and non-militia figures were incapable or wary of asserting 
their authority. The disarming of factions loyal to Jess also caused the strengthening of 
the forces of Morgan and led to the fall of Kismayu. Lyons and Samatar contend, “All
47. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 42.
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parties agreed that an institutionalized Somali order was needed, but they differed on the
AO
roles the militia leaders would play.”
Finally, and most importantly, the intervention itself altered the systems of 
Somalia. Clarke and Herbst observe, “When U.S. troops intervened in December 1992 to 
stop the theft of food, they immediately disrupted the entire political economy of 
Somalia.”49 The system became dependent upon the UN troops for it to operate. With the 
removal of the now essential element of the system, the system again collapsed. The 
ancillary consequences of actions are a key element o f this study. Table 6 provides some 
examples o f unintended secondary effects that ran counter to stated U.S. objectives.
Table 6. Unintended Secondary Effects
Node Intended Effect Secondary Effect Comment
Radio
Mogadishu
Disrupted anti-UNOSOM  
propaganda
Attack on UN troops 24 Pakistanis killed
Aideed HQ Captured fighters Killing on non-combatants Mob murders four 
journalists
Aideed Captured Inceased popular support
Omar Jess Disarmed Morgan’s forces strengthened Kismayu falls
R elief supplies Reduced value Bandits rewarded Food supplies hoarded
48. Ibid., 54.
49. Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention, in Learning from  
Somalia ,” 242. Patrick Gilkes, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Somalia Precedent,” 
Middle East Report, November-December 1993, 23, cites a report that “increasingly, Somalis regarded 
UNOSOM as another faction and Admiral Howe as another warlord.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
200
Summation
In this chapter, I inserted examples of the systems, subsystems, elements, and 
nodes o f Somalia in the early 1990’s into the structure of the methodology presented in 
Chapter V. The objective was not to provide a full system of systems analysis, but rather 
to illustrate further the steps presented earlier with examples as a means of enhanced 
understanding of the construct. However, it is clear that this intervention was not planned 
and executed using a system effects approach.
The Somalia operation was not replete with notable successes. The intervention 
provides examples of some utilization of various elements of the proposed system of 
systems construct. Examination of the record of the intercession indicates that there were 
instances o f the use o f principles of the overall approach. Additionally, there were several 
occurrences where an understanding of the systems enabled amplification of the effects 
of actions, discovery of alternative actions, or recognition of potential secondary effects. 
However, it is clear that uses of the principles of the construct were infrequent, 
unstructured, and incidental.
However, the few examples of the utilization of an understanding of the political, 
economic, military, and social systems, their elements, and the connections between 
entities, contributed to the more effective and efficient achievement of the stated 
objectives of the operation. There is not sufficient empirical evidence to prove this 
contention or to establish causation as well as correlation. However, the record indicates 
that more progress toward attainment of objectives occurred when those with the best 
understanding of the system and it elements were responsible for the key decisions. I will 
provide a few illustrative examples.
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Due to their familiarity with Somali culture and history extensive, experience in 
the region, and remarkable diplomatic skills, Robert Oakley and Mohamed Sahnoun were 
particularly adept and exploiting this knowledge. Sahnoun understood the importance of 
the clans and their ability to dilute national power, and he “aimed to put the clan system 
to work for Somalia.”50 Oakley also recognized the need for alternative security 
structures. He wanted U.S. forces to become “more deeply engaged in assisting the 
reestablishing of the police, prisons, and judiciary” and believed that unless these were in 
place, a successful U.S. withdrawal would not be possible.51
Both Sahnoun and Oakley understood the importance of the clans in Somali 
society and how any attempts to alter system behavior required engagement o f clan 
leadership. They were proactive in attempts to influence the key nodes, i.e., Aideed and 
Ali Mahdi. However, this focus on only two factions is one of the more common and 
valid criticisms of the nature of the engagement. Renowned anthropologist I. M. Lewis 
concludes that UN and U.S. did not pay “sufficient attention to genuinely representative 
local leadership.”52 The focus on these two entities, at the expense of other elements of 
the social and political systems, may have had the unintended effect of strengthening 
their position within the Somali system. When the international forces and agencies 
withdrew, there were no alternatives to fill the vacuum of power.
A limited appreciation of the phenomenon of secondary effects is also apparent. 
Crocker identifies attempts to confront the major warlords without making them national 
heroes, establishment of police and government functions coincident with disarmament
50. Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia,” 146.
51. Lyons and Samatar, Somalia, 42.
5 2 .1. M. Lewis, “Misunderstanding the Somali Crisis,” Anthropology Today 9, no. 4 (August 1993), 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
202
and “pushing the military factions toward a locally led political process.”53An earlier 
section of this chapter provided multiple instances of when planners were not able or did 
not attempt to anticipate or consider the secondary effects of actions. However, 
identification of instances of the successful use of the principles of the approach were 
extremely limited, and consequently the accrued benefits were minimal. There were some 
successes, particularly during the brief period of the UNITAF deployment, the 
psychological operations effort being one notable example.
The evidence leads to the conclusion that the interventions of 1992-95 were only 
marginally successful in influencing the systems of power in Somalia to conform to 
stated international objectives. At the time of this writing, nearly ten years after the 
withdrawal of the last UNOSOM forces, the state of the systems in Somalia remains 
similar the systems in 1995. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency observes, “Numerous 
warlords and factions are still fighting for control o f the capital city as well as for other 
southern regions.” 54 The postulated reasons for the failures are diverse and have been the 
topic of extensive debate.
Jeffrey Clark places much o f the blame on the years o f neglect o f Somalia by the 
international community and a lack of professional capability in UN humanitarian 
agencies, as well as a general ineptitude on the part of the UN leadership.55 Oakley 
concludes that the U.S. and UN “overreached when they expanded their original 
mandate—without making it possible to carry out.”56 Others claim that while the overall
53. Crocker, “Lessons o f  Somalia,” 4. He observes that these tasks were “undertakings o f  the highest 
order o f  delicacy in a militarized and fragmented society like Somalia’s.”
54. CIA Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.pdf (accessed 25 April 2005). 
The assessment adds, “Suspicion o f  Somali links with global terrorism further complicates the picture.”
55. Clark, “Debacle in Somalia,” 3-4. Also critical o f  U.S policy he describes Washington’s response to 
the crisis as “schizophrenic.”
56. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, xi.
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policy decisions were flawed, given additional time they may have succeeded. Instead, it 
was the lack of consistency and political will stay the course and help rebuild the systems 
of Somalia that were the main contributors to the calamity. Crocker argues that the 
military intervention changed the local balance of power and strengthened other elements 
of Somali society, but did little to ensure that this alteration survived the departure of the 
UN forces.57
While the reasons for the failures o f the intervention are multiple and myriad, 
among these is the failure of the UN and U.S to understand the adversary and the 
environment. Brune argues that neither Bush nor Powell understood the “vital connection 
between Somalia’s political anarchy and the attainment of success o f the ‘humanitarian’ 
mission.”58 Although Brune’s supposition is debatable, it is apparent that if  some degree 
of understanding of the interrelationships between entities in Somali society existed, the 
use of this knowledge was not optimized.
As related in the introduction to this chapter, the exceptionally weak systems in 
Somalia make this a challenging scenario for application of the methodology. However, I 
have used it to illustrate how the construct may be applied even in situations where the 
systems are undeveloped and unstructured. I do not argue that employment o f the system 
of system construct during the UNOSOM missions in itself would have produced a 
stable, self-functioning Somalia. The reasons for the failures are complex and varied and 
extend far beyond the assessment of Somali systems of power in the post-Barre era. Even 
the most highly developed, complete and sophisticated analysis will not compensate for 
poor policy decision-making processes. Rather, the intent is to illustrate the process and
57. Crocker, “Lessons o f  Somalia,” 8.
58. Brune, United States and Post-Cold War Interventions, 19.
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to identify cases o f the utilization o f some elements of the system of systems construct in 
dealing with this crisis. When employed, they enhanced the potential for successful 
attainment of the overall objectives. The extension of that supposition is that additional 
use of the construct could improve the decision-making process. The additional case 
studies that follow will support that contention.




When viewed across the broad and tragic landscape of Balkan history, the 78 day­
long aerial operation undertaken by member nations of the NATO alliance is a relatively 
minor incident in the unfortunate history of the region. The ethno-religious conflicts are 
centuries old, and attempts at the establishment o f national identities and homelands have 
been essentially continuous over the past several hundred years. However, this most 
recent confrontation presents a case study relevant to this examination in that it can 
provide several examples of coercive actions taken to achieve alliance objectives by 
influencing the systems o f national power o f an adversary.
The Kosovo intervention also is notable for multiple additional reasons. First, it 
represented the initial use of sustained military combat actions by the then 50-year-old 
North Atlantic alliance. Secondly, the stated principal rationale for the action was not 
self-defense of the member nations; nor was it designed to preclude state aggression 
against a third party. Lastly, it represented the use of force against a sovereign nation to 
deter alleged repression of a minority population within its own sovereign borders, i.e., 
the humanitarian crisis resulting from Serb killing and expulsion o f the majority ethnic 
Albanian population in the province of Kosovo.
Even several years after the conflict, debate abounds as to the outcome. Senior 
U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials have described the 
operation officially as an “overwhelming success,” while others evaluated it as “just shy
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of a full-blown policy fiasco.”1 While all these factors make this intervention a 
fascinating case study across a wide range of topics, the element most critical to this 
demonstration is the means of coercion utilized and the analysis of the way in which the 
planners and implementers of these actions employed a holistic, systems approach to the 
adversary.
The purpose of this chapter is illustration of the methodology—not a complete 
system of systems analysis of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in early 1999. I 
can provide only a small sampling. Since this analysis is dependent upon unclassified 
information that has been made available to the general public, the data set is limited. The 
assessment relies primarily on publicly released NATO targeting data and official 
Serbian claims. Most o f these were made while the conflict was ongoing, and hence, the 
accuracy of these sources is subject to challenge. This imperfect data is supplemented by 
limited independent analysis. However, adequate information is available with which to 
reconstruct the essential rationale for and effects resulting from the actions taken.
Although precise knowledge of the actions employed against the selected nodes 
and detailed awareness of the influence on the target would improve the analysis, the lack 
of such exactitude is not a major disadvantage to this study. Any exhaustive Battle 
Damage Assessments remain classified at the time of this writing.3 However, the 
performance o f individual weapon systems, effectiveness of tactics, and the number of
1. Success claimed in U.S Department o f  Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action 
Report.” Report to Congress, 31 January 2000), xvii, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf 
(accessed 14 January 2005). Other official releases from the U.S. and NATO mirror this assertion. For an 
opposing view, see, Ted Galen Carpenter, in NATO's Empty Victory ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington, 
DC: The Cato Institute, 2000), 1.
2 . 1 use the terms FRY and Yugoslavia interchangeably in the text.
3. For example, Headquarters United States Air Force, “The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in 
Operation Allied Force,” (1 April 2000) remains classified, although excerpts o f  the findings have been 
selectively released. The available selections suggest that the report contains more than battle damage 
assessments, and that it also addresses the overall effects generated by the actions.
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tanks and bridges destroyed are only ancillary to this effort. I focus on the macro effects 
o f actions.
Documentation regarding NATO objectives and, through extension, desired 
effects is generally available. However, many assumptions as to the objectives of the 
Serbian side must be gleaned from official press releases and reports. Additionally, some 
of the illustrations are also dependent upon press reports, the accuracy of which is 
difficult to ascertain. Until the declassification of official records, these provide the best 
available information and insights. Again, this condition does not seriously degrade an 
analysis whose intent is to provide a demonstration of the use of a systems approach to 
the analysis of national power.
The degree of achievement of objectives is important to this discussion. In some 
cases, the attainment is relatively clear, even if the precise cause is less obvious. Debate 
continues as to why Milosevic decided to agree to terms when he did. I will not propose 
definitive answers to that question here, although the results of detailed analysis by others 
will be included where appropriate. The Kosovo intervention has been, and continues to 
be, the subject of immense interest, discussion, and debate. There is no intent to conduct 
a comprehensive analysis of that campaign. Only a very few examples will be presented 
with the objective of providing illustrations of the previously presented methodology.
With the presentation of the outline, objectives, and boundaries of this chapter 
completed, I may now conduct the presentation of the background to the conflict and the 
motivation for the subsequent intervention.
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The Impetus for Intervention
Ethnicity and history provide the principle causes of the crisis that led to the 
conflict. Multiple studies have examined the complex chronicle o f the diverse peoples of 
this region, and there is no intention to reproduce those efforts here. Similarly, others 
have addressed the development of the proximate conditions for the conflict in the years 
immediately preceding the operation, and this segment will include only the bare 
minimum of background required to put the conflict into perspective and for the 
understanding of the sections to follow.4 My intent is to provide a foundation on the 
political and social environment, which emerged from centuries of tumultuous events, 
and set the stage for the crisis in the spring of 1999.
Ethnicity is the most often cited basis for the conflict. The principal population 
groupings in the area, Albanians and Serbs, differ along religious, ethnic, and language 
lines. The Albanians in Kosovo are probably descended from the Illyrian tribes and are 
primarily Sunni Muslims; the Serbs are Slavic and mostly eastern Orthodox.5 The 
Albanians represented the indigenous population, but in the era following the fall of the
4. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998) provides an 
excellent background primer. See also Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1999) for an appreciation o f the complexities and impact o f  
history on current events in the region. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo  
Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33-64, provides a good summary o f  later events. See 
also Zidas Daskalovski, “Claims to Kosovo; Nationalism and Self-Determination,” in Understanding the 
War in Kosovo, ed. Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), and 
Dejan Guzina, “Kosovo or Kosova - Could It Be Both,” also in Understanding the War in Kosovo, ed. 
Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003) for a concise history o f  
the region addressing both the Albanian and Serbian perspectives. Daskalovski provides a valuable 
examination o f  the competing claims to the territory while Guzina examines the majority-minority 
relationships in Kosovo.
5. In future references, ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo will be referred to as Kosovar Albanians or 
Kosovars to distinguish them from their ethnic brethren living in the state o f  Albania. See also Susan 
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 
esp. 47-81, for more extensive background information o f  the cultural and economic aspects o f  the region. 
In 1999, the Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia (FRY) was comprised o f  Montenegro and Serbia, which 
included the provinces o f  Vojvodina and Kosovo, and included multiple nationalities. The major 
protagonists were the Kosovars and the political leadership o f  the province o f  Serbia. I use the more 
common name Kosovo  to describe the province, but it is synonymous with the Albanian version, Kosova.
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Roman Empire, Slavs migrated to the area, and by the 14th century, the territory of 
Kosovo became a religious and cultural center of the Balkan Slavs. Although living in 
geographic proximity for centuries, the ethnic and cultural distinctions between the Serb 
and Albanian populations in the region provided an unstable mixture that only needed a 
catalyst to explode into violence. That force was Serbian nationalism.
The area came under Ottoman Turk control after the epic battle of Kosovo-Polje 
in 1389—a defeat for the Serbs, but often described as a “mystical event” in their history. 
“The story of the battle of Kosovo has become a totem or talisman of Serbian identity, so 
that this event has a status unlike that o f anything else in the history of the Serbs.”6 
Hence, the value of the land to the Serbs cannot be determined from purely economic or 
political analyses.
Due in part to the brutal Turkish administration of the area, the many Orthodox 
Serbs emigrated from present day Kosovo to more hospitable regions coincident with the 
arrival of additional Islamic Albanians into the territory. In the post-World War I 
settlements, the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was assigned 
control of Kosovo despite the presence of an estimated half-million ethnic Albanians in 
the region.
The immediate post World War II years and emergence o f the uniting policies of 
the Tito era saw containment of the demands for full independence by the majority 
Albanians in Kosovo (hereinafter, Kosovars), reduced ethnic tensions, and a gradual 
increase in self-rule for the region. An autonomous status within the Serbian Republic 
was achieved in 1963, and in 1974, the official ties to Serbia were removed and Kosovo
6. Malcolm, Kosovo, 58. It was at a rally commemorating the 600th anniversary o f  the battle that 
Slobodan M ilosevic achieved increased national prominence.
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became an autonomous federal republic within Yugoslavia. With the death of Tito in 
1980, and as the nation dissolved in a series of nationalist conflicts, the Kosovars 
continued their demands for full independence. By this time a combination of a disparity 
in birthrates in favor of the Kosovars and continued emigration of Serbs from Kosovo 
resulted in additional rationale for a Kosovo free o f Serb control. However, in 1989, the 
new Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status and fully 
integrated Kosovo into Serbia.7
Kosovar countermoves included the establishment of a shadow government that 
advocated a political settlement. However, by 1996, elements that were more radical 
formed what became known as the Kosovo Liberation Army, and attacks against Serb 
security forces in Kosovo ensued.8 Sporadic violence evolved into open conflict, with 
official NATO sources alleging that Serb security forces killed 1,500 Kosovar Albanians 
in 1998.9 The situation deteriorated, achieved increasing international attention, and 
subsequently UNSCR 1160 imposed an arms embargo on the entire country. The Contact 
Group for the Former Yugoslavia imposed further sanctions and threatened Milosevic
7. This step required amendments to the existing constitution. On 23 March 1989, the Assembly o f  
Kosovo voted to accept the changes, the majority o f  the Albanian delegates abstained. Despite the lack o f  
the required two-thirds majority, the amendments were declared to have passed. Population figures can 
only be estimated due to the lack o f  an inclusive census since 1981, but estimates are that in 1991 o f  the 
approximate 2,000,000 residents o f  Kosovo 85-90% were Kosovars, and only 5-10% Serbs. See 
“International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Indictment Case No. It-99-37, 24 May 1999, 
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/English/mil-ii990524e.htm (accessed 13 February 2005).
8. With its roots in the Levizja Popullare e Kosoves (LPK) Party, the KLA (in Albanian, Ushtria 
Clirimtare E Kosoves (UCK) began as a small, poorly equipped and financed resistance movement. They 
were, not surprisingly, regarded as a terrorist organization by the FRY government. References to FRY 
security forces include primarily the Yugoslav Army, Vojska Jugoslavskaya (VJ); and the Interior Ministry 
Forces, Ministerstvo Unuprasnif Poslava (MUP).
9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo," 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (accessed 14 January 2005).
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with military action unless the repression of the Kosovars receded.10 In September 1998, 
UNHCR 1199 called for a cease-fire and, inter alia, the cessation of the repression of 
civilians and the establishment of a war crime tribunal.11
The situation had deteriorated sufficiently that by the following month NATO 
threatened air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and only last 
minute personal diplomacy appeared to prevent the actual launch of weapons. Through 
discussions between Serbian government officials and representatives of NATO and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) an agreement was reached 
that provided for a partial withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, limits on future 
deployments, and establishment of a 2000 member, unarmed Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM)12
Although it is perilous to assign a specific event as the trigger for a conflict, the 
killing of 40 plus Kosovars near the village of Racak by Serb security forces on 15 
January 1999 is regarded a seminal event in the path toward military action. A direct 
result was the North Atlantic Council authorizing the Secretary General to conduct air 
attacks against Serbia if the Serbs continued to refuse to conduct negotiations with 
representatives o f the Kosovar population. As the crisis was steadily worsening, an
10. The Contact Group was established in 1992; members were France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the 
U.K., and U.S., with representatives from the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC). 
Russia elected not to participate in this round o f  sanctions.
11. Invoking Chapter VII o f  the UN Charter the resolution restated the proscription o f  external support 
for the belligerents and addressed the estimated 230,000 persons who had been displaced from their homes.
12. UNSCR 1203 supported this action as well as NATO’s intention to establish an extraction force in 
Macedonia to be used if KVM personnel were threatened, and an air verification mission over Kosovo to 
complement the OSCE mission on the ground. United Nations Security Council, “UNSCR 1203,” 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u981024a.htm (accessed 21 January 2005). The KVM proved 
unsuccessful as members remained powerless to prevent Serb atrocities, and the KVM was eventually 
pulled out on 20 March 1999.
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international peace mission was organized in the Paris suburb of Rambouillet. The talks 
commenced on 7 February.
Milosevic’s motivation and attitude toward the Rambouillet consultations are 
subject to question. Some view his participation as a means of buying time to better 
prepare for his planned intensification of ethnic cleansing efforts (Operation Horseshoe 
(Potkova).13 The initial negotiations were conducted from 6 until 23 February without 
agreement, and reconvened in Paris on 15 March.14 The Kosovar representatives agreed 
to the proposal; Milosevic would not. The unacceptable portions for the Serbs were the 
requirements for them to accept the deployment of a NATO-led military peacekeeping 
force anywhere within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the provision that 
a referendum, held within three years, would decide the province’s future sovereignty. 
Milosevic viewed these as incompatible with the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and 
subsequently rejected both conditions.15
The refusal of Milosevic to sign the agreement became the proximate (sufficient) 
conditions for war. Last-minute efforts to induce Milosevic to comply failed, and during
13. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO'.? Air War fo r  Kosovo  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 9, uses the 
near simultaneous launching o f  the Serb offensive, using heavy artillery and armor, in the central region 
near Drenica as evidence.
14. Christopher Layne, “Miscalculations and Blunders Lead to War,” in NATO's Empty Victory, ed. Ted 
Galen Carpenter (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2000), 16, disagrees with the characterization o f  the 
meetings as “negotiations.” In his view, “Belgrade was presented with an ultimatum and given the choice 
o f  signing or being bombed. See also Elizabeth Allen Dauphinee, “Rambouillet: A Critical (Re) 
Assessment,” in Understanding the War in Kosovo, ed. Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (Portland, 
OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003). She contends that the agreement was “fundamentally flawed from its 
outset” (ibid., 117). Among its failings was its inability to reconcile the two contradictory principles o f  
sovereignty and human rights
15. The preponderance o f  observations tends to agree with this analysis. Stephen T. Hosner, Why 
Milosevic D ecided to Settle When He D id  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 12-15, contends that 
Milosevic believed that accepting these terms would endanger his hold on power since they would be 
unacceptable to the majority o f  the Serbian populace. See Annex 3 o f  Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, for a summary o f  the proposed agreement. Full text is also 
available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/kosovo/kosovo_rambtoc.pdf (accessed 13 February 2005). 
Annex 1 provides documentation o f  human rights abuses that led to the conflict.
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the evening of 24 March, NATO commenced Operation Allied Force with the launch of 
cruise missiles. Planners were told to expect a very brief air operation. This optimism was 
not to be realized. It was only after the death and destruction of a nearly three-month long 
air campaign that Milosevic agreed to NATO’s demands.
The actions taken by NATO to achieve its objectives are the focus of this 
examination. Therefore, with at least a cursory description of the conditions and 
environment now having been presented, the next step is to consider the objectives of the 
protagonists.
NATO Political Objectives
The condition and direction of the NATO Alliance in 1999 is important to this 
discussion. The stated primary purpose of NATO is “to safeguard the freedom and 
security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter.”16 The realist rationale for establishment o f the 
organization was to formalize the European-North American relationship and to establish 
a mechanism for defense as a counter to any military aggression expected to come from 
the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting evaporation of 
the principal threat, the political and military leadership struggled with the question of the 
rationale for continuation of the arrangement.
As the Alliance was about to integrate three former Warsaw Pact nations as new 
members, the events of March-June 1999 presented a largely unanticipated exercise of
16. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office o f  Information and 
Press, 1998), 23.
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17the experience and military doctrine developed over the 50-year history of NATO. The 
stated objectives of NATO in the Kosovo crisis were only very loosely connected to the 
raison d ’etre for existence of the alliance. These were:
A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and 
repression
The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military police and paramilitary forces 
The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; the unconditional and safe 
return o f all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by 
humanitarian aid organizations; and, the establishment of a political framework 
agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with
t  t o  t
international law and the Charter of the United Nations The connection to the 
Rambouillet Accords suggests that this fifth objective would be unacceptable to the 
Serbs.
In a post-conflict joint testimony, the senior American civilian and uniformed 
military officials asserted that NATO had “strong interests at stake: (1) Serb aggression
17. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were fully incorporated into the Alliance on 12 March 
1999, 12 days before the bombings commenced.
18. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo. Statement 
o f the Extraordinary Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held at NATO HQ on 12 April 1999 and 
reaffirmed by Heads o f  State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999. The US objectives were 
similar. President Clinton included: 1. Demonstrate the seriousness o f  NATO’s opposition to aggressions 
and its support for peace; 2. Deter M ilosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless 
civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and, 3. If necessary, damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war 
against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities. See Bill Clinton, “Statement 
o f  President Clinton on Kosovo 24 March 1999,” White House, Office o f  Press Secretary, 
http://www.mthoyoke.edu/ acad/intrel/bombkos.htm (accessed 13 February 2005). A NATO press release 
contended, “The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values o f  democracy, human 
rights and the rule o f  law.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Situation in and around Kosovo," 
Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO 
Headquarters,” http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/1999/p99-051e.htm (accessed 14 January 2005).. A senior 
U.S. officer essentially duplicated the NATO list, but added a “creation o f  a Kosovar autonomy within 
Yugoslavia.” U.S. Congress, House o f  Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. Performance o f  the 
B2 Bomber in the Kosovo Air Campaign, Hearing before the Military Procurement Subcommittee, 
Statement o f  Lt. Gen. Marvin R. Esmond, 106 Cong., 1st sess., 30 June 1999,
http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/ 106thcongress/99-10-19esmond.pdf (accessed 14 January 2005).
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in Kosovo threatened peace throughout the Balkans; (2) Belgrade’s repression of Kosovo 
created a humanitarian crisis; and, (3) Milosevic’s conduct leading up to Operation Allied 
Force directly challenged the credibility o f NATO.”19 Hence, in the NATO view, the 
conflict was far more than an internal Yugoslav matter; it had widespread implications 
for the future, which they could not simply ignore.
Serbian Political Objectives
It is difficult to separate the personal aspirations o f Milosevic from the national 
objectives of Serbia. He was an authoritative ruler, but did not possess unconstrained 
dictatorial powers. Hence, his continuation in authority was a personal objective that was 
not necessarily a national aspiration. However, a trait common to most nation states is 
that they will resist actions by external powers to become involved in domestic affairs. 
The level of support for Milosevic notwithstanding, the perception that outside powers 
were attempting to wrest away a piece of sovereign Serb territory was reason enough to 
resist.20 The preservation of Kosovo therefore was considered a legitimate national 
objective.
Barry Posen argues, “Serbia had a hierarchy of objectives.”21 Chief among these 
was to preserve freedom of action to conduct unrestricted operations against the KLA, in 
Kosovo. Other Serbian objectives included the maintenance of Russian political support;
19. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services, Joint Statement on the Kosovo After-Action 
Review , Hearing Before the Committee on Arm ed Services. Testimony o f  William S. Cohen and General 
Henry H. Shelton, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 1999, http://www.dod.mil/releases/1999/ 
bl0141999_bt478-99.html (accessed 6 January 2005).
20. Barry Posen, “The War for Kosovo,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 43, observed, 
“For every Serb who was willing to fight for Kosovo for religious or historic reasons associated with the 
province, there were probably several others willing to go to war on the principle that nobody takes their 
land without a fight.
21. Ibid., 45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
and gaining time for further eviction of Albanians from Kosovo. The personal objective 
of Milosevic was to maintain and enhance his own political and economic power base. 
Therefore, not all the objectives of NATO and Milosevic were irreconcilable. The ending 
of the repression and violence against the Kosovars was incompatible with the Serb 
objective of freedom of action within their own sovereign territory. An independent 
Kosovo was never a stated NATO objective. However, the Serbs considered as 
unacceptable the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence. At the onset 
of the conflict, the removal of Milosevic was not a stated objective; however, his 
subsequent indictment for war crimes made this an implied goal. Although, Milosevic 
rejected the Rambouillet framework, most provisions were probably negotiable.
However, the stipulation for the presence of foreign forces in Kosovo was considered 
incompatible with Serbian sovereignty. A change in behavior, not regime change and 
establishment of an independent state for the Kosovars, was NATO’s overall goal.
Despite the potential for a negotiated settlement, when the preferred diplomatic 
efforts failed, military options became the primary vehicle to induce this desired change 
in behavior. The manner in which military and other actions were applied during the 
conflict is the central element in this chapter and will be addressed. However, since the 
illustration of the principles of a system of systems analysis in the selection of actions is 
the premise of this study, I will provide a brief depiction of such an examination.
A Representational System of Systems Analysis
I contend that in some instances during the Kosovo operation NATO utilized the 
principles of a system of systems analysis in their selection of actions. In order to support
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this supposition, and to illustrate further the methodology, I will present the framework 
for a system of systems analysis in Yugoslavia in 1999. The steps presented in Chapter V 
are: (1) Identify the essential elements within each system; (2) determine the essential 
sub-elements; (3) designate nodes; (4) examine nodes for node-to-node linkages; and, (5) 
assign linkages between nodes. As with the previous chapter, a complete analysis is 
beyond the scope of this effort, and I provide only illustrative examples.
Essential Elements of the Systems
Political. While there is no intent here to provide more than a cursory 
examination o f the political structure that existed at the time of the intervention, a brief 
overview is justified in that it provides some exposure to the complexities of that system. 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was formed as self-proclaimed successor to 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 11 April 1992. From a structural 
perspective the FRY consists of two republics, Serbia (including its two provinces 
Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro. In 1999, it consisted of three branches: 
Executive—President (chief of state), Prime Minister (head of government), Council of 
Ministers (cabinet); Legislative— Serbia and Montenegro Union Parliament; and 
Judicial—Federal Court and Constitutional Court. Multiple political parties existed, 
many drawn along regional and ethnic lines, e.g., Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 
(SVM) and Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro. The predominant organizations were 
the Serbian Radical Party (SNP), Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS—former Communist
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Party), and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL).22 However, structure provides only a part of 
the analysis, and as stated earlier, function is the critical area for consideration.
Although the constitution provides that Yugoslavia is “based on the rule of law 
and recognizes and guarantees human rights and liberties,” in reality it was an 
authoritarian regime with its core within the executive branch. By 1999, Yugoslavia was 
beset with poverty, ethnic violence, and an authoritarian political system, due in most part 
to a decade of warfare. Additionally, the legacy from the Tito years of a strong central 
government and power concentrated in one individual gave to the president a degree of 
power far in excess of the constitutional provisions. Therefore, the sub-element selected 
for examination is the executive branch; an obvious choice for designation as a node is 
the President, and member of the SPS, Slobodan Milosevic.
The strength of the system was the connection between the regime and intense 
Serbian nationality. Milosevic had skillfully exploited the deeply rooted but suppressed 
sense of Serbian identity and nationalism. However, this was insufficient to preserve his 
hold on power; accordingly, he needed additional support mechanisms. This included 
establishment o f ties with commercial and political entities throughout Yugoslavia. The 
critical vulnerability of the system was the need for the ruling party to form coalitions to 
maintain power, complicated by the existence of quasi-independent provinces. Therefore, 
the political and economic patronage of the senior government leadership becomes an 
area upon which to focus the analysis.
22. Europa World Yearbook 1999 (London: Europa Publications, Inc., 1999), 3962-65.
23. Information consolidated from multiple sources including ibid., 3956-70. Materials for an analysis 
o f the political system are immense. Available analyst resources and time limit the depth o f  the research, 
not the amount o f  information. While open sources can provide the foundation for the analysis, 
determination o f  node-to-node linkages will require multiple additional sources, including classified 
information. Importantly, while determination o f  structure may be readily attainable, function o f  the system 
is more difficult and complex and requires a must more intense level o f  analysis.
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Economic. Many considered Yugoslavia the most reformed socialist economy, 
although Serbia and Montenegro had a gross domestic product (GDP) below the 
Yugoslav national average in the late 1980’s.24 However, due to a near continuous series 
of armed conflicts, by 1998 the economy was a shambles, with essentially no foreign 
trade and continued hyperinflation o f the dinar. Unemployment was approximately 30 per 
cent, and the overall economy was operating at around half of the 1989 level. GDP was 
approximately $24 billion in purchasing parity with a per capita income of around 
$2,300.25 In early 1999 only around 37 per cent o f the Yugoslav economy was produced 
in the private sector, and only 31 per cent of the population employed in the private 
cooperative and mixed sector.26 The economy rated among the ten most corrupt in the 
world, and estimates o f the black or gray economy ranged from 30-50 per cent o f GDP. 
The post-Tito privatization effort resulted in concentration of these financial interests in 
the hands of economic and political elites.
Industry, mainly petrochemical, metallurgy, automobile manufacture, and 
electronics, comprised the largest part of the economy. Ferrous and nonferrous mining 
was a significant portion of the sector, while agriculture was primarily for internal 
consumption. Major exports were machinery and transportation equipment, as well as 
some raw materials. Imports included finished materials and products and some
24. Serbia itself was one o f  the more highly developed economies within the FRY. For perspective, the 
FRY was on the level o f  Turkey in purchasing power parity.
25. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons o f  the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo  
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 169. Due to the current fluctuations and the gray and black economies, a 
wide range o f  economic figures for this period has been published.
26. Milica Uvalic, “Kosovo's Economy,” Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies 1, no. 1 (Summer 
2000), 12. He notes that “Some 75 state owned enterprises, which are among the largest and most 
profitable firms and represent 35 per cent o f  the economy” were excluded from privatization or to be 
privatized within a special government program.
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27agricultural commodities, although Yugoslavia was a net importer of food. Hence, the 
essential sub-elements would be heavy industry, metallurgy, mining, and agriculture. For 
illustration, I will utilize the heavy manufacturing sector.
A strength of the economic system related to its ability to withstand attacks was 
its dispersed infrastructure and its relative self sufficiency in meeting basic needs. 
Additionally, its limited production capability had ties to other fragile economies in the 
region that would be affected by any strikes against facilities in Yugoslavia. A key 
vulnerability o f any industrial production is the availability o f fuel, raw materials, and 
electrical power. Consequently, petroleum product refining and distribution are critical 
sub-elements of the economic system, and these will be further developed. Automobile 
production was a large part of this sector. In the search for nodes, the Zastava automobile 
plant at Kragujevac would likely appear. The plant, with an estimated 24,000 employees, 
produced over 14,000 cars per year.29 The concentration of wealth in the hands of an 
oligarchy also presents vulnerability appropriate for exploitation.
Military. The military forces consisted of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the 
paramilitary Interior Police (MUP). The MUP were lightly armed, and under the 
command of the Ministry of the Interior. Regular army personnel numbered over 
110,000, with 1,200 tanks and armored fighting vehicles, and over 1,400 artillery pieces.
27. Europa World Yearbook 1999, 3958-61. Reliable foreign trade data is likewise elusive, but imports 
were believed to significantly exceed exports. Regardless o f  the lack o f  precise data, most analyses indicate 
a very fragile economy that is susceptible to external influence.
28. The steel industries o f  Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic all had connections to that o f  
Serbia. Christian Kohl, “Cost o f  War: $3 50m to Steelmakers,” American M etal Market, 20 May 1999, 2. 
Steel production in the FRY was in decline prior to the NATO operation.
29. An additional 40,000 subcontractors were put out o f  work. See also, Deyan Anastasijeic, “Nation 
Builders: Western Leaders Want to Help Balkans Move from Self-Destruction to Reconstruction,” Time 
International August 1999, 30-33.
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Anti-air systems were the primary threat to the NATO air campaign and consisted 
mainly of SA-2 (S-75 Dvina or Guideline), 24 fire units, SA-3 (Perchora-M or Goa, 24 
fire units), and SA-6 (2K12 Kvadrat or Gainful, 16 fire units) surface to air missiles. SA- 
9 and SA13 tactical systems, man portable systems, and air defense guns augmented the 
strategic systems.30 A redundant command and control system that included landlines 
supported these. Serb air forces consisted of an estimated 240 combat aircraft, including 
MIG-21 and MIG-29 interceptors. The Serb air defense system was most effective 
against targets at low altitudes, i.e., less than 15,000 feet.31
The major ground elements in and near Kosovo were the VJ Third Army, 
supported by the First and Second Army units. These were primary highly mobile forces 
that operated in small combined arms battle groups. The forces were coordinated through
19a command and control system with multiple redundancies. Led by a cadre of 
professional officers, and originally designed for a mission of making a Soviet invasion 
as painful as possible, Serb forces were capable of enduring attacks from a superior force 
without breaking. Their military infrastructure was hardened, camouflaged and 
dispersed.
The key vulnerability o f the Serb military was the clear mismatch when compared 
to the overwhelming force that the NATO Alliance could employ. The forces on the 
ground in Kosovo and their ability to maneuver and conduct their operations against the
30. Cordesman, Lessons and Non-Lessons o f  the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, 197-98.
31. Bruce R Nardulli et al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Arroyo Center, 2002), 28.
32. At the beginning o f  1999 the commander o f  the 3rd Army was Colonel General Samardzic and the 
Commander o f  the Pristina Corps was General Nebojsa Pavkovic. Personal loyalty to Milosevic was a 
factor in promotions and obtaining senior military positions. For a more extensive listing see, “Operations 
in Kosovo: Yugoslav Order o f  Battle,” Janes Defence Weekly, 1 April 1999, 5. For a more comprehensive 
assessment o f  FRY military forces see, Cordesman, Lessons and Non-Lessons o f  the Air and Missile 
Campaign in Kosovo, 191-241.
33. Lambeth, NATO's Air War fo r  Kosovo, 17-21.
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Kosovars were an essential sub-element. Additionally, the ability of the Serb air defense 
system to protect those ground forces and the command and control and logistics support 
were essential sub-elements of the military system. Therefore, specific nodes were air 
defense command and control facilities, air defense radars, airfields and fuel and massed 
ammunition supplies.
Social. The population of Yugoslavia in 1999 was just over 10 million, with all 
but 600,000 living within Serbia or its provinces (including Kosovo). Serbs comprised 62 
per cent of the population with Albanians being the largest minority group (16.5 per 
cent). The culture of Serbia is inexorably intertwined with the complex and often tragic 
history of the region.34 A displayed willingness to stand up to both the West and the 
Soviet Union, and to steer its own course during the cold war was emblematic of this 
independent spirit. Serb nationalism was a primary factor and strength of the social 
system.35 Therefore, the loyalties and connections of the general Serb populace to the 
central government and the political leadership was an essential element of the social 
system. Additionally, as illustrated earlier, Serbs regarded Kosovo with an almost 
mystical importance.
Religion also is a factor in Serb society. Most of the ethnic Serbs were at least 
nominally Christian, with the Eastern Orthodox Church containing the primary 
denominations. The Serbian Orthodox Church has always been a major component of
34. Europa World Yearbook 1999, 3967-71. The amount o f  published material on the culture and social 
systems o f  the FRY is immense. Among the most relevant studies is Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. She 
notes the differences between the “rural culture, based on obligations to kin, intergenerational transfer o f  
knowledge, and the social influence o f  the clergy,” and the culture o f  the cities. She contends that socialism  
reinforced this cultural divide (ibid., 238).
35. “Serbian roots are in Kosovo, and everything that is connected to the Serbs throughout the past 
centuries is there. Every Serb is intimately connected to it.” Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with 
Commander o f  the Yugoslav 3rd Army, Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html (accessed 6 January 2005).
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Serb society, both in a cultural and religious sense. The Church had survived Ottoman 
regimes and the atheistic communism of the Tito era. The Church top-level leadership 
maintained the position that Kosovo must be an integral part of Serbia. Milosevic was 
eager to associate with the Church hierarchy, however due in part to his communist 
legacy, the level of support for him personally varied.
Information, its means and manner of distribution, and the sources from which the 
general population could obtain it, were critical to nurturing and reinforcement of this 
nationalist culture. The media was largely and increasingly government controlled. The 
Belgrade published newspaper Politika, represented a primary print source, and 
Radiotelevizija Srbije (RTS) the primary broadcast media. Both would be considered to 
be nodes. The vulnerability was the central government’s ability to broadcast its own 
message, while concurrently denying the populace access to alternative versions of 
conditions and events from abroad.
I have presented in a few pages a very cursory analysis of the political, economic, 
military and social (PEMS) systems, some of their essential elements and sub-elements, 
and a sampling o f nodes. A fully developed systems o f systems analysis would use this 
type of approach, but would require a far greater depth of analysis and would produce a 
larger set of nodes. Additionally, a much more highly developed and detailed knowledge 
on these nodes would be required. For illustration, Table 7 presents a further depiction of 
potential nodes in the 1999 FRY. Some of these nodes will be used in subsequent 
examples.
While the level of analysis provided thus far can be of some value to the decision 
maker, it falls short in providing the advantages that a completed system of systems
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analysis could offer. More specifically, an understanding of the connections between 
nodes within and across the PEMS systems could contribute to (1) amplification of the 
effects of actions; (2) indication of possible undesired effects; and, (3) recognition of 
alternative actions. The objectives requires examining potential linkages between nodes.
Table 7. Sampling of Nodes by PEMS Area
PEMS System Elements Sub-Elements Nodes
Political Executive Senior leadership Slobodan Milosevic
Political Parties Socialist Party o f  Serbia Belgrade Headquarters
Yugoslav United Left 
(JUL)
Mila Markovic
Ministries Ministry o f  Interior MUP Headquarters at Kula 
Milicija
Economic Manufacturing Automobiles Zastava Plant Complex
Steel Steel Works Sartid
Construction equipment 14 Octobar factory at 
Krusavec
Communications Serbia Telecom Relay site near Srbobran
Banking National Bank o f  
Yugoslavia
Petroleum Refining Petrochemicals at Pancevo
Utilities Electric Power Belgrade Transformer Yard
Transportation
infrastructure
Bridges Danube Bridge near Novi 
Sad
Ports Fuel terminals at Bar
Military Air Defense Anti-air missile force SA-3 Battalion near 
Batajinica
Command and Control Belgrade Air Defense 
Center
Aviation Interceptor force Obvra Military airfield
Logistics/Re-supply Diesel Fuel Storage site at Srbobran
Social Media Television RTS Studios Belgrade FM- 
TV RADREL Mt. Avala
Print Politika
Religion Bishop Artemije
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Node Linkages -  The System of Systems
Many o f the linkages within military systems are readily apparent, and planners 
routinely have utilized this type of analysis. For example, ground forces must be supplied 
and sustained. Therefore, provision and replacement of equipment, weapons, fuel, food, 
water, and personnel are critical to military operations. Recognizing this, an adversary 
will use the connections between manufacturing, storage, and transportation facilities in 
their overall planning. Hence, the means of supply, including the lines of communication 
into an area, will be attacked.
Bridges, railroad lines, road intersections, storage sites and the enablers of 
transport, e.g., diesel fuel, are often targeted as well as the forces in the field themselves. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of an interceptor aircraft is severely degraded if the target 
detection and command and control facilities are not functioning. For example, the 
effectiveness of the SA-3 battalion near Batajinica would be affected by actions taken 
against its related command and control facilities. The premise is that if the desired effect 
is degrading the capability of the surface to air missiles, then this may be achieved 
through indirect attack on the related elements of the command and control system. The 
multiplier effect is that removal of the command and control may also influence other air 
defense facilities. Hence, targets such the integrated air defense system (IADS) related 
radar site at Urosevac were attacked with the intent of amplifying the effect of the 
weapons deployed beyond the target itself.
Similarly, in economic systems, the sources of power and fuel for a facility may 
be determined and the connections between nodes established. For example, assume that 
the Zastava auto plant is dependent upon the Sartid steel works for materials. Both of
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these are affected by any changes to the facilities that produce power e.g., the Kolubara 
Power Plant, to the steel complex. Hence, any disruption of electrical power production 
will be likely to produce cascading effects. Any dependence on supply presents 
vulnerabilities and opportunities for indirect actions to achieve influences on another 
node. Not all the nodes will be within the geographic boundaries of the nation being 
assessed. In a global economy, some of these connections will extend beyond national 
borders.
The connection is not always apparent when multiple systems are involved. In the 
Yugoslav political system the connections between the leadership of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Yugoslav United Left (JUL) are not difficult to 
ascertain, since in this instance they were Slobodan Milosevic and Mila Markovic— 
husband and wife. Political connections to financial interests are often intentionally 
concealed and are normally difficult to establish. Political support is often a perishable 
commodity, and connections between political and social nodes are often transient and 
dependent upon events. Perception becomes reality, and nodes that promulgate 
information are critical to influencing opinion and political support.
A depiction of a complete set of nodes and their connections in the 1999 
Yugoslavia is well beyond the scope of this effort. It also is unnecessary in order to 
adequately present selected examples to demonstrate the proposed methodology. The 
supposition that needs support is that the principles of a system of systems analysis were 
utilized in the NATO operations against Yugoslavia, albeit not overtly. Therefore, an 
efficient and appropriate means o f completing this objective is to select specific instances 
where NATO planners utilized the existence of nodal connections. This first requires a
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revisit o f the political objectives and how the military objectives were developed to 
support these goals.
Military Objectives
Not surprisingly, the U.S. and NATO objectives for the use of force were closely 
aligned. These were stated succinctly as the Three D ’s :
1. Demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the 
Balkans
2. Deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and 
create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing, and
3. Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread war to
■JiT
neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military operations.
The actions required to achieve the second and third objectives likely would result in 
attainment of the first. Therefore, the measures conducted by NATO in pursuit of those 
last two goals will be the focus of further analysis. The military objectives of Milosevic 
were relatively simple, i.e., to withstand the limited bombing offensive and to wait for the 
NATO nations to become frustrated and abandon the military strategy. This would result 
in presentation of more favorable terms during future negotiations.
Determination of primacy among NATO’s objectives was, and continues to be, a 
topic of discussion and debate. The NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
36. U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Armed Services. “Joint Statement on the Kosovo After- 
Action Review. The attacks would be conducted in five phases: Phase 0 -  deployment o f  assets into 
theater; Phase 1 -  establish air superiority over Kosovo and degrade command and control over the whole 
o f the FRY; Phase 2 would attack military targets in Kosovo and those FRY forces south o f  44 deg; Phase 
3 would expand air operations against a wider range o f  targets; and Phase 4 would redeploy as required. 
U.S. Department o f  Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,” 8, refers to a Limited 
Air Response option that was later incorporated into Phase 1 o f  the air campaign.
37. Hosner, Why M ilosevic D ecided to Settle When He Did, 19-34. The author contends that Milosevic 
may have expected a much more limited campaign and that he believed that the NATO nations would not 
be able to maintain cohesion through a more expanded conflict.
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(SACEUR), U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, believed that the Serb forces operating in 
Kosovo were the center o f gravity and should be the primary target of the campaign 
(Objective 2 preeminent). The operational air commander of NATO air forces in the 
region, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, did not share this view. He 
believed that attacking critical infrastructure within Serbia itself was the preferred 
strategy (Objective 3 most important). Although actions taken at times served both 
objectives, they more frequently did not. The air campaign was based on the phases 







Forces in the Field
Roads & Bridge Network
Petroleum Refineries, Storage & Distro
Command, Control and Communications
VJ/MUP - Leadership and Sustainment
IADS
Figure 19. Allied Force Campaign Plan38
38. Depiction adapted from U. S. Department o f  Defense, “29 April 1999 US DOD Press Briefing,” 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aprl999/990429-J-0000K-001.jpg (accessed 22 February 2005). Industry 
and power were not included in the DOD slide. Those blocks were labeled “Classified.” Cordesman, 
Lessons and Non-Lessons o f  the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, 23, inserts these under Decimate in 
his adaptation o f  the slide. Although depicted as a timeline from left to right, there is no clear delineation 
between phases, e.g., some power facilities were attacked during the initial days o f  the campaign if  they 
were determined to be linked to military nodes.
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The Set and Maintain Conditions phase focuses on the Integrated Air Defense 
System (IADS) and the ability to command and control the VJ (military) and MUP 
(paramilitary) forces in the field. The isolation of those forces required additional strikes 
against command and control facilities, but also required attacks on vital infrastructure. 
Since many of these entities in the Decimate Phase were dual-use, i.e., utilized by both 
the military and civilian sectors, the effect o f attacks on these nodes influenced multiple 
PEMS areas.
When the air operations commenced on 24 March, engagement o f fixed targets 
was limited to IAD sites and military command and control (C2) facilities. Despite the 
focus on VJ/MUP related targets, the first week of the campaign witnessed strikes against 
some power transmission facilities, and other not primarily military targets such as the 
civilian airfield at Batajnica.39 Attacks were concentrated on targets that could be 
described as nodes within the military system, with choke points and strategic 
marshalling areas getting special emphasis. These targets were engaged with great 
precision and the weapons performed largely as intended. However, the successes in this 
endeavor did not appear to attain the stated objective.
Despite the admitted failure to achieve the prime objective, subsequent actions 
continued to focus primarily on influencing the Serb forces in the field, although this 
objective included attacks on dual use infrastructure such as bridges and petroleum 
refining facilities. Coincident with the NATO Summit in Washington on 23 April, the 
target list was enlarged to include strategic targets, including industrial, media, and 
infrastructure sites. The shift was to concentrate on what had become characterized as
39. The first day targets were classified as 42% forces on the ground; 21% air defense; and, 15% 
command and control. U.S. Department o f  Defense, "DOD News Briefing 21 May 1999," 
http://www.defeselink.mil/news/Mayl999/990521-J0O0Ok-002.jpg (accessed 22 February 2005).
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“the four pillars of Milosevic’s power—the political machine, the media, the security 
forces, and the economic system.40 Since strikes on the dispersed VJ forces were not 
successful, subsequent attacks now, “concentrated instead on second-order effects by 
going after bases, supplies, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).”41 With this redirection 
o f strategy, the utilization o f the principles of a system of systems approach was more 
evident. To further support this premise, and continuing with the PEMS construct, 
examples will be provided from each of the non-military systems.
Political. Since the paramount political node was Milosevic himself, and his 
ability to maintain his position as President, NATO’s concentration was on him and the 
nodes related to his power base. However, a direct approach was not possible. NATO 
consistently and unequivocally asserted that the elimination o f Milosevic was not a 
objective: “We are not targeting Milosevic,” a spokesman claimed, although he admitted 
that they were “certainly targeting what makes him what he is.”42 Therefore, operations 
were directed at the nodes linked to him. These would be both internal and external to 
Yugoslavia.
A RAND study contends that Milosevic thought that he could exploit Russia’s 
support for Yugoslavia.43 This was based on the unwavering backing that Yugoslav 
delegation had receive from the Russians at Rambouillet and the historical and cultural 
connections between the two Slav nations. The subsequent actions of NATO support this
40. Lambeth, NATO's Air War fo r  Kosovo , 39. These equate to the PEMS systems proposed here.
41. Ibid., 29.
42. A NATO spokesperson added: “We will go after the brain as much as we go after the fingertips.”
Jamie Shea, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 20 April 1999,” http://www.nato.int/kosovo/
press/p990420.htm (accessed 22 February 2005).
43. Hosner, Why Milosevic D ecided to Settle When He Did, 33. This assumption was not without 
justification. Shortly after the bombing commenced the Russian Duma by a vote o f  279 to 30, demanded 
that the Russian government send aid and advisors to the FRY. Posen, “The War for Kosovo,”51, adds that 
Russia also was motivated by resentment over what was perceived as NATO’s long-term efforts to 
dominate Europe.
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contention since a significant effort was made to break or weaken this relationship. The 
node utilized was the Russian government and its Special Envoy Victor Chernomyrdin 
who eventually convinced Milosevic that Russia would not come to its aid.44 The official 
U.S. report on the conflict contends “the alliance’s continuous efforts to engage Russia in 
diplomacy proved critical to achieving the settlement.”45
The political isolation o f Milosevic was made a priority. On 27 May, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia formally charged Milosevic 
with “Crimes Against Humanity and Violations of the Laws or Customs of War.”46 This 
significantly assisted in attainment of this NATO objective. The sub-element most 
influenced by this action was the general populace of Yugoslavia upon whose support the 
Milosevic regime depended. Additionally, the chance of Milosevic obtaining any external 
support, even from nations who condemned the NATO actions, was all but eliminated by 
the indictment. Thus, the political system was influenced primarily through external 
means, with the discrediting of Milosevic and the deterioration of his political support.
Economic. Attacks against military targets also resulted in effects on the 
economic system, since many facilities were overtly or covertly dual-use. As a result, 
destruction or degradation of these facilities produced effects on the economic and social
44. Despite anti-western sentiments over the bombings, the Russian government became the primary 
intermediary between NATO and Milosevic. See Carpenter, in N ATO ’s Empty Victory, 77-91, for 
expansion on this peculiar relationship. The author contends that the Kosovo campaign resulted in a 
marked deterioration in relations between Russia and the West.
45. U.S Department o f  Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, “13. Tim Judah, 
Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 274, provides additional 
insights and addresses the personal element observing that Chernomyrdin “did not like M ilosevic.”
46. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, “Indictment,” 4. Four others were 
included in the indictment Milosevic was identified as the dominant Serbian political figure exercising de 
facto  control o f  the federal government.” Although NATO exercised no direct control over the activities o f  
the tribunal, the timing o f  the indictment clearly supported NATO objectives. The next day a NATO 
spokesman declared: “This morning the people o f  Yugoslavia have woke up to be the first people in history 
to live under the rule o f  an indicted war criminal.” Jamie Shea, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 28 
May 1999,” http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990528a.htm (accessed 22 February 2005).
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systems as well as on the military. Examples from the Kosovo campaign include the 
Zastava factory in Kragujevac that reportedly produced munitions as well as cars and 
trucks, the Sloboda industrial unit in Cacak that produced ammunition in addition to its 
output of vacuum cleaners, and the 14 Oktobar plant at Krusevac that reconditioned tank 
engines while also producing heavy construction equipment.47
Electric power is a commodity with both civilian and military utility. Attacks on 
fixed power generation infrastructure have a greater impact on the former, since many 
military facilities have backup systems. By late April, the NATO target list had expanded 
to include electric power transformers supplying command and control centers near 
Belgrade. Although making no attempt to conceal the strikes on those targets, the official 
NATO position was that their intention was to go after the transformers and “edges of the 
power system,” in a manner that would limit irreparable harm to the power infrastructure. 
This desire to minimize unnecessary permanent damage also influenced the selection of 
specific weapons. After extensive debate, on 3 May, United States Air Force (USAF) F- 
117A’s deployed BLU114/B’s, a formerly highly classified weapon that uses graphite 
filaments to disrupt electrical power lines, substations, and power generation plants. 
Attacks on these facilities produced multiple effects, not all limited to the military 
system. One analyst argues, “it seems logical that NATO attacks on power facilities must 
have a political and economic impact, and an impact on public opinion.”49
47. Steven Erlanger, “Bombing Unites Serb Army as It Debilitates Economy,” The New York Times, 30 
April 1999. An estimated 100,000 people were estimated to be unemployed as a result o f  the NATO  
bombing, 15,000 at the Zastava plant alone.
48. Bryan Bender, “US 'Soft Bombs' Prove NATO Point,” Janes Defence Weekly, 10 May 1999, 13. 
Other sources refer to this weapon as the CBU-94. See also Nardulli et al., Disjointed War: Military 
Operations in Kosovo, 1999, 38. Most resistance came from the French who were concerned about possible 
civilian casualties. The RAND analysis concluded that the effect on the civilian population was greater than 
the impact on the military that had backup generators for their systems.
49. Cordesman, Lessons and Non-Lessons o f  the A ir and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, 181.
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Specific connections between the political and economic nodes were at times 
difficult to ascertain. However, as a NATO spokesman related, “Yugoslavia is a state 
based on nepotism, as a result it is ‘almost impossible’ to strike an industrial target 
without having an effect on Milosevic’s cronies or family members.”50 While during the 
conflict there normally was no acknowledgement of direct targeting of commercial 
activities connected to the friends and family o f Milosevic, some knowledgeable analysts 
and observers contend that this was a key factor in the ultimate decision for his 
capitulation.51 The supposition is that if NATO threatened the basis of their wealth and 
power, supporters could be turned against the regime. A later study for the U.S. Congress 
concluded, “Though NATO spokesmen emphasized that all targets had military 
significance, the air strikes were increasingly targeted against economic and political 
infrastructure.”52
Among several economic-political connections postulated are Dragan Tomic, 
Director of Yugo Petrol; Milan Beko, director of the Zastava automobile plant and a 
former Minister of Privatization; and, Zivota Kosic, who headed Duvanska Industrija Nis. 
Additionally, a radio station had been linked to Milosevic’s daughter, Marija, and a 
tobacco factory in Nis was connected to his son, Marko.53 All these facilities were 
recipients of NATO ordnance.
50. Shea, “Press Conference, 20 April 1999.” The stated primary purpose o f  attacks on utilities and 
industrial facilities was to cause difficulties to the military complex in the FRY.
51. This determination o f  linkages was reportedly called “Marix” and developed by the CIA. General 
Clark reportedly denied any knowledge o f  the operation. Jim Mokhiber, “Why Did M ilosevic Give Up?” 
Public Broadcasting Service, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/fighting/giveup.htm  
(accessed 18 February 2005).
52. Paul E. Gallis, “Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force,” (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 19 November 1999). These were determined to be “targets o f  value to the 
regime” and intended “to force the political capitulation o f  M ilosevic.”
53. Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, “NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite's Property,” New 
York Times, 19 April 1999. See also “NATO Strike Targets Milosevic Inner Circle,” Financial Times, 21
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Social. A key element in Serb culture is nationalism. Milosevic attempted to 
portray himself as the defender of Serb territory and honor and to translate this role into 
political power. The Yugoslav media was the major source of information for the Serb 
populace, and therefore became a likely source of nodes. Both broadcast and print media 
were essentially state controlled and consequently a source of propaganda for Milosevic. 
Hence, from the NATO perspective, they became justifiable targets. A notable and 
contentious episode in the conflict was the 20 April attack on the Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS) Belgrade headquarters, which also was the site o f a radio transmitter for 
Radiotelevizija Srbije (RTS). A senior NATO official, in justifying the attack, argued that 
the party headquarters was “an integral part o f the strategic communications network” 
that was vital to the control apparatus of the Milosevic regime.54
Public opinion in Yugoslavia was considered important enough that President 
Clinton presented a video address to the Serbian people emphasizing “that the United 
States and our European allies have no quarrel with the Serbian people,” and called upon 
Serbs to “join with us in seeking an end to the needless and avoidable conflict.”55 In the 
desire to influence the social system of Yugoslavia, nodes that could influence public 
opinion became the primary focus of alliance efforts.
April 1999. Pending any future release o f  currently classified information, the accuracy o f  these reports 
cannot be confirmed. However, within the NATO Alliance development o f  intelligence on financial 
connections is a sensitive issue.
54. Brig. Gen. Giuseppe Marani, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 21 April 2001,” 
http://www.nato.int/ kosovo/press/p990421a (accessed 18 February 2005).A later NATO spokesman 
declared that M ilosevic used television and radio stations “to suppress the truth and are integral to his 
ability to conduct his brutal campaign.” Brig. Gen. Walter Jertz, “Press Conference NATO HQ, Brussels, 
23 May 1999,” http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990523a.htm (accessed 18 February 2005).
55. Cable News Network, “Text o f  President Clinton Videotaped Address to the Serbian People,” 26 
March 1999, http://www.cnn.com/world/europe/9903/26/clinton.transcript/index.htm (accessed 13 
February 2005). Determination o f  the effect o f  this broadcast, or even o f  the number o f  Serbs who may 
have viewed it, is problematic. However, the demonstrations in support o f  the regime immediately 
following the commencement o f  the bombing suggest that its impact was minimal.
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It is apparent that NATO attempted to achieve its objectives through actions 
against a set of nodes designed to influence the behavior of Slobodan Milosevic. These 
ranged from high-level external entities to specific military command and control 
facilities, industrial plants, and media broadcast sites. The intent was to make Milosevic 
and the Serbian people change their behavior in Kosovo or to pay a strategically 
significant price for not doing so. Unable to achieve its goals, NATO turned to a 
campaign designed to damage Serbia’s capacity to expel the Kosovars by degrading 
Yugoslavia’s ability to wage military operations. The NATO strategy is addressed next.
Effects of the Coercive Actions
Table 8 depicts the categories of targets struck by NATO’ aircraft.56
Table 8. Categories o f Targets Engaged
Category Total Destroyed D am aged
Counter-regime 7 1 6
Electrical power 19 6 9
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) 30 13 17
C4I 88 31 33
Bridges and Railroads 68 39 16
Military industry 17 4 10
56. William R Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: The Most Precise Application o f  Air Power in History,” 
in War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 22. Attributed to the USAF Air War Over Serbia Study 
Group information that was made available to the author.
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At a post-conflict congressional hearing a senior USAF officer testified that the goal of 
Allied Force was to degrade and diminish the Serb-led military. To this end, NATO 
aircraft reduced oil-refining capacity to zero; destroyed almost 40% of the FRY military’s 
fuel supplies and more than two-thirds of Yugoslavia’s capability to manufacture 
ammunition.57 Industrial facilities were often dual-use and therefore deemed to be 
legitimate targets. The official justification for destruction of the bridges was to cause 
“Delays and disruptions in delivery of military equipment, fuel distribution, and civilian 
staples.58
Although many assessments are available, Stephen Hosner effectively captures 
the most often stated and best-supported conclusions. He contends that the bombing 
campaign generated pressure on Milosevic to compromise; and that most of the impetus 
resulted from damages to Serbia’s dual-use infrastructure. He further argues, “Attacks on 
purely military targets probably did not provide a major source of pressure.”59 Ivo 
Daadler and Michael O’ Hanlon expand on this conclusion but diverge on the 
effectiveness of the actions, asserting, “the military objectives of the bombing campaign 
were only indirectly related to the overriding political objectives of achieving a durable 
peace.”60 Although the direct attacks on Serb forces did employ some o f the elements of 
the system of systems approach, e.g., attacks on air defense C2 facilities as a means of
57. House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Congress, House o f Representatives, Committee on 
Armed Services. Performance o f  the B2 Bomber in the Kosovo Air Campaign, ”32.
58. U.S. Department o f  Defense, “DOD New s Briefing 30 April 1999,” http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
news/Aprl999/990430-J-000K-004.html (accessed 13 February 2005). Emphasis added. This represents 
one o f  the few acknowledgements o f  an attempt to interdict supplies to the civilian population. The stated 
effect o f  the attacks on these lines o f  communications included “Significant impact on sustainment and 
ground operations.”
59. Hosner, Why Milosevic D ecided to Settle When He Did, xvii. He estimates that M ilosevic’s primary 
concern was increased bombing. If the campaign lasted beyond the summer months, loss o f  electric power 
would have threatened heating o f  75% o f Serbian homes.
60. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo  
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000), 210.
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degrading the anti-air missile threat, the segment of the conflict analysis most relevant to 
this study are the effects across political, economic, military, and social (PEMS) 
boundaries. Once the effort shifted to indirect approaches to influence Milosevic, the use 
of this construct becomes more apparent. The availability of petroleum products provides 
one good example.
The limited refining capabilities of Yugoslavia were quickly destroyed, and 
storage and transport capabilities were gradually being degraded through methodical 
attacks. As Table 8 indicates, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) targets were a major 
component of NATO strike plans. However, two factors worked against NATO’s 
objectives. First, VJ and MUP forces in the field required very little gasoline and diesel 
fuel to operate. Their needs could be met with only a few truckloads per day. Secondly, 
the air strikes did little to reduce the import of petroleum products into Yugoslavia by 
land or by sea. The principal seaports of Yugoslavia were Bar and Kotor Bay in 
Montenegro. Through diplomatic activity imports from neighboring countries were 
reduced, but smuggling across borders continued. However, despite the effort to further 
reduce POL supplies, a full embargo and naval blockade were never implemented.
A political node connected to these economic seaport nodes was Montenegrin 
President Djukanovic. A former ally of Milosevic, he possessed an independent nature 
and successfully ran against his former mentor’s candidate. Although he condemned the 
NATO bombing, he resisted Serbian pressure and criticized VJ/MUP activities in 
Kosovo. Recognizing this thorn in the side of Milosevic, NATO provided Montenegro 
with a temporary security guarantee.61 Some analysts contend that if NATO had been
61. Ibid., 128. This guarantee did not protect Montenegro from air strikes. The radar sites at Podgorica 
and the airfield at Golobovci were hit in the very early days o f  the conflict.
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able to cut off foreign oil supplies as well as destroying the refineries and existing storage
S ')
facilities, the mobility o f FRY forces in Kosovo may have been affected. Hence, a 
combination of diplomatic, economic, and military efforts was executed, although the 
effectiveness of the effort is arguable.
Another example related to the strategy of influencing Milosevic though an 
indirect approach was the action taken against industrial facilities associated with his 
family and political supporters. Additionally, the European Union took steps to freeze the 
assets of more than 300 Milosevic supporters who were believed to have funds secreted 
in European banks. This action followed on to a visa ban intended to keep Milosevic’s 
cronies in Yugoslavia and allowing them to share the dangers and privations resulting 
from the bombing.63
Strikes against electrical power production and its associated nodes had 
consequences across PEMS areas. The already addressed economic impact was 
reinforced by the eventual effect on the Serb populace and their support for the regime. 
While initial air strikes were met with scorn and defiance, the attacks after late April 
steadily wore down civilian morale. The unemployment resulting from the damage to 
electrical power facilities exacerbated the already pitiful standard of living in Yugoslavia. 
While the graphite fiber weapons were intended to minimize permanent damage, the 
early May attacks knocked out power to an estimated 70 per cent o f Yugoslavia.
62. Ibid., 146. They note that SFOR troops were successful in restricting oil imports from Bosnia. 
Although lasting longer than both sides had foreseen, the duration o f  the 78-day conflict did not allow for 
POL shortages to have a full impact.
63. “War in the Balkans— Leader's Cronies Face Loss o f  20m Pounds in Assets,” The Independent- 
London, 31 May 1999, 6. Among those FRY government officials identified were Bogoljub Karic, a 
Minister without Portfolio, and Dusan Simic, the Mayor o f  Pristina.
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By late May, the U.S. claimed that public dissent against Milosevic was growing 
within Serbia. “Wages are no longer being paid. Fear is mounting. People are beginning 
to turn against the regime and call it to account.”64 This sampling suggests that NATO 
was successful in using the knowledge of FRY systems, and the connections between 
elements within these, to amplify the effects of their actions. However, not all secondary 
effects were desired or anticipated.
The Unintended Secondary Effects
The examples cited earlier propose instances where the principles of a system of 
systems analysis allowed NATO planners to amplify the impact of their actions and to 
consider alternative actions and nodes. However, there were instances where unintended 
effects also resulted. Chief among these was the increase in VJ/MUP operations during 
the initial days of the Allied Force. During the initial stages of the bombing campaign the 
degree of ethnic cleansing activity in Kosovo accelerated. Some observers contend, “air 
power had little or no impact on the Serb’s efforts to expel Kosovars from their 
homeland.”65 Another independent analysis posits that the NATO actions produced a 
“temporary and severe worsening of conditions,” and that for Kosovars “atrocities were 
greatly intensified during the period of the NATO military campaign.”66 Herein is the
64. Linda D Kozaryn, “NATO Air War Stirs Serb Dissent against M ilosevic Regime” American Forces 
Press Service, 20 May 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mayl999/n05201999_9905201.html 
(accessed 13 February 2005). These assertions by DOD spokespersons were based on “fairly large 
demonstrations” in three towns in central Serbia.
65. Scott A. Cooper, “Air Power and the Coercive Use o f  Force,” in Immaculate Warfare, ed. Stephen 
D. Wrange (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 6.
66. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, 163-64. However, the study 
asserts that the bombing did at least avert the worst fears o f  ethnic cleansing. Reports suggest that the CIA 
was aware o f  the potential for an increase in violence upon commencement o f  air operations and predicted 
this outcome might result. Lambeth, NATO's Air War fo r  Kosovo, 24.
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most evident and intensely debated unintended effect of the conflict. That is, did the 
actions intended to deter atrocities against the Kosovars actually promote them?
Debate continues with some analysts contending that the Serb operations were 
preplanned and would have been executed with or without the commencement of Allied 
Force. They argue that Milosevic expected a short conflict and postulate that Yugoslav 
strategy was to quickly complete the eviction of the Kosovars and present NATO with a 
fa it accompli o f a predominantly Serb province. The question of whether NATO should 
have anticipated such an outcome is valid. A vocal critic of the operation claims that the 
bombing campaign was “disastrously counterproductive” and that the Clinton
f \7administration “failed to foresee the consequence of the initiation of the air campaign.” 
Collateral damage was an overriding concern of NATO planners, and 
extraordinary attempts were made to reduce its impact. The inadvertent casualties and 
destruction inflicted on civilians in the course of military operations was a sensitive issue 
in Europe, and particularly in Germany where the Green Party held a place in the 
coalition government. Milosevic was aware of this apprehension and took advantage of 
opportunities to exploit any civilian deaths or environmental damage. Maintaining 
alliance unity was an overarching strategic objective; hence, any actions that were 
perceived as producing an unacceptable degree o f collateral damage put achievement of 
this objective at risk.68 Despite great care and the unprecedented level of the use of 
precision weapons, civilian casualties did occur.
The Human Rights Watch estimates that “some 500 Yugoslav civilians are known 
to have died as a result o f NATO actions,” but its investigations “found no evidence of
67. Christopher Layne, “Collateral Damage in Yugoslavia,” 51.
68. U.S. Department o f  Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,” 7.
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war crimes,” i.e., the direct targeting of civilians.69 The extraordinary efforts made by 
NATO to minimize collateral damage resulting from their air strikes substantiates the 
supposition that planners considered secondary effects when targets were nominated, and 
that the political leadership took this into account in the approval process.
Initially, NATO strike operations produced the unintended effect of strengthening Serb 
nationalism and internal support for Milosevic. Additionally, the attacks were condemned 
by many nations outside the NATO sphere. Although regime change was not a stated 
objective, this strengthening of resolve certainly did not contribute to the intent of 
altering Serb behavior in Kosovo. However, as the intensity of attacks increased, this 
level of internal support waned to a point where Milosevic may have feared that his
70power base was endangered.
A desired end state for NATO was peace and stability in the region. However, the 
destruction of the Yugoslav economic infrastructure had deleterious impact on 
neighboring nations, many of whose economies were weak and unstable. One observer 
claims, “NATO’s 11-week air war is estimated to have cost the struggling economies of 
Yugoslavia’s neighbors more than $4.2 billion.71 This problem was exacerbated by the 
massive influx of refugees, mainly in Albania and Macedonia, although NATO’s hurried 
but effectual establishment o f refugee camps suggests that some planners anticipated this 
secondary effect.
69. Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign— Summary,” 
http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2000/mnato/natbm200.htm (accessed 22 March 2005). The report is critical o f  
NATO operations strikes against heating plants and bridges that were not on major transportation routes or 
had no apparent military functions.
70. Byman, Waxman, and Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument, 19. They acknowledge that 
attempts to manipulate the opinion o f  an adversary population “remains largely beyond the capability o f  
planners and leaders” (ibid., 22).
71. Gary Dempsey, “Headaches in Neighboring Countries,” in NATO's Empty Victory, ed. Ted Galen 
Carpenter (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2000), 51 and 59.
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The attack on the party headquarters that was collocated with radio and television 
studios was a prime indicator of NATO’s awareness of and concern over secondary 
effects. Despite their declaration o f the building as a legitimate military target, concern 
over damage, loss of life, and the perception of an attack on the press caused extensive 
debate and discussion among NATO planners and the political leadership. Table 9 
provides a sampling of some of the unintended effects resulting from NATO actions.
Table 9. Unintended Effects of NATO Actions
Node Intended Effect Secondary Effect Comment
Zastava auto plant Reduce military related 
production
Civilian population; up 
to 50,000 unemployed
Increased resolve and 
support for FRY regime
14 Octobar Factory Preclude reconditioning 
o f tank engines
Civilian population; up 
to 7,000 unemployed
Increased resolve and 
support for FRY regime




o f war crimes
Potential for loss o f  
alliance cohesion and a 
cessation o f  operations
MJ/VUJ Forces Reduction in ethnic 
cleansing operations
Increase in ethnic 
cleansing operations
Kosovars displaced after 
commencement o f  
bombing causing a 
refugee crisis in 
neighboring nations.
Steel works Reduction in war 
materials
Damage to regional 
economies
Weakening o f  NATO  
international support




Weakening o f  NATO  
international support
MJ/MUJ Forces Stop ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo
Ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo
Serb population departs 
Kosovo
Despite the use of some of the principles of a system of systems analysis some 
unintended effects still resulted. This is not surprising in that there is no pretense that the 
adoption of such a construct will eliminate the occurrences of this phenomenon. 
However, during Allied Force the determination of linkages between nodes within and 
across the PEMS systems did reveal insights that allowed planners to anticipate and to
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mitigate some of the deleterious consequences of unintended secondary effects. In some 
cases alternative actions were utilized. In others, the unintended effect was anticipated 
but the decision calculus supported continuing with the strikes on the target and accepting 
the negative impact. In these situations attempts were made to minimize the expected 
consequences. The objective of the analysis is understanding and management of 
secondary effects, not their elimination. In NATO’s Kosovo intervention, this benefit was 
evident, notwithstanding the unstructured and ad hoc manner in which the 
interrelationships were determined. Hence, the potential value of the adoption of a system 
of systems construct was revealed.
Summation
This chapter used the 1999 Kosovo conflict to display how elements of a systems 
approach were utilized to plan and direct the use o f coercive force. Although not 
explicitly conducted using a system of systems approach, the selection of actions by 
NATO planners provides multiple examples of how a holistic perspective afforded 
decision-makers with a deeper understanding of how the behavior of an adversary may be 
influenced. This was accomplished by using the knowledge of connections between 
nodes to enable the attainment of effects that would be unachievable by direct means.
The lessons of the 1991 Gulf War were utilized in the planning and execution of 
the actions against military targets. Clearly the relationship between military nodes was 
understood and exploited. However, the major difference in the overall campaign was the 
expansion of the use of the principles of the construct to include the other aspects of 
power, i.e., political, economic, and social. This is a significant difference from earlier
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conflicts, including Somalia, where knowledge was compartmentalized, systems were 
treated independently, and the effects across systems were not adequately addressed. 
Although not all objectives were attained, most notably NATO’s inability to disrupt the 
VJ/MUP operations in Kosovo, the conflict was brought to a conclusion with most of the 
alliance’s stated goals achieved. A post-conflict study contends that when the initial 
efforts against the Serb ground forces failed, NATO then “concentrated instead on
• 77second-order effects by going after bases, supplies, petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL).
The U.S. Department of Defense Report on the operation concludes, “NATO 
nations employed other economic and political means—enforcing economic sanctions, 
tightening travel restrictions, freezing financial holdings—that raised the level of anxiety
73and discontent within Belgrade’s power circles. This shift in strategy would not have 
been possible without consideration of interrelationships between elements of the 
Yugoslav system of power.
While some of the successes can only be postulated, it is apparent that NATO 
used the basic principles of the system of systems construct in the conduct of their 
campaign against Milosevic. The system of systems methodology presents three 
advantages to the decision-maker. This analysis of Allied Force and related activities 
displayed instances of all of these.
(1) Amplification o f  the effects o f  actions. The decision to concentrate air strikes 
against command and control nodes, marshalling areas, and storage facilities indicates 
that the military planners used the concept of node-to-node linkages in their efforts. As
72. Lambeth, NATO's Air War fo r  Kosovo , 29. Emphasis added.
73. U.S Department o f  Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,” 11. The 
assertion was that diplomatic and economic leverage combined with military force were the important 
factors in bringing the crisis to a close (ibid., 12).
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the target list expanded, attacks on industrial facilities had an impact on the economic, 
political, and social as well as the military system, and the effects on these systems also 
supported attainment of overall alliance objectives.
(2) Indication o f  possible undesired effects. Recognizing the consequence of 
widespread civilian casualties and wanton destruction of economic infrastructure, NATO 
planners took extraordinary care in the selection of targets and of weapons to minimize 
the undesired effects o f their actions.
(3) Recognition o f  alternative actions. Precluded from going after “the head of the 
snake,” i.e., Milosevic himself, attempts were made to influence his behavior through 
indirect means, notably actions that affected the financial interests o f his friends and 
family. Importantly, recognizing that military actions alone would not achieve the overall 
political objectives, the alliance embarked upon an extensive diplomatic effort, including 
the use of a Russian envoy.
Daadler and O’Hanlon assert, “when military force is used, military means must 
relate to political ends.”74 In the conduct of Allied Force NATO decision-makers 
generally adhered to this guidance, although inconsistently and with debatable results. 
However, the important insight obtained from this examination of the conflict is that the 
principles of a system of systems analysis were utilized and that the potential for further 
development and application of the construct is evident.
Two years after the conclusion of Allied Force, another action would be 
undertaken, this time in a dramatically different strategic environment. The next chapter 
will examine American led operations in Afghanistan to further illustrate the extent to
74. Daalder and O ’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 210.
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which the use o f the principles o f a system of systems analysis were utilized and the 
benefits that may have accrued.




The Somalia and Kosovo case studies provided examples of the use of the 
principles of a system of systems analysis by the United Nations in Somalia and by 
members NATO alliance in Operation Allied Force. In several instances, utilization of 
these tenets resulted in enhanced effectiveness in the attaining o f primary desired 
outcomes and provided a limited level of ability to anticipate secondary effects. The 
examinations revealed greater utilization of the approach in Kosovo. However, a single 
case study does not present sufficient justification, nor does it adequately support the 
contention that the system of systems construct can provide additional tools with which 
to make the hard choices between alternative courses of action.
I will examine in this chapter a more recent and decidedly different scenario to 
display instances where the principles of system of systems analysis were applied, and to 
further illustrate the potential advantages of adoption of the approach. The predominantly 
U.S. operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in October through December 
2001 provides an opportunity to explore the assertion that these principles can be applied 
under a vastly different set of circumstances in a considerably dissimilar environment.
The confines on the analysis addressed in the Kosovo study also apply here; 
primarily, the need to depend upon open source unclassified information of 
undeterminable accuracy and reliability. Additionally, the U.S. operation removed the 
Taliban from power, denied al Qaeda their base of operations, and established an elected 
central government in Kabul; however, at the time of this writing, the conflict is not yet
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concluded, and the attainment of U.S. political objectives remains incomplete. 
Nevertheless, as with the previous study, adequate information is available to determine 
that the U.S. political leadership and military planners utilized the principles of a system 
of systems analysis to evaluate the possible consequences of actions. This will allow me 
to identify and present examples o f occasions where their use produced the hypothesized 
advantages of the construct.
For illustration and comparison, I will utilize the Kosovo and Afghanistan 
operations, since they provide significant dissimilarities, but were executed within two 
years of each other.. Table 10 provides a summary of these differences from Kosovo.
Table 10. Comparison o f the Systems of Power o f Yugoslavia and Afghanistan
System Yugoslavia 1999 Afghanistan 2001
Political Internationally recognized government 
Authoritarian, but democratically elected 
regime
Sophisticated bureaucratic structure 
Multiple parties
Tradition o f  strong central government
No recognition by international bodies 
Regime not in complete control o f  territory 
Strict Theocracy
Unskilled and inexperienced management 
Active autonomous militias (warlords) 
Tradition o f  dispersed political power
Economic Weak, but functioning economy 





Primitive road networks 
Smuggling/drugs primary foreign trade
Military Armed Forces loyal to political leadership
Modern air defenses
Mechanized
High level o f  tactical proficiency
Primary loyalty to tribe and warlord 
Poorly equipped and supported 
Limited armor and mechanized units 
Tradition o f  shifting allegiances
Social Western
Homogeneous population, predominantly 
Christian and Slavic (outside Kosovo) 
High educational and literacy levels
South Asian Islamic
Multiple and sizeable ethnic groups
Tribal based
Extremely low education and literacy levels
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More than a function of geography and demographics, the nature of the 
divergence is especially apparent in comparisons of the adversary’s systems of national 
power.
Several other noteworthy contrasts make Afghanistan a suitable scenario with 
which to demonstrate the potential for wider application of the construct:
(1) Geography. Afghanistan is land-locked and was hundreds of miles from the nearest 
U.S. military base. The terrain and primitive road infrastructure provided few viable 
targets for American airpower. Lack of foliage made troop maneuver susceptible to air 
attack.
(2) Objective. The goal became regime change, instead o f behavior modification.
(3) Adversary. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were the threat and hence the primary 
objective, and provided the justification for the operation. The Taliban government was 
given the opportunity to avoid American military actions by giving up the terrorists 
believed to be responsible for the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and 
Washington. Once they refused, the defeat of the Taliban forces became a key objective.
(4) Political Environment. The domestic and international conditions post 9/11 enabled 
the adoption of a set of rules of engagement that would not have been considered before, 
and were not available to planners in 1999.
(5) Complexity. Although Balkan is a term that is utilized as an adjective to describe 
issues that are deeply intertwined, Afghanistan provided an even more complicated 
dilemma.1
1. As early military plans were being discussed and analyzed, National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice was reported to have stated, “W e’re going to wish this was the Balkans.” Bob Woodward, Bush at 
War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 80. He restates the depiction o f  Afghanistan as “the fabled 
deathtrap o f  invading armies and the graveyard o f  empires past” (ibid., 168).
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Therefore, the removal of the Taliban regime provides a sufficiently dissimilar 
environment from the previously examined cases through which to examine the use of 
the system of systems approach. A brief exploration into the relevant background and 
extant conditions in Afghanistan is warranted prior to identifying specific instances of 
application of the construct.
By virtue of its geographic location at the crossroads of diverse civilizations, 
Afghanistan has been invaded throughout its history. The most noteworthy early example 
was the army led by Alexander the Great that spent over two years fighting its way across 
the rugged terrain en route to its final conquests in India. Persians, Huns, and Turks 
followed the Greeks in succeeding centuries. In the 7th century, conquering Arab armies 
brought Islam along with their cavalry. Genghis Khan’s Mongol hordes devastated its 
cities in the 13th century, and later Tamerlane and Babur also led armies into 
Afghanistan. The common factor in all these invasions was the ferocious resistance of the 
warrior inhabitants of the territory. This spirit of independence and combative culture 
resulting from these invasions remains an important factor in understanding modem 
Afghanistan.2
With advances in the means of maritime exploration and the discovery of the 
alternatives to the overland routes to India, Afghanistan became less important to East- 
West trade, and a hiatus in foreign invasions ensued. However, by the 19th century, 
Afghanistan once again emerged as a factor in world politics, this time as part o f the 
Great Game for power and influence in the region between Russia and Great Britain. The
2. See Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise o f  
the Taliban (Seattle: University o f  Washington Press, 2001), esp. 23-53, for a useful condensed history o f  
the region with an emphasis on the impact on current conditions. Victoria Scholfield, Afghan Frontier: 
Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia (New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2003), likewise provides a 
valuable history o f  conflict in the region, particularly the British involvement.
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containment of Russia and the protection of their empire in India were the motivators for 
the British who were to learn that Afghanistan was easy to invade but difficult to 
conquer. Their strategy, rather effectively employed after their last significant military 
adventure in 1877, was to use paid surrogates to govern internally, while foreign policy 
was made in London. Although denied the prize of domination, Russia continuously 
maintained interest in their neighbor to the south.
The next century brought relative peace but little economic or social progress to 
Afghanistan, which was less o f a nation by Western standards than it was a collection of 
ethnic groups and tribes only loosely connected to the weak central government. The 
monarchy, which lasted until 1973, was not enlightened or effective; however, it proved 
to be adequate in maintaining a degree of internal order. With the end of the British Raj 
in 1947, Afghanistan gained its independence, but remained under the shadow of the 
communist superpower to the north—the USSR. Soviet efforts to bring Afghanistan into 
its orbit were subtler than those employed in Eastern Europe and consisted primarily of 
economic and technical aid and military assistance. Nevertheless, Afghanistan became 
increasingly dependent upon this financial support, and although a form of democracy 
emerged in the 1960’s, Soviet cultivation o f local communists continued. The Afghan 
armed forces also became increasingly dependent upon their Soviet suppliers for 
weapons, parts, and technical training.
In 1973, while the reigning monarch, Zahir Khan, was temporarily away from the 
country, Mohammad Daoud, who had served as prime minister from 1953-1963, declared 
himself Head of State, Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of a new Republic 
of Afghanistan. Although he had the backing of communist elements, Daoud worked
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toward weakening ties with the Soviets, and by 1978, he was purging them from 
government positions. This led to a revolt of mainly communist officers in the Afghan 
army, a coup d ’etat, and the establishment o f the Democratic Republic o f Afghanistan in 
1978.
The reform program of the new communist government met with widespread 
resistance, particularly in the rural areas. Religious traditionalists opposed the forced 
modernization, since these reforms “struck at the very heart o f the socioeconomic 
structure” o f society.3 The year-old constitution was abolished, The People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the only legal party, and relations with the USSR 
were strengthened. In the spring of 1979, this tension led to uprisings in Herat, which 
spread rapidly to other parts of the country. Hafizullah Amin assumed the position of 
prime minister, although Nur Mohammed Taraki remained in the largely powerless role 
of president.
The Amin regime was a disaster. Terror became the primary means of internal 
control, and its bungled foreign policy alienated the Soviets as well as the United States. 
By November, the situation had deteriorated enough so that Soviet planning for direct 
intervention progressed. On 24 December, with the 105th Airborne Division as the 
spearhead, the Soviet Union invaded and very quickly occupied Kabul and the major 
population centers, executed Amin, and set up a puppet regime. Thus began what was to 
be the long 20th century nightmare in Afghanistan—a trauma that would eventually 
contribute to the collapse of the Soviet invader’s overall system of national power.4
3. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 57.
4. See William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 27-36, for a 
more detailed account o f  the events leading up to the decision for invasion. The author also addresses the
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Goodson characterizes the Soviet occupation in stages: (1) National Resistance 
and Soviet Entrenchment, 1980-1983; (2) Air War, Interdiction, and Destabilization 
1983-1986; and, (3) Resistance Gains and Soviet Withdrawals, 1986-1989. The saga of 
this period in Afghan history provides for a fascinating study, and the sources and 
explanations for the Soviet failure have been topics of extensive analysis and conjecture 
that I will not repeat here. The important factor is that the elements of Afghan society that 
were responsible, largely with American support, for the expulsion o f the Soviet military 
would reemerge in the subsequent U.S. operations against the Taliban.
The leaders of the resistance (Mujahideen, or Holy Warriors, such as Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Ismail Khan), were to 
have an influence on Afghanistan long after the Soviets withdrew. By 1983, the change in 
the Soviet strategy from a focus on controlling the cities and major road connections to 
attempts at actively confronting the insurgency resulted in an immense migrant problem 
with a major impact on neighboring nations. An estimated 4 million refugees were now 
in Pakistan and an additional 2.4 million in Iran.5
By early 1985, as Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the USSR, an 
amalgamation of domestic and external factors led to his conclusion that the Soviet 
Union should seek a means o f disengaging from this conflict. Dr. Mohammed Najibullah 
was installed as president in May 1986, coincident with an attempt at a cease-fire and 
establishment of a national reconciliation government. Although the Soviet-backed 
Afghan regime was largely ineffective, the opposition was even more fragmented. After a
impact o f  other major events ongoing at this time, most notably the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis, leadership 
changes in the Soviet Union, and the SS-20 IRBM deployment.
5. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless Wars, 64. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI), 
which was to play an important role in the subsequent U.S. operation, began to train and supply mujahideen 
elements in this timeframe.
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series of discussions in Geneva, the beleaguered Soviets agreed to a phased withdrawal, 
which they completed in February 1989. While the crossing of the border by the last 
Soviet occupation troops was a momentous event from a geopolitical perspective, sadly it 
was not to represent the end of the fighting and the tragedy of modem Afghanistan.
The next five years were to witness multiple changes in government with a near 
continuous shifting o f allegiances between the major tribal and ethnic leaders. Having 
achieved its goal of removal of Soviet forces, the U.S. turned to other matters of foreign 
policy and left the fate of Afghanistan to the United Nations. Civil war ensued with 
thousands of civilian casualties resulting from the bombardment of Kabul alone. 
Hekmatyar and the former communist General Abdul Rashid Dostum formed a 
temporary alliance in early 1994, but fighting continued. In October Kandahar fell to an 
obscure band of religious students (Taliban) led by Mullah Mohammed Omar. After a 
series o f failed attempts at a coalition regime, in September 1996 Taliban forces took 
control of Kabul, captured and publicly executed Najibullah, and declared Afghanistan to 
be a completely Islamic state.
The rule o f the primarily Pashtun Taliban was not to extend throughout the 
country. An anti-Taliban Council for the Defense of Afghanistan, representing Uzbek and 
Tajik minorities in the north, emerged. This Northern Alliance (also known as the United 
Front) would engage in near continuous battles with the Taliban, which resulted in major 
population centers changing hands multiple times. Into this morass entered al Qaeda and 
its founder, Osama bin Laden, who seized the opportunity for a secure geographic base of 
operations. His organization continued to support the Taliban financially, and their 
common fundamentalist Islamic perspectives worked to cement the relationship.
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Although al Qaeda operatives were successful in assassinating the most viable 
Northern Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah Mossoud, on 9 September 2001, the events of two 
days later were to have the most momentous effect on the future o f Afghanistan. The 
American response to the attacks, which launched “The Wars of 9/11,” is the focus of 
this case study.6
The Impetus for Intervention
The American military undertook the operation in response to what was judged a 
direct threat to the United States. Even while the ruins of the World Trade Center were 
still smoldering, President Bush was considering the options for retaliation. In his now 
famous remark to workers at the site on 14 September, “the people who knocked these 
buildings down will hear from all of us soon.”7 Recovering from the initial shock and 
despair, the targets of the promised retribution, as well as the means of attacking them, 
were debated within the National Security Council (NSC). Although, al Qaeda and bin 
Laden were among the first perpetrators considered, the involvement of Iraq and Iran 
were also suspected. The dilemma presented was that if  a non-state actor was responsible, 
what is the appropriate response with regard to the nation that is providing it with a base 
of operations?
6. Simon Serfaty o f  the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Old Dominion University 
first introduced this term for actions in reaction to the September 2001 attacks. See Simon Serfaty, “The 
New Normalcy,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 211.
7. Woodward, Bush at War, 70. Earlier that day, at the Washington National Cathedral, Bush stated that 
this conflict will “end in a way, and at an hour o f  our choosing.” At this point, the nature o f  the beginning 
o f  the U.S. response was far from decided. Much o f  the subsequent summary o f  the decision-making 
process is taken from Woodward’s narrative, which at the time o f  this writing is the best available account. 
Since, the sources o f  much o f  his information (some o f  which he claimed to be highly classified) are not 
identified, his observations cannot be regarded as purely factual and objective.
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Essentially ignored by the U.S. after the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan prior to 
9/11 was not at the apex of the list; however, several factors kept it among American 
international concerns. The perceived human rights abuses of the Taliban regime, 
particularly in its treatment o f women, generated nearly universal and unbroken 
condemnation in the West.
The presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan was an open secret. After the August 
1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration had 
lobbed 66 Tomahawk cruise missiles into suspected al Qaeda bases with minimal effect. 
The disdain within the Bush administration over the feckless futility of this action was to 
be a factor in subsequent planning. Fortunately, from the U.S. perspective, the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reportedly had multiple assets in Afghanistan 
attempting to monitor al Qaeda activities and to support Northern Alliance operations 
against the Taliban regime. These operatives were to be the nucleus of the American 
effort. However, their use needed to be legitimized.
The United Nations Charter provides for every nation’s right of self-defense. 
However, when this document was drafted and adopted, aggressors were assumed to be 
other sovereign nations. The emergence of a non-state actor capable of a devastating 
attack on the world’s sole superpower was not envisioned. However, even potent non­
state actors cannot defy the laws of physics— they must physically be somewhere—and it 
was indisputable that the regime in Kabul was providing al Qaeda with a geographic base 
from which to train and deploy its operatives. The U.S. previously had warned the 
Taliban “that we will hold them responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken by Bin
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Laden from Afghanistan.”8 This clear connection between al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime was to provide the U.S. with an unambiguous target for retaliation.9
International sympathy for the U.S. and support for retaliatory actions was nearly 
universal. The NATO Ambassadors had taken the unprecedented step o f invoking Article 
V of the North Atlantic Treaty.10 There was little question that the perpetrators of the 
mass murder should be punished, the problem was to prevent the actions taken against al 
Qaeda and their Taliban protectors from being interpreted as attacks against the Afghan 
people. The Taliban leadership solved this dilemma for the Americans by continuing to 
support al Qaeda elements within the country and refusing U.S. demands to apprehend 
and provide them for justice.
On 28 September, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf dispatched the Director- 
General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, to 
Kabul to attempt without success to get the Taliban to hand over bin Laden.11 By early 
October, the Bush Administration had decided that if  the Taliban would not give up bin 
Laden, then the U.S. would remove the Taliban from power. The U.S. demanded that the 
Taliban “Close terrorist training camps; hand over leaders of the al Qaeda network; and 
return all foreign nationals, including American citizens, unjustly detained in your
8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. The Taliban: Engagement or 
Confrontation, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Hrg. 106— 
868 ,20  July 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. Statement o f  The Honorable 
Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary o f  State for South Asian Affairs.
9. Steven Tanner, The Wars o f  the Bushes (Haverstown, PA: Casemate, 2004), 168, contends that the 
defiant policy o f  the Taliban in their support for al Qaeda was fortunate for the U.S. Other nations would 
have been more willing to rid themselves o f  al Qaeda or intimidated by the threat o f  U.S. attack. He notes 
that if  bin Laden were operating across the border in Pakistan the repercussions o f  the use o f  American 
military power would have been decidedly more complex.
10. “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more o f  them in Europe or in North America 
shall be considered to be an attack against them all.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 
1998), 396.
11. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 260. Ahmed, whose sympathies were with the Taliban, resigned two 
weeks later and was replaced by a more moderate officer, Eshanul Haq.
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country.”12 However, due to the geographic location and limited infrastructure of 
Afghanistan, the means by which this objective could be achieved were to be remarkably 
different from previous U.S. military campaigns.
U.S. Objectives
On 7 October, President Bush announced the commencement o f combat 
operations: “These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of 
Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the 
Taliban regime.”13 Notably, no mention was made of a desired political end state after 
obtainment of these objectives. The U.S. Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff declared that the objectives of the military actions were:
(1) To make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is 
unacceptable and carries a price
(2) To acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime that harbors the terrorists
(3) To develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime 
and the foreign terrorists that they support
(4) To make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base 
of operation
(5) To alter the military balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive 
systems that hamper the progress of the various opposition forces, and
12. George W. Bush, “Presidential Address to the Nation,” White House, Office o f  the Press Secretary,
7 October 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.htm (accessed 2 March 
2005).
13. Ibid.
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(6) To provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions 
under the Taliban regime.14
The inclusion of the last objective on this listing indicates that senior decision-makers 
were considering the social impact of the actions necessary to achieve the other stated 
goals.
While the military strategy was relatively clear, Woodward reports that Secretary 
of State Colin Powell and CIA Director George Tenet made repeated efforts within the 
National Security Council to establish a political strategy.15 As later events were to 
demonstrate, this lack of an agreed political course o f action was to complicate the post- 
conflict efforts at establishment of a viable central government.
Taliban Political Objectives
Maley describes the Taliban as, “above all, an anti-modernist movement.”16 He 
adds that the goal of the Taliban was to seek security and stability and establishment o f 
Islamic Law (Sharia) in a domestically secure and externally strong nation. The near 
anarchy of the immediate post-Soviet occupation period made security a welcomed goal 
for most of the populace. However, the strict interpretation of Sharia provided order at 
the price of near universal ostracism and isolation from the international community.
Despite Taliban efforts to gain United Nations recognition and to occupy the 
Afghan seat in the General Assembly, their requests were rebuffed six different times 
between 1996 and 2001. Focused on internal matters and without experience in
14. U.S. Department o f  Defense, “Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing on Enduring Freedom,” 7 October 
2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/tl0072001_tl007sd.htm (accessed 12 February 2005).
15. Woodward, Bush a t War. 226.
16. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 232.
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international affairs, the diplomatic record of the Taliban regime is a debacle. The 
proposal for a trans-Afghanistan pipeline to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to 
Pakistan gave the Taliban an economic impetus to improve relations with the rest o f the 
world. However, their unwillingness to abate the human rights abuses in enforcement of 
Sharia and refusal to turn over bin Laden as demanded by a series o f United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions indicated their contempt for international public 
opinion and the world organization in particular.17
The Taliban had no clear objectives except to maintain themselves in power, 
defeat the resistance in the north, extend their influence throughout the entire country, 
and t resist any unwanted foreign influence on how they conducted their internal affairs. 
This last goal, which included the protection of al Qaeda, was to be the principal 
generator of the American operation. The dilemma presented to American decision­
makers was how to influence a regime that had no lawful foreign trade or discernible 
willingness to moderate its policies in order to be accepted as the legitimate government 
of Afghanistan. If economic and diplomatic actions were to be utilized, then their 
application would need to be dramatically different from earlier conflicts, such as in the 
Balkans. Success in this endeavor would require an understanding of the systems of 
power of Afghanistan and the Taliban.
A Representational System of Systems Analysis
This cursory examination of Afghanistan from a systems perspective is presented 
in order to maintain the connection to and focus on the use of the system of systems
17. UNSCR 1267 o f  15 October 1999 and UNSCR 133 o f  19 December 2000. The latter added a 
proscription against any military materials to include technical advice.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
261
construct. As with the previous examinations of Somalia and Yugoslavia, it is intended to 
be only a representational sampling of the larger analysis that would be required to 
effectively utilize the methodology.
Essential Elements of the Systems
Political. Although Afghanistan has long been a recognized independent nation 
despite a series o f foreign invasions and varying degrees of external influence, it has also 
been described as a country without a state. While the criteria for statehood is not 
precisely defined or universally accepted, among the characteristics normally associated 
with sovereign statehood are: a defined geographic territory, an administrative system, 
and a monopoly over the use of force.18
Clearly, Afghanistan in September 2001 possessed internationally accepted, albeit 
permeable borders, and the rudiments of an administrative system, although one that was 
exceptionally weak. The continuing battles with Northern Alliance forces and the 
existence of powerful warlord militias make the third factor (monopoly of force) 
debatable. A more accurate depiction is that o f Afghanistan as a failed  state. Noelle- 
Karami, et al, contend that a key indicator of a failed state is when “tribal, ethnic or 
religious ties” replace the loyalty previously afforded to the state apparatus.19 The 
political order o f Afghanistan in 2001 supports this characterization.
Historically, politics in Afghanistan have been characterized by a diverse and 
decentralized structure. Loyalties are based primarily on language, ethnicity and tribal
18. Christine Noelle-Karimi, Conrad Schetter, and Reinhard Schlagintweit, Afghanistan - a Country 
without a State? (Frankfurt-Main), Germany: IKO-Verlag fur Interulturelle Komminkation, 2002), 2-3.
19. Ibid., 7. The question o f  Afghanistan as a failed state is the focus o f  this edited volume o f  essays. 
The authors urge caution in using legitimacy and issues such as democracy and human rights as criteria for 
determination o f  failed statehood.
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connections, not by any uniting political ideology. The most powerful unifying factor in 
Afghan politics has been resistance to foreign domination. Members of the largest ethnic 
grouping, the Pashtun, long have been the dominant force in Afghan political affairs. The 
Taliban leadership was primarily Durrani Pashtun and was connected to Afghanistan’s 
most conservative provinces of Kandahar, Hilmand, and Uruzgan. After the Taliban 
assumed of control in Kabul, the Taliban’s spiritual and political leader, Mullah Omar, 
elected to administer from Kandahar in the primarily Pashtun region. Even in non- 
Pashtun areas, significant power resided within this group.
Taliban has been described as more of a movement rather than a political 
ideology. Sharia, as enforced by the religious police responsible for “The Promotion of 
Virtue and the Suppression of Vice,” is the most visible manifestation o f state power.
This blending o f the political and social is an important element in understanding the 
overall system. Maley asserts that Taliban ideals were “the values o f  the village as 
interpreted by refugee camp dwellers or madrassa students who had typically had no 
known normal village life.”20 Taliban power was absolute and directed by Mullah Omar 
and an Interim Council of Ministers. The enigmatic and ideologically driven Omar 
became isolated and received input from only a small core of advisors, most of whom 
possessed the same simplistic and fundamentalist vision of Afghanistan. Without any 
structure or administrative experience, meetings of the council were disjointed and 
unorganized. This left the appointed governors who administered the 31 provinces of the 
country, with a lack of guidance and control.
20. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 233, emphasis in original. The madrassi were fundamentalist schools that 
produced many o f  the most fanatical Taliban members. Afghan refugees comprised a sizeable portion, but 
not the total number o f  students in these schools.
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The internationally recognized Islamic State o f Afghanistan, headed by President 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, controlled only the 10 per cent of Afghanistan not under Taliban 
authority. Its presiding Council of Ministers included Minister of Defense Abdollah and 
Minster of Security General Fahim who would play an important role in the campaign to 
remove the Taliban. This provided a shadow regime upon which to base a new 
government upon removal of the Taliban.
21Pakistan was one of only three nations ever to recognize the Taliban regime. 
Strong ties existed between the Pakistani intelligence organization (the ISI) and the 
Taliban. After the 1999 coup that placed Musharraf in power, relations with Pakistan 
deteriorated. Although officially condemning Taliban excesses and supporting UN 
sanctions, the ISI reportedly continued to support the Taliban.
Afghanistan was almost completely isolated politically, although they embarked 
upon some attempts at fostering relations with China. Taliban support for Chechen 
separatists further deteriorated their relationship with Russia. Already under sanctions 
from the United Nations and considered a pariah regime, there was little opportunity to 
further threaten the international standing of the Taliban regime.
Political loyalty in Afghanistan traditionally has been fluid. Changing allegiance 
based on perceived swings in the power equation or for economic gain are integral parts 
of the system. There is no tradition of a strong central government or ingrained loyalty to 
it. This decentralized structure resulted in a lack of critical sub-elements and nodes that 
could be identified and acted upon.
Although Mullah Omar was the spiritual head o f the movement, his bureaucratic 
skills and control over the regime and government policies were much different from
21. The others were the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
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Milosevic’s in Yugoslavia. Omar was not dependent upon an electorate and personal 
popularity. This condition also provided a political strength, i.e., the government was 
more than a cult o f personality around one person. Hence, the vulnerabilities of the 
political system were limited. Instead of the central government leadership representing 
the key elements, the key political nodes were to be the leaders of the Northern Alliance, 
and from outside the country, most notably in Pakistan.
Economic. Even before the latest decades of the continuing warfare, Afghanistan 
was one of the poorest nations in the world. The destruction and carnage of the Soviet 
occupation, and the near continuous internal conflict since 1989, resulted in stagnation of 
an already weak economy and a primitive level o f development.22 The system can be best 
described as a bazaar economy, i.e., one in which “a capitalist free-market economy 
regulates all economic activities in the absence of state regulation.” The inept 
administration and policies of the Taliban only served to preclude any development. With 
no industrial base and with hand woven rugs its principal legal export, Afghanistan was a 
nation in severe economic crisis. Without any experience or expertise in economic 
affairs, the inept Taliban bureaucrats were not able to control the national currency, and 
they presided over a criminalized economy, with smuggling of goods across the Pakistani 
border being Afghanistan’s primary source o f income.
The other major source of revenue was opium poppy cultivation. An estimated 
200,000 Afghan farmers were engaged in poppy growing in 1999, and the government
22. Average per-capita GDP was less than $300, which includes the drug trade. William Byrd and 
Christopher Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan, Social Development Papers: Conflict 
Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No. 18 December 2004,” (New York: The World Bank, 2004), 1.
23. Schetter, in Afghanistan - a Country without a State? 110.
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did not attempt to conceal their support for this activity.24 When the Taliban authorities 
banned opium poppy production in February 2000, those farmers who had become 
dependent upon it as a source of income were left without an alternative source of 
livelihood. The effects of the proscription on poppy cultivation were dramatic, with the 
United Nations reporting a 91 per cent reduction in acres under cultivation in 2001. Not 
surprisingly, the level of popular support for the regime in the poppy producing areas was 
affected by this banning of poppy production.
While much of the illegal trans-border activity was beyond the reach or control of 
the Taliban, it did represent a sizeable portion of their financial support. Smuggling of 
consumer goods, as well as the drug trade had economic benefits for those integrated into 
the process; however, it presented enormous suffering for the larger population who was 
not engaged in the growing, processing or transport of drugs. Hence, the economy, and 
any of its benefits, was in the hands of a few.
The very narrow and weak attempts to attack foreign investment failed due to the 
political isolation resulting from the regime’s internal policies. As a result, opportunities 
for an adversary to negatively affect the Afghan economic system were nearly non-
Oftexistent. It was an economy with essentially no strengths and no vulnerabilities. While
24. Europa World Yearbook 1999, 372. UN sources are cited that estimate that 165,000 acres o f  arable 
land were under poppy cultivation. The strict code o f  the Taliban condemns drug abuse, however, the 
Taliban share o f  the trade reportedly was 20 per cent o f  the opium transported out o f  the country. Estimates 
vary, but at the acme o f  Afghan drug production 75-90 per cent o f  the world heroin supply had its source in 
Afghan fields.
25. United Nations, International Drug Control Programme, “Annual Poppy Survey 2001,” 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/report_2001-10-16_l.pdf (accessed 12 February 2005). This resulted in a 
tenfold increase o f  the price o f  dry opium to $300/kg. These UN supply estimates are a function o f  the 
estimated land under cultivation. The region was experiencing a drought in the period, which also affected 
production. See also Byrd and Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan,” for additional detail and 
statistics on the Afghan drug trade. Looking at the trade from a purely economic viewpoint, they 
acknowledge benefits as well as costs o f  the drug economy.
26. In 2003,1 participated in a German Bundeswehr sponsored workshop related to the International 
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. An anthropologist who has spent much o f  his adult
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the number of U.S. actions that could affect the overall economic system was negligible, 
this condition made financial incentives (bribes) to individuals a viable means of 
influence.
Military. Estimates o f the size of the Taliban military forces vary greatly, ranging 
from 10,000 to 125,000.27 Generally, they were lightly armed, with some artillery, no 
large armored or mechanized units, and less than 100 tanks of various vintage and states 
of repair. Its air force and air defense system were miniscule and woefully impotent 
against any modem force. It was a “come as you are force” with little opportunity to 
obtain sophisticated weapons from foreign sources, although the region possesses a near 
endless supply o f small arms and ammunition, much o f it produced in home workshop 
endeavors.
The advantage held by the Taliban force was in its battle-hardened elements, 
ability to fight with minimum sustainment, and religious motivation. The legacy of the 
mujahideen gave them a mystique and an aura that they could defeat a modem and 
sophisticated military. However, as a primarily Pashtun force, their support in Tajik, 
Uzbek, and Hazara areas was minimal. The key characteristic for exploitation was the 
tradition of shifting allegiances when the advantage swings to the other side.
Social. A former U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan testified, “The Afghan 
national identity is a unique, holistic blend of Islam, tribal codes of conduct and Afghan
life in the country made the observation that if  the West devoted decades o f  time, effort and extensive 
funding to the building o f  its economy, Afghanistan could rise to the level o f  a third w orld nation in 15-20 
years.
27. Michael E. O ’Hanlon, “Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs (May-June 2002): 49, and US DOD 
press briefings use a range o f  50,000 to 60,000. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Ongoing Lessons o f  
Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation and Nation Building" (forthcoming), 6 May 
2004 draft, http://www.csis.org (accessed 2 March 2005) cites estimates o f  up to 125,000 although only 
25,000 o f  these could be considered serious fighters.
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nationalism.”28 A diverse society, the largest ethnic groups were the Pashtun (38%), Tajik 
(25%), and Hazara (19%), with Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluch, and Uzbeks comprising most 
of the remaining population. The Pashtun, residing primarily in the southern parts of the 
country historically have been the dominant group. Identity is defined by membership in 
a qaum, which includes “a complexity of affiliations, a network of families or 
occupations.”29 Goodson believes that it may be “inappropriate to refer to Afghan culture, 
for Afghanistan is in many ways a society with differing cultures, both overlapping and 
clashing.”30 Loyalty and group identification normally does not extend beyond family, 
clan or tribe. Islam is one unifying influence with approximately 84 per cent o f the 
population adherents of the Sunni sect.
The illiteracy rate in Afghanistan was one o f the highest in Asia: approximately 
70 per cent for males and 85 per cent for females. The near continuous conflict had 
resulted in an exodus of teachers and the destruction of school buildings. Strict 
interpretations of Sharia resulted in the closure o f all schools for girls in 1998. Taliban 
attitudes toward women, manifested in the proscription against females working (with
•j i
few exceptions) outside the home, degraded their popular support. The low literacy rate
28. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. The Taliban: Engagement or 
Confrontation, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Hrg. 106— 
868, 20 July 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001. Statement o f  Peter Tomsen.
29. Library o f  Congress, “Country Studies, ‘Afghanistan,’” http://www.lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ 
aftoc.html (accessed 2 March 2005). Qaum refers to descent groups, extended family or clan and tribal 
affiliation. Family provides the major economic and social unity in Afghan society. However, years o f  
warfare and the resultant refugee problem have weakened this element. Many Taliban fighters never 
experienced a normal existence in their tribal homelands.
30. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 27.
31. Noelle-Karimi, Schetter, and Schlagintweit, Afghanistan, 98. In this same collection, Heike Bill 
offers that although the Taliban rules were rigid, they “merely continue long-established cultural and 
religious conditions” (ibid., 98).
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meant that radio was the principal means of communication, especially in the rural
32areas.
A characteristic of Afghan society that became a primary cause of the intervention 
was the concept o f hospitality. Despite clear evidence of their link to terrorist activities, 
bin Laden and al Qaeda were considered to be guests in their country and Afghan social 
mores would not allow for them to be given up to outsiders for justice. The motivation 
was not entirely altruistic. Bin Laden’s substantial financial contributions strengthened 
the Taliban resistance to surrender him.33
A phenomenon that is essential to understanding Afghan society is the role of the 
leaders of private armies, popularly known as warlords. The system provides for support 
for the state but with the autonomy of the militia leaders intact: “Loyalty is contingent 
rather than absolute.”34 The warlord culture has long been extant in Afghanistan with 
tribal armies fighting against invaders when present and against each other when they 
were not. Notable among these has been Hekmatyar, the Pashtun leader of the 
fundamentalist Hezb-I-Islami Party; Dostum, an Uzbek; and, Ismail Khan, a Shiite Tajik.
The vulnerabilities of the social system were its ethnically diverse character, the 
identification with tribe rather than with nation or the Taliban regime, and the tradition of 
shifting loyalties. The strength was in its centuries-old tradition of resistance to foreign 
influence and the uniting force that previous invasions had engendered.
32. Inexpensive transistor radios were abundant in Afghanistan. Radio Kabul became Radio Sharia and 
represented the most important mode o f  Taliban propaganda transmission.
33. The Pashtun custom o f  melmastia (hospitality) was the justification for the protection o f  bin Laden. 
Omar was quoted, “Even if all the countries o f  the world unite, we would defend Osama by our blood.” 
Scholfield, Afghan Frontier, 343.
34. Maley, Afghanistan Wars, 110, asserts that the militias can serve as “a half-way house for those who 
wish to shift their allegiance, but not completely lose their autonomy.”
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Table 11 provides an illustration of the overall system of power in Afghanistan 
using a few examples from each system.
Table 11. Nodes in the Afghan System
System Elements Sub-Elements Nodes
Political Warlords Tajiks Ismail Khan
External support Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (ISI)
Economic Opium poppy 
production
Fields under cultivation Opium refining facilities
Commercial goods 
smuggling
Transit routes Islam Qala
Military Fielded forces Anti-air capability SA-3 radars
Foreign volunteers A1 Qaeda Osama bin Laden
Social Religion Fundamentalist Islam Mullah Omar
Ethnicity Pashtun Kandahar
Tribal Leaders Warlords Ismail Khan
Abdul Sayyaf
Node Linkages -  The System of Systems
In Afghanistan the demarcation lines between the political and the social are 
blurred to a point of near non-existence. All politics is tribal; patronage is a function of 
ethnicity and clan and family connections. An important connection exists between the 
Pashtun of Afghanistan and those living across the border in Pakistan. Military and 
economic support was provided enthusiastically to the Taliban because of the close 
religious and ethnic connections to the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) chief, 
Lieutenant General Ahmed.35 This linkage was identified and subsequently broken as the
35. Ibid., 35. The ISI was a key conduit o f  American military aid to the mujahideen during the Soviet 
occupation. Its financial support for the Taliban regime was estimated at $10 million by 2000. The spy
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Figure 20. Pakistani-Taliban Connections
Ahmed was clearly a supporter of Mullah Omar as well as the madrassi religious schools 
that provided a significant number of Taliban fighters. The link between bin Laden and 
Omar was well established. With some considerable U.S. pressure, Ahmed was removed 
with the effect of breaking the link between the ISI, al Qaeda, and the Taliban.
Even after Musharraf removed Ahmed, thousands of Pakistani Pashtuns were
• • l i C  t
entering Afghanistan to fight at the side of their ethnic comrades. Religion is 
inseparable from the political philosophy of the Taliban, many of whom were influenced
agency, with an estimated 40,000 operatives was a political force in itself, and the action o f  Musharraf 
involved considerable personal risk.
36. Tim McGirk, “Deep Loyalties, Ancient Hatreds,” Time, 19 November 2001, 53.
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by their time in the madrassi in Pakistan where an ultra conservative sect o f Sunni Islam 
was preached.
These connections were not limited to Pashtuns who resided on both sides of the 
Afghan-Pakistani border. Elements of the Northern Alliance also maintained close 
contact with their ethnic kin across national boundaries; borders that were established 
during great power struggles without much concern for the ethnicity o f the resident 
populations. One of these, Ismail Khan, was a Shiite and an ethnic Tajik, with his base of 
power in Herat and ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The connections between the drug traffic and other illicit activity were well 
established. Estimates of Taliban profits from this trade were $75 million. The Pashtun 
head of the Islamist Hizb-i Islami political party, engineer, warlord, and former Prime 
Minister Hekmatyar was also linked to the drug trade. Hence, he could be a node in 
multiple systems. Until their subsequent policy reversal on opium production, Taliban 
authorities encouraged poppy cultivation, and yield increased steadily since 1996. Most 
of this trade was through Pashtun regions and across the Pakistani frontier. Pakistan’s 
Interior Minister, Nasrulla Babar, also a Pashtun and a Taliban sympathizer, was less than 
energetic in reducing this illicit cross border trade.
The illustration provided in Figure 20 is exceptionally simple, including only a 
few connections. However, the linkages within a complex adaptive system are extensive.
I provide Figure 21 for illustration of some additional connections that could have been 
exploited. At its center is the Tajik-Shiite warlord, Ismail Khan. His connections to the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were well known and reinforced by their common
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Figure 21. Warlord Linkages
Khan’s connections to General Dostum extended back to their experiences in the 
anti-Soviet war. Dostum, an Uzbek, drew his support from the area around Mazar-i 
Sharif, which was to become vital as a supply route from Uzbekistan. The node city of 
Chacharan became important as a link between Khan’s forces in Herat and Dostum’s 
near Mazar. Khan was also connected through party affiliation to Bumhanuddin Rabbani 
who still represented the recognized government of Afghanistan. Through the Jamiat-i- 
Islami, Rabbani was connected to the Pashtun, Abdul Sayyaf, who later served under the 
interim president Karzai. Sayyaf s forces included many Arabs, and he, unlike most
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Afghans, was a member of the strict Wahbabi sect of Islam with connections to Saudi 
A rabia.37
While there is no evidence that U.S. planners overtly used this type of depiction in 
their planning process, subsequent events indicate that their strategic thinking included 
recognition of some o f these linkages, either to enhance the effects of actions, or to avoid 
undesirable secondary effects. Since the links between nodes cut across system and 
national boundaries the key to an understanding of Afghanistan resides in an appreciation 
of these interrelationships. As I will illustrate in the exploration of U.S. actions that 
follows, this knowledge was successfully exploited in many instances.
Effects of the Coercive Actions
The primary U.S military objectives were the military collapse o f the Taliban; the 
Northern Alliance in control of the Northern provinces; and, the capture of Osama bin 
Laden or him on the run.38 However, even as the initial munitions were being deployed, 
the official American line was that the military actions were only a part o f the overall 
campaign. On the day the attacks commenced, Donald Rumsfeld opened a press briefing 
with the statement that the direct overt military force was “to complement the economic, 
humanitarian, financial and diplomatic activities which are already well underway. The 
military action is designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive, and relentless 
operations to drive them [the Taliban] out.” 39
37. Kathy Gannon, “Afghanistan Unbound,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004): 35-36. She 
observes that many o f  the linkages between warlords existed before the Taliban, and equates many o f  their 
ideology as more radical than the Taliban. Many o f  these warlords are now part o f  the interim government.
38. Woodward, Bush a t War, 229.
39. U.S. Department o f  Defense, “Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing,” 7 October 2001.
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The pursuit o f these objectives included the dropping of more than bombs over 
Afghanistan. In the same press conference, General Richard B. Meyers described how 
within hours after the initial arrival o f explosive ordnance on Afghan targets, American 
aircraft commenced dropping of humanitarian supplies including food, blankets, and 
medicine with the intent of easing the conditions o f Afghan refugees.
As the attacks commenced, President Bush stated, “This military action is a part 
of our campaign against terrorism, another front in a war that has already been joined 
through diplomacy, intelligence, the freezing of financial assets and the arrests of known 
terrorists by law enforcement agents in 38 countries.”40 Hence, unlike Kosovo, military 
coercion was only one element o f a comprehensive campaign to influence multiple 
systems of Taliban and al Qaeda power.
The strategy of the Afghan campaign, subsequently renamed Enduring Freedom, 
reversed the priority of targets used in Allied Force.41 In Kosovo, the fielded Yugoslav 
forces were initially viewed as the principal object for attack, and the focus on 
infrastructure was made later in the conflict. In Afghanistan, the opening targets were the 
exceptionally limited number of fixed military targets. Although bomb damage 
assessment (BDA) data remains closely protected, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
spokesmen claimed that by the second day of the bombing 11 of 12 SA-3 radars, 7 of 8 
airfields, one-half of long-range radars and several radio towers had been “damaged.”
40. George W. Bush, “Presidential Address to the Nation, 7 October 7 2001,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8 (accessed 2 March 2005).
41. The original designator was Infinite Justice; however, this was changed to preclude the unintended 
effect o f  weakening international support due to Islamic sensitivities to the U.S. assuming a role normally 
assigned to the Deity.
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Other targets included the al Qaeda Brigade, command facilities, SAM sites and terrorist 
training camps.42
By the end of October, concentration had shifted to “those Taliban forces arrayed 
against the Northern Alliance.” A DOD spokesman briefed reporters: “The focus of the 
operational efforts included targets involving terrorists in Taliban command and control 
locations, including bunkers and tunnels, as well as airfield facilities and Taliban military 
forces that support the opposition forces.”43 Planners soon added caves and potential 
hideouts for al Qaeda elements to the list of primary targets.
The connections between the anti-Taliban forces and nations in the region, 
particularly Pakistan, were an early concern of the Bush security advisors. Hence, they 
did not regard merely substituting the Northern Alliance leadership for the Taliban 
regime as a prudent course. However, as battlefield events unfolded, it became clear that 
the U.S. did not control this diverse and complex organization. Accepting this condition, 
U.S. support for Northern Alliance operations emerged.
The objective o f the Northern Alliance forces, now augmented by U.S. military 
Special Forces and CIA teams, was reported to be the city of Mazar-i Sharif. This was an 
important node due to its location 35 miles from the Uzbekistan border and the perceived 
improvement in the ability to supply Northern Alliance troops accrued from taking the 
objective. The effectiveness of this support increased due to continuous CIA contacts 
with Northern Alliance elements, and their understanding of key cultural characteristics 
of Afghan society.
42. Woodward, Bush at War, 213.
43. U.S. Department o f  Defense, “News Transcript, Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, Joint Staff, 31 
October 2001,” http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/tl0312001.htm (accessed 2 March 2005). The 
figure for Taliban combat troops was now estimated at 50,000 - 60,000, nearly double the figures used by 
the NSC a month earlier. The previous day’s activities had brought the total number o f  Human Daily 
Rations (HDRs) intended for refugees to more than 1 million.
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Although it represented an important task, having anti-Taliban forces in control of 
the major population centers did not necessarily equate to the complete attainment of all 
U.S. objectives. As major military resistance by Taliban forces ceased, on 11 December, 
Rumsfeld acknowledged this condition: “It does not end with the fall of Kabul or Kunduz 
or even Kandahar, or even with the capture o f some of the individual Taliban and al 
Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.”44 Even with this qualification, the military operation that 
removed the protectors of al Qaeda in a matter of weeks may be considered to be a 
notable success. Many pundits expected the Kosovo campaign to last for a few days; 
others later predicted that removal of the Taliban would take years. Events would prove 
them wrong.
The important difference between the Kosovo and Afghanistan campaigns was 
the incorporation in the latter case of more aspects of a systems approach and actions that 
influenced all elements of Taliban power. Woodward reports that CIA operatives were 
able to buy the allegiance of warlords who were previously supporting the Taliban 
regime for approximately $50,000 each. The premise, successfully exploited, was that 
“you can’t buy an Afghan, but you can rent one.” Although counter to Western standards 
and values, this observation indicates an appreciation of the cultural norms of the 
Afghans. Woodward claims that the CIA expended $70 million in direct cash payments 
to support the military operations. When compared to the $569,000 price tag of a single 
Tomahawk missile, the relative cost/benefit ratio is put into perspective.45 Director
44. U.S. Department o f  Defense, News Transcript, “DOD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and 
Gen. Myers, 11 December 2001,” http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/tl2112001_tl21 l.htm  
(accessed 2 March 2005).
45. U.S. Navy cost figure, using 1999 data. U.S. Department o f  the Navy, Chief o f  Information, 
“Tomahawk,” http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/misiIes/wep-toma.html (accessed 2 March 
2005). Approximately 70 were employed in the conflict.
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George Tenet and others in the CIA understood that for the Pashtuns, “their allegiances 
were negotiable in Afghanistan, just like everybody else’s in Afghanistan.”46
The major advantage of the use of the principles of a system of systems approach 
in Afghanistan resided in the more efficient attainment of objectives and the ability to 
influence multiple systems. However, some attempts to anticipate the secondary effects 
of actions were also apparent.
The Secondary Effects
In general, there were fewer deleterious unintended secondary effects in Enduring 
Freedom than in the Kosovo operation. This was due in part to a better understanding of 
the systems of power in Afghanistan, which allowed planners to better anticipate the 
ancillary effects of actions. I will provide a few examples for illustration.
The links between actions to achieve effects in Afghanistan and secondary effects 
across its geographic boundaries were considered in the development of the overall U.S 
strategy. The U.S. recognized that events in Afghanistan could not be contained within its 
geographic borders. Hence, in deference to Pakistani concerns, establishment o f the 
Northern Alliance as the new rulers of Afghanistan intentionally was not an original goal. 
However, once their military victory became inevitable, an extensive political effort was 
made toward Pakistan to reassure Musharraf that the takeover by the primarily Tajik and 
Uzbek Northern Alliance would not be a threat to him. Recognition of the link between 
the Pakistani intelligence service and the Taliban also resulted in U.S. encouragement for 
Musharraf to remove his pro-Taliban ISI chief.
46. Woodward, Bush at War, 230.
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An unintended result of military action, particularly air and missile attacks, is the 
effect on the morale and allegiance o f the civilian population. The emphasis on providing 
food and other humanitarian assistance in concert with military activities mitigated the 
historically fierce Afghan resistance to foreign invaders. Even while the military actions 
were ongoing, the U.S. Agency for International Development established a “five-point 
assistance strategy for Afghanistan: reduce death rates; minimize population movements; 
lower then stabilize food prices; ensure aid reaches those it is intended for; and, begin 
developmental relief programs.”47 This type of activity, which exploited knowledge of 
the social and economic systems, allowed the U.S. to weaken the linkage between the 
Taliban and the general population, and to reduce the impact of the destruction resulting 
from the air and missile operations.
Despite the increased awareness o f the connections between elements in the 
political, economic, military, and social systems, not all secondary effects were 
anticipated. Largely for ethnic and religious reasons, the Iranian government had 
distanced itself from the Taliban regime and established ties with Ismail Khan (a Tajik- 
Shiite). However, once Northern Alliance forces led by other warlords threatened Mazar- 
i Sharif, Iran reassessed their allegiance. By 8 November, some U.S. officials believed
• 48that the Iranians might have switched sides and gone over to the Taliban.
Another issue was the unintended civilian casualties resulting from attacks on 
military targets. An extensive study suggests “a level of civilian fatalities in Afghanistan
47. George W. Bush, “The Global War on Terrorism: The First Hundred Days,” (Washington, DC: The 
Coalition Information Centers, 2002), 16, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ 12/ 
100dayreport.pdf (accessed 2 March 2005).
48. Woodward, Bush at War, 298. The connections between Ismail Khan and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps were well known, however, Iranian fears over the U.S. gaining a foothold in the region took 
precedence over loyalty to former clients. However, by November, there was little that Iran could do to 
rescue the Taliban regime.
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greater that that experienced in the 1999 Kosovo war.”49 Analysts attribute this to 
different objectives, more limited target intelligence, and a more dynamic battlefield with 
more synergy between ground and air forces.
U.S. planners recognized that every Afghan non-combatant fatality weakened the 
solidarity of the coalition.50 The use of cluster munitions also had a tragic effect. On 
occasion, explosives believed to be humanitarian packages were picked up by hungry 
Afghans, with appalling results. Table 12 provides some examples of unintended 
secondary effects that ran counter to stated U.S. objectives.
Table 12. Unintended Secondary Effects
Node Intended effect Secondary Effect Comment
Mazar-i Sharif Removal o f  Taliban regime Iranian support for Taliban Iranian concerns over 
U.S. foothold
Refugees Survival/Support Casualties Confusion with 
unexploded ordnance
Mullah Omar Remove Taliban from power Increased supply o f  heroin Lack o f  planning for 
alternatives
Breakdown o f local 
government
Ismail Khan Strengthen for use against 
Taliban
Post conflict autonomous 
power
Threat to interim 
government
Although the Bush security advisors expertly managed the warlords of the 
Northern Alliance during the period of active combat, they were less adroit in controlling
49. Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate o f  Civilian Bombing Casualties,” 
Project o f  Defense Alternatives, 18 January 2002 ,2 , http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html (accessed 2 
March 2005). He uses sources that estimate that there were 1000-1300 civilian casualties as compared to 
500 in Kosovo. This equates to one death for every 12 bombs or missiles expended, compared to one 
civilian fatality for every 46 bombs dropped in the Balkan campaign (ibid., 6).
50. Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: Afghanistan, Al Q a ’ida and the Holy War (Sterling,VA: 
Pluto Press, 2003), 287. These Human Daily Rations (HDRs) were designed to conform to Muslim dietary 
restrictions.
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the post-conflict political situation. Having embellished the power o f the warlords, and 
concurrently removed the existing regime, U.S. actions created a power vacuum that 
resulted in powerful militias without direct allegiance to any central authority.51 This 
resulted in conditions, in some cases, as bad as during the Taliban reign. The Human 
Rights Watch claimed, “Human Rights abuses in Afghanistan are being committed by 
gunmen and warlords who were propelled into power by the United States and its 
coalition partners after the Taliban fell in 2001.”
Despite their many undesirable characteristics, the Taliban were relatively 
successful in dramatically reducing opium production in Afghanistan. Once they departed 
the scene, drug production almost immediately returned to and subsequently exceeded 
pre-2000 levels.53 While some increase in production was expected, the elimination of 
strict Taliban enforcement and the lack of a viable alternative government once they were 
removed made opium poppy cultivation an attractive, if not the only option available to 
Afghan farmers. The U.S. did not establish viable alternatives to it. However, lack of 
success does not connote lack of attempts. U.S. humanitarian funding for Afghanistan in 
the October-November 2001 timeframe alone exceeded $250 million.54
Ex post facto  identification of instances of unintended secondary effects is simple; 
anticipation during the heat of combat is not. Despite these and other occurrences, the
51 .The existence o f  private militia has been a primary danger to the interim government in Afghanistan. 
In September 2004, President Hamid Kharzai was successful in removing Khan as Governor o f  Herat.
52. Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Warlords Implicated in New Abuses,” 29 July 2003 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/afghan072903.htm (accessed 22 March 2005). See also N.C. Aizenman, 
“Afghan Crime Wave Breeds Nostalgia for Taliban,” Washington Post, 17 March 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/a45302-2005marl7 (accessed 22 March 2005).
53. In 2000 an estimated 82,000 hectares were under cultivation. This was reduced to 7,600 in 2001, but 
rose to 80,000 in 2003 and 131,000 in 2004. United Nations, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Summary 
Finding on Opium Trends in Afghanistan,” http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ afghanistan-2005_summary_opium- 
afghanistan-2005.pdf (accessed 2 March 2005).
54. U.S. Department o f  State, Fact Sheet, “Summary o f  U.S. Assistance to the Afghan People since Oct. 
1, 2001,” 23 November 2001, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/6303).htm (accessed 4 March 2005). 
Nearly half o f  these totals were the Defense Department food drops, consisting o f  over 1,175,000 HDR’s.
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number of unintended effects of actions appears to be smaller than in the Kosovo 
operation. Multiple variables exist; however, it is reasonable to conclude that a better 
understanding of the connections elements within the political and social systems were a 
factor in this consequence.
Summation
The primary objective of this chapter was to illustrate the application of the 
principles of a system of systems analysis in a milieu that was significantly different from 
both Somalia and Kosovo. Somalia and Afghanistan were similar in that they both 
occurred in failed or collapsed states. Clans and tribes comprise the foundation of both 
societies; however, Somalia is homogeneous, while Afghan society is diverse. Although 
separated by only two years, coercive operations in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were 
conducted against a dramatically different adversary in a vastly dissimilar geographic and 
political environment. However, in both cases, decision-makers achieved some of their 
objectives through an approach that considered the opponent from a holistic perspective. 
In the Afghan scenario, this utilization was more evident.
As the American offensive military operations concluded and organized Taliban 
resistance collapsed, President Bush observed: “Our intelligence professionals and 
special forces have cooperated with battle-friendly Afghan forces— fighters who know 
the terrain, who know the Taliban, and who understand the local culture.”55 Successes in 
this phase of Enduring Freedom were due largely to this degree of understanding of the 
adversary. Linkages beyond the borders were also important. American decision-makers
55. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at the Citadel, South Carolina, 11 December 2001,” 
White House, Office o f  the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/
2001121 l-6.htm (accessed 2 March 2005).
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recognized Pakistan’s Musharraf as a key political node. Severing the connections 
between the Pashtuns in the Pakistani intelligence service and the predominantly Pashtun 
Taliban was a critical element in the rapid military victories.
By 11 December, the objectives that were stated two months earlier, i.e., 
destruction of the Taliban military and the denial of Afghanistan as a base for terrorists 
were attained. Despite the immense difficulties encountered, the U.S. actions were almost 
totally successful. O’ Hanlon’s depiction of Enduring Freedom as “a masterpiece of 
military creativity and finesse” is supportable by the evidence.56
A more complete understanding of the antagonist was a factor in this result. 
American planners were aware that loyalty in Afghanistan was principally to tribe and 
clan, rather than to any central government. This appreciation, combined with awareness 
of the acceptability and tradition of changing sides in a conflict, allowed for expectations 
that small victories could result in significant advantages as perceptions of the tide of the 
battle shifted. Although acceptance of bribes to change allegiance could be considered to 
be treacherous by Western standards, CIA operatives achieved many of their objectives 
with suitcases of cash instead of cruise missiles. This reduced the potential for harmful 
secondary effects inherent in kinetic attacks.
The skillful use of American Special Forces embedded within Northern Alliance 
forces and an expert coordination of air and ground power certainly also contributed to 
the successes.57 However, these actions were dependent upon target intelligence and an
56. O’Hanlon, “Flawed Masterpiece:” 47. He contends that it will be remembered as “one o f  the greater 
military successes o f  the twenty-first century” (ibid., 63).
57. President Bush asserted, “This combination— real-time intelligence, local allied forces, special 
forces, and precision air power— has really never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught 
us more about the future o f  our military than a decade o f  blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums.” 
See Bush, “Remarks by the President at the Citadel." Steven Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future o f  
Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (March/April 2003): 32, does not agree with those who assert that the
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understanding of the adversary’s culture and social interrelationships. Appreciating 
Afghan sensitivities to foreign troops, Special Forces often donned local apparel and 
means of transport. The U.S. took advantage of the connections between warlords that 
existed during the Soviet occupation. The ethnic diversity, suspicions and jealousies 
among the warlords who made up the Northern Alliance was appreciated, and efforts 
were made to maintain and strengthen this fragile coalition. The Afghan concept that the 
“enemy of my enemy is my friend” was appreciated and successfully incorporated into 
the strategy.
An understanding of the financial support and connections to al Qaeda and the 
Taliban was recognized and exploited. Treasury Department and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation efforts to cut off financial support through non-governmental organizations 
met with some limited success.58 Therefore, the use of the principles of a system of 
systems analysis contributed to the successes of the operations that took place between 
October and December of 2001. However, these objectives were relatively limited in 
scope.
The primary objective had always been Osama bin Laden “dead or alive.” 
Although denied a geographic base of operations and much of its source of funding, al 
Qaeda remains an acknowledged threat, and its founder, as well as his protector Mullah 
Omar, remains at large despite enormous efforts. The merits of going after the key 
leadership of the Taliban are arguable. Pape does not view decapitation strategies as
Afghan model represents new way o f  warfare, Rather he asserts that the war “was much more orthodox, 
and less revolutionary, than most now believe.”
58. Central Intelligence Agency, “Annual Report o f  the United States Intelligence Community, Support 
to the War on Terrorism and Homeland Security 2002,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/ 
ann_rpt_2002/swtandhs.html (accessed 4 March 2005).
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effectual and contends that any attempts to kill Omar proved to be largely ineffective.59 
The question of the broader effect o f the killing or capture of bin Laden on the terrorist 
threat against the United States is equally contentious.
In Afghanistan, the holistic understanding of the adversary and the connections 
between elements within and across system boundaries contributed to a more efficient 
campaign at achievement of objectives. However, those objectives were limited to only 
one phase o f the campaign.
President Bush was reportedly frustrated by the lack of an existing plan for 
Afghanistan. With constant pressure on them, defense officials and Central Command 
planners, hurriedly built the plan after 9/11. An existing assessment o f Afghanistan using 
the system of systems construct could have been useful in commencing the operation 
sooner. However, the major benefit would have been in the phase that followed the 
removal of the Taliban.
Despite reluctance o f the Bush national security team to use the military in nation 
building roles, it is clear that the U.S. cannot afford to make the same mistake of 
disengagement that it did in 1989. Although the use of the system of systems construct 
provided benefits during the active military campaign, its principles may be even more 
useful in the more difficult and demanding task o f establishing an economically viable, 
socially diverse, and democratically governed nation of Afghanistan.
59. Robert Pape, “The True Worth o f  Air Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 116- 
17. He concludes that the combining o f  air and ground power continues to be a winning strategy. Steve 
Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 287-88, provides an insightful appraisal o f  the 
enigmatic Pashtun, Omar, who seems to be an unlikely candidate to lead a radical movement.




An objective of this study is to determine if a multi-disciplinary approach to 
assessments can contribute to a holistic understanding of overall systems of national 
power. The product is a process and a methodology framework that provides a tool for 
the decision-maker in anticipating the effects o f coercive actions. The benefits are an 
increased likelihood of attainment of objectives through more efficient application of 
coercive power. Additionally, the methodology contributes to an ability to anticipate the 
secondary effects resulting from those actions.
I organized this dissertation around three fundamental and interrelated questions:
(1) Can the processes and capabilities through which a nation accomplishes its overall 
objectives be considered complex and nonlinear?
(2) Can the principles of nonlinearity that are used to describe and understand physical 
systems be applied to non-physical systems? and,
(3) If national systems of power are complex and nonlinear, and if a systems approach is 
useful to understanding physical systems, then can the application of the principles 
derived from studies in diverse academic disciplines provide a metaphor or model that 
could contribute to the understanding of national systems of power?
I have illustrated that national power operates, in both structure and function, as 
an open complex system, and that system models developed in mathematics and the 
physical sciences provide a paradigm for enhanced understanding of all nonlinear 
systems. Subsequently, I concluded that utilization of such an approach provides a
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metaphor or model for increased understanding of the systems and the secondary effects 
o f actions taken to influence those systems.
Chapter II introduced concepts of national power and the means that historically 
have been used to influence it. This required a brief examination of the theoretical 
foundations, components, and uses of coercion. The contention that nations are likely to 
continue to exert coercive power is independent o f the justification or motivation for the 
actions. Hence, the moral aspects are not at issue here. Historically, stated rationales have 
ranged from self-serving conquest and economic dominance, to altruistic peacekeeping 
and humanitarian relief. While analysis, evaluation, and debate over jus ad bellum and 
the moral right of nations to intervene in the affairs of others are important considerations 
in the study o f relations between nations, they are not a topic of this inquiry.
The observation most relevant to this study is that the elements of power are not 
universally fungible; however, they characteristically are interconnected. While 
constituent parts of power may be isolated and identified, they are invariably linked to 
others. These multiple connections make the system complex. The important deduction is 
that the relationships between elements within complex systems of national power are not 
amenable to linear analysis. Therefore, an improved method of conducting assessments is 
required.
This realization segued to the examination of nonlinearity, including chaos and 
complexity theories, which I presented in Chapter III to determine if these approaches 
had applicability to the task of understanding national systems of power. I illustrated how 
the integration of perspectives on complexity provides a promising path for further
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analysis and concluded that the complex adaptive system provides the most appropriate 
model upon which to base assessments.
Further progress required an examination of systems theory in order to determine 
which components could be applied to the task set forth in the hypothesis. In Chapter IV,
I described how the sources of national power could be examined and better understood 
through utilization of a systems approach. However, even if it is insightful, a model is 
inadequate if it does not provide any practical value to the decision-maker. Therefore, in 
Chapter V, I proposed a methodology, based on a system of systems construct, which 
utilizes the applicable components of systems theory in the context of assessments of 
national power. I contend that employment of this process can provide a means through 
which a more holistic understanding of the system may be attained, as well as some 
limited capability to anticipate the secondary effects of actions.
The task of supporting this argument is challenging; empirical data that can 
provide irrefutable evidence are not available. Accepting that limitation, I relied on an ex 
post illustration of how the fundamentals of the construct were utilized, albeit without the 
overt recognition or cognizance of the involved decision-makers. However, since these 
principles have been frequently utilized, an extensive intellectual reach was not required. 
Knowledge o f the adversary has been an element of conflict since the days of Sun Tzu, 
Genghis Khan, and Alexander the Great.
What is missing, and the contribution that I attempt to make, is the application of 
commonly held tenets into an organized and coherent methodology that provides a 
structure and a framework for assessments of national power. This could serve to fill a 
void in the knowledge base available to decision-makers, and represents the primary
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purpose of this undertaking. However, prior to identification of the impact of adoption of 
the proposed process, a brief recapitulation of the limitations of current approaches and 
hence the justification for this study is warranted.
Rationalization Revisited
Nations apply power in order to influence the systems of other states. I illustrated 
that power is comprised of more than a summation of military assets. Hence, a calculus 
that considers the political, economic, military, and social systems as interrelated 
elements of an overall system of power is critical to the assessment. Importantly, the 
overall system o f power is different from the sum of the parts. Therefore, a construct that 
can enhance the level of comprehension of the functioning of that system can contribute 
to more effective and efficient attainment of objectives. An effective utilization of such 
an approach requires an understanding of the systems to be acted upon, especially in the 
interrelationships between elements within and across the systems.
The objective of the process and methodology presented in Chapter V is to 
provide a tool that could mitigate existing analysis shortfalls. Since there are no examples 
of overt utilization of the proposed methodology, I relied on an alternative means to 
demonstrate the potential value of the construct. Using three case studies, I illustrated 
how elements of the system of systems construct were utilized, albeit not explicitly, in 
three distinct scenarios. The reasons for the varied degrees of success of these operations 
are themselves complex, and have been the object of extensive analysis.
In these scenarios, I identified instances of the utilization of the principles of the 
systems of systems approach, and examples where the decision-maker was provided with
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advantages. These benefits were: (1) amplification of the effects of actions; (2) indication 
o f possible secondary effects; and, (3) recognition o f alternative actions. The section that 
follows amalgamates and integrates the previously presented observations in order to 
illustrate how these advantages were evident in three significantly different scenarios.
Synthesis of The Case Studies
The important conclusion from these case studies is that the principles of the 
approach are applicable to accomplishment o f a wide variety o f objectives in diverse 
geopolitical environments. Each of the interventions, which were examined 
independently, provided examples where the benefits associated with the system of 
systems construct were attained. The key principles of the approach are: (1) nations 
operate as complex adaptive systems; (2) understanding of the structure and functioning 
of these systems is critical to assessments; and, (3) linkages between entities (actors) 
within and across systems provides a foundation for a holistic assessment of the potential 
effect of coercive actions. The particular case studies were selected since they provided a 
diverse set of illustrations upon which to base the claim of applicability beyond a single 
intervention. The differences between the three are summarized in Table 13.
From a holistic perspective, and despite the differences across all the systems of 
power, these cases provide examples of utilization of the basic principles of the system of 
systems construct. That is, regardless o f the type o f political organization, extent of 
industrial development, level of military modernization, and nature o f cultural 
foundation, a basic understanding of the structure and the functions of the systems and 
the interactions could be extracted. Additionally, the model appears to be appropriate
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independent o f the organization applying the coercive force—be it the UN, NATO, or a 
single nation.
Table 13. Comparison of the Systems of Power
System Somalia 1992-95 Yugoslavia 1999 A fghanistan 2001















Tradition o f  strong central 
government 
Separatist movement in 
Kosovo
N o recognition by 
international bodies Regime 
not in complete control o f  
territory
Strict Theocracy 
Unskilled and inexperienced 
management
Active autonomous militias 
(warlords)
Tradition o f  dispersed 
political power
Economic Most industry defunct 
Limited agricultural 
exports
Near total dependence 










Primitive road networks 
Smuggling and drugs the 
primary means o f  foreign 
trade
Military Loose loyalty to more 
powerful warlords 
Independent armed bands 
Varied level o f  
connections between 
military and clan 
leadership
Armed Forces loyal to 
political leadership 
Modern air defenses 
Mechanized ground forces 
High level o f  tactical 
proficiency
Primary loyalty to tribe and 
warlord
Poorly equipped and 
supported 
Limited armor and 
mechanized units 
Tradition o f  shifting 
allegiances
Social Single ethnic group 
Complex clan, tribe and 
family relationships 





and Slavic (outside 
Kosovo)
High educational and 
literacy levels
South Asian Islamic 
Multiple and sizeable ethnic 
groups 
Tribal based
Extremely low education and 
literacy levels
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An important characteristic of the system of systems approach is that the 
methodology has near universal applicability. The foundation of the analysis and the 
logic behind the process that produces the assessments remains apposite regardless of the 
type of political structure under examination. The three case studies provided illustrations 
of the applicability o f the methodology to a range of regime types. The Afghanistan study 
includes a political regime as well as a non-state actor. While the extremes of the political 
spectrum were not examined in the case studies, there would be no essential difference 
between the use of the methodology in assessments of a fascist dictatorship or a modem 
liberal democracy.
This aspect of the methodology provides additional advantages as well as inherent 
dangers. An examination of a nation’s own systems of power would provide valuable 
insights. Those engaged in the protection of vital infrastructure and broader aspects of 
homeland security could utilize the tenets of the system of systems approach as an aid in 
determination of key vulnerabilities. As stated earlier, the construct and principles are 
amoral and may be applied for the most noble or most iniquitous purposes. The danger is 
that adversaries could also use the principles of the construct in planning terrorist 
activities. Due to their dependence on complex information systems, modern and highly 
developed economic systems are particularly susceptible to outside attack. Hence, 
industrialized nations fear intrusion into their commercial networks and have applied 
significant assets to cyber defense.
The primary purpose of the case studies was to illustrate the principles of the 
system of systems construct by using data from actual operations. The proposed 
methodology is based on the presumption that the quality of decisions is dependent upon
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the level of understanding of the systems and the relationships between elements. 
However, decisions in a crisis are rarely made in isolation; multiple other imperatives 
influence the process. Hence, the task is not to evaluate the policy decisions, but rather to 
demonstrate how use o f the principles of the construct contributed to an enhanced level of 
understanding. Previous chapters explored each of the scenarios in some detail. However, 
in order to reinforce the assertion of wide applicability, I will provide a summation of the 
key elements of the cases as they relate to the assessment process.
Somalia
The environment was a collapsed state with non-functioning systems. Somalia 
itself was not an adversary; there simply was no government to coerce. In this political 
vacuum, armed bands ranging from organized militia to roving gangs of teenage thieves 
vied for power. This internal conflict exacerbated the effects of famine resulting in tens 
of thousands of Somalis dying of disease and hunger. The intervention was designed to 
confront this humanitarian disaster, sanctioned and sponsored by the largest and most 
inclusive multinational organization, and carried out by military forces provided by its 
most powerful member nation. Therefore, it provides an appropriate test to determine if 
the construct can be applied to attempts to influence the most undeveloped and fragile 
systems.
The study revealed occasions of recognition of the importance of understanding 
the systems, and examples of a focus on specific nodes, as well a consideration of 
possible secondary effects. The close alignment and extensive overlap between the social, 
political and military systems in Somalia presented challenges, since actions taken to
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influence one system invariably produced effects in the others. Characterization of 
figures such as Aideed and Ali Mahdi as nodes within a single system was problematic 
since they were key figures in each system. However, it was apparent that they were 
considered key actors and much of the UN. and U.S. actions were directed at them.
Among the important lessons from this intervention is that when actions are taken 
to influence a system, the entity taking that action becomes a part of that altered system. 
Due to the lack of a government in Somalia and the scale of the military and civilian 
agency presence, the UN. dominated the political, military, and economic systems, 
significantly altering the means of operation. When the supports were withdrawn, the 
system, not surprisingly, collapsed.
The efforts of Mohamed Sahnoun and Robert Oakley reflected an appreciation for 
the Somali social system and its linkages to the political and military systems. However, 
for a variety of reasons, including the lack of clearly defined objectives and the political 
will to achieve them, these insights were not fully exploited and the overall objectives of 
the intervention were not achieved. Their efforts were notable for the consideration of the 
larger impact o f their actions and the recognition that the belligerents could be influenced 
by means other than direct military confrontation. However, after the departure of Oakley 
and Sahnoun from the scene and the June 1993 attacks on the Pakistani troops, Aideed 
transformed from a partner to an antagonist, and attrition of the adversary became a 
primary UN. objective. The force-on-force operations that followed resulted in casualties 
beyond what the United States was willing to accept, and led to the almost immediate 
decision to withdraw from the operation.
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Aideed was the military node. He was connected to the populace of Mogadishu. 
The attacks on Aideed’s forces produced the unintended effect o f reinforcing his stature 
and support among the local population. When the actions taken to influence the node 
(Aideed) changed from persuade, flatter and support to capture or destroy, the secondary 
effects also changed. This was manifested in the celebrations and mutilations of the 
bodies of the American soldiers, which was vividly displayed by the American media. 
Consequently, The Battle of Mogadishu had an impact on the systems o f power o f the 
United States, just as it did in Somalia. This illustrates an important consequence of 
coercive actions. This secondary and unintended effect was to extend into the next 
operation.
Kosovo
The Kosovo operation was undertaken by the NATO alliance with the objective 
of precluding the continuation of ethnic cleansing within the borders of a sovereign UN. 
member nation. Its legal basis was a set of UN. Security Council Resolutions, but the 
intervention was not organized as a UN. force as in Somalia. The task was to influence 
the behavior of the political leadership in a relatively modem and developed European 
nation. The initial and relatively ineffective actions that targeted the Serb ground forces 
suggest that those directing and planning the campaign did not possess, or failed to 
optimally utilize, an understanding of the Serb culture, military traditions, and 
capabilities. Attacks on Serb ground forces in Kosovo were largely unproductive, and 
may have actually increased the level of violence against the Kosovars. The related
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attacks on military infrastructure in Serbia proper had a minimal impact on and 
contributed little to the attainment of NATO’s stated objectives.
As a result of lessons accrued earlier in the decade from the successes achieved in 
Operation Desert Storm against the Iraqi military, U.S. and allied planners made effective 
use of the connections between military nodes. The Yugoslav integrated air defense 
system was expeditiously neutralized, and attacks on logistics and support activities were 
steadily achieving the desired effect on Serb military capabilities. However, NATO 
planners did not exploit the linkages between the economic and political systems until 
later in the conflict. When they eventually utilized it, this knowledge was useful in 
achievement o f the stated objectives.
An advantage of the system of systems construct is identification o f alternative 
actions and the multiplication of the effect of actions. These were realized in the later 
stages o f the bombing campaign. Milosevic was the key decision-maker and therefore a 
key node to be influenced. However, there were limited means of acting directly against 
him, so a NATO employed a strategy that exploited knowledge of connections. The 
destruction of commercial entities controlled by the family and political supporters of 
Milosevic are claimed to be factors in his eventual capitulation. Actions against economic 
and social nodes provided alternate paths to the major political node—Milosevic.
Another indirect approach was manifested in NATO diplomatic actions to influence an 
external node, Chernomyrdin, who was able to play an important role in the eventual 
outcome, due to his connections to Milosevic.
It is apparent that the secondary effects of actions were also a consideration of 
NATO planners. However, they did not always correctly assess the effect of the bombing
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operations on internal support for Milosevic. Nevertheless, it was a consideration. The 
use of non-explosive devices to disrupt electrical power displayed NATO concerns for 
permanent impact on the Yugoslav economy, collateral damage, and civilian casualties. 
The objective also was to minimize the secondary effects on the political systems of the 
NATO member nations. As asserted earlier, the coercing nation, alliance, or coalition can 
become a part o f the system it is attempting to influence. Additionally, it is possible for 
these actions to have an influence on the systems of the nation taking the actions.
An unintended secondary effect of the Somalia operation on the U.S. political 
system emerged in Kosovo. Due in part to the Somalia experience, avoidance o f alliance 
military casualties was a primary consideration of operation planners. U.S. decision­
makers appreciated the secondary effects on its political system that resulted from media 
images of prisoners and mutilated bodies of servicemen. The requirement to conduct 
aerial bombing from higher altitudes to preclude loss of aircraft and crewmen degraded 
the ability of NATO tactical aircraft to attack Serb ground forces. Milosevic reportedly 
believed that NATO distaste for combat casualties would mean that there would be no 
ground operation to support the air campaign. This confidence allegedly strengthened his 
resolve. Convinced that he could wait for NATO to tire and become frustrated, he hoped 
that public opinion in the NATO nations would turn against the military action. As the 
leader o f a complex and adaptive system, he was not passive in this regard and strove to 
exploit every possible instance of collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Since Kosovo was such a dissimilar environment, and the systems to be 
influenced were far more complex and developed, it is not possible to declare with a great 
deal of certainty that the lessons of the failures in Somalia contributed to additional use of
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elements of the system of systems construct in Kosovo. However, it is apparent that 
NATO planners possessed a better understanding of the systems of power in Yugoslavia, 
that they understood connections between the nodes within and across systems, and that 
when they exploited this knowledge, objectives were more readily achieved.
Afghanistan
The primarily U.S. operation in Afghanistan utilized a holistic understanding of 
the system of power in a failed Central Asian state that had been under the economic and 
political influence of a non-state actor. Decision-makers made use of the knowledge of 
Afghan culture, the multi-system characterization of the warlords in Afghan society, the 
fragile state o f the economy, and the transitory quality o f political and military loyalties. 
More so than in the previous scenarios, uses of the principles of the system of systems 
construct were more evident.
Upon initial investigation, the systems of Somalia and Afghanistan appear 
similar: Islamic, loyalties based on clan and tribe, technologically undeveloped, 
subsistence economies, low literacy, nomadic populations, and independent militias led 
by warlords. However, U.S. objectives were dramatically different: feeding the starving 
masses in Somalia; regime removal in Afghanistan. The major factor was the radically 
changed security situation in which the Afghan system operated in late 2001. The attacks 
of 9-11 had radically altered the geo-political environment. Actions that were readily 
supported in Afghanistan would have been politically unacceptable in the previous 
scenarios.
The Taliban had not attacked the United States and murdered thousands of its 
citizens. However, their refusal to apprehend and deliver the perpetrators of the attacks
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made them unequivocally an adversary. There was little discussion of influencing their 
behavior. The fury over the attacks on Washington and New York and the desire for 
retaliation meant that the objective was the forceful removal o f the Taliban. In this 
respect, the Afghanistan campaign was similar to a war for national survival. Hence, a 
traditional attrition campaign, employing the overwhelming power of the U.S. military 
could have been conducted. However, American policy-makers adopted an alternative, 
effects-based approach.
Selection of the nodes was not difficult; the means to attack them without massive 
destruction and undesired effects on Afghan society was the limiting factor. Being 
resource limited in the area proved to be an advantage. Instead of a Gulf War style 
massive build-up and land invasion preceded by an intense air campaign, the U.S. 
adopted a different approach. This strategy required an understanding of the Afghan 
culture, history and its social system to be effectively employed. Fortunately, from the 
American perspective, this knowledge existed and was effectively exploited. On scene 
operatives understood the propensity of Afghans to change sides as the fortunes of war 
shifted. The amplification of effects of turning a single warlord was effectively utilized.
Since the attacks had such widespread support and Afghanistan had very little 
infrastructure that could be damaged, secondary effects were not as large o f a 
considerations as in Kosovo. While hundreds of Afghan civilians were reportedly killed 
by the U.S. actions, still fresh images of collapsing skyscrapers made this less of a factor 
in internal U.S. politics. The major warlords of the Northern Alliance—Rabbani, Ismail 
Khan and Dostum—were the primary nodes. The action was to support them militarily 
and economically. This produced the cascading effect of bring lesser warlords and
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militias into the anti-Taliban alliance. This also amplified the effects of actions, since 
small military victories often resulted in massive defections of Taliban supporters.
Exploitation of node-to-node linkages also was not confined to the borders of 
Afghanistan. The connections between Mullah Omar and the head of the Pakistani Inter- 
Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate were recognized and acted upon, albeit with 
indirect effects. The principal node in this case was Pakistani President Musharraf, who 
replaced the ISI chief and cut the linkages and support to the Taliban. The financial 
connections between al Qaeda and the Taliban were identified and severed, denying the 
Taliban leadership of much of their economic base.
I have illustrated that the principles o f the system of systems construct were 
applied in all three scenarios. Over a ten-year period, these principles were utilized more 
often, and their benefits were increasingly accrued. Their use provided the reward of 
amplification of the effects of actions, indication of possible secondary effects, and 
recognition of alternative actions. Post event analysis allows for identification of 
instances where the approach could have been more extensively and effectively 
employed.1 The common element is that in all three cases, objectives may have been 
more readily achieved through a better understanding of the adversary and the 
environment. Again, there is nothing radically innovative here; few would refute that 
contention. The new assertion is that a systematic approach that recognizes the 
importance of the relationships between entities within and across systems and provides a
1. These observations are not a critique o f  the commanders and planners o f  the operations, who were 
under significant political pressure and constraints. They were making decisions with the best information 
available to them, without the benefit o f  knowing the reactions o f  the adversaries or the eventual outcome 
o f  the campaign.
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holistic perspective makes achievement of this requisite understanding an achievable 
goal.
These case studies focused on the periods when offensive military operations 
represented the principle coercive actions. When the military aspects of the operation are 
isolated, the objectives were for the most part attained. Despite the casualties in the Battle 
of Mogadishu, the UNOSOM and supporting U.S. forces were never in danger of being 
defeated militarily. Milosevic has been removed and the organized murder and eviction 
of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo has ceased. The Taliban is no longer in power, its 
remnants are widely dispersed and Osama bin Laden is a fugitive in hiding.
However, more than ten years after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, Somalia 
remains essentially a stateless society, and susceptible to influence by organized terrorist 
elements. Kosovo is relatively stable, but only due to the presence of a NATO 
peacekeeping force, six years after the conclusion of the bombing missions. The primary 
antagonist, Slobodan Milosevic awaits the deliberations of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but Kosovo has been effectively “cleansed” of its 
former Serb occupants and the fundamental issues o f power in Kosovo remain unsolved. 
While the Taliban has been removed from power and most al Qaeda operatives are now 
fugitives without a permanent geographic base, a sizeable U.S. force, in concert with the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will remain in Afghanistan for the 
indefinite future.
In all three cases, the coercive actions taken to influence the systems of the target 
nation were at least partially successful. However, a common unintended effect was 
significantly altered systems that needed to be rebuilt. Herein is the greatest potential
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
301
benefit of a holistic knowledge of the systems of power. While useful when planning and 
conducting offensive military actions, the system of systems construct and the proposed 
methodology may prove to be of more value in the post active combat phases of the 
operation.
If the system was better understood, different actions may have been taken that 
could serve to minimize the deleterious secondary effects taken. These extend beyond the 
offensive military operations phases. For example, if  the UN had possessed a better 
appreciation of the impact o f its presence and of abandoning Somalia without a viable 
political system in place, the strategy and actions may have been different. Similarly, if 
the potential benefits of actions against economic nodes and their linkages to elements 
within the political system had been made earlier, the objectives may have been achieved 
without continued destruction in Kosovo. Identification of shortfalls after the fact is an 
easy task. The more difficult and important undertaking is attainment of a means to 
mitigate these reoccurring problems in the future. That is the objective of the next 
section.
Implications: What Must Be Done?
Appreciation that nations operate as complex adaptive systems, and that the 
elements that comprise these systems are interrelated, is an important realization. An 
essential first step is acceptance of the premise that an understanding of the adversary as 
a holistic system is beneficial. Over the period covered by the case studies, the apparent 
upward slope of the extent of utilization of the related principles suggests increased 
recognition of the potential rewards of such an approach. However, since an objective of
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this study is to move beyond conceptualization and to provide practical tools for the 
decision-maker, the challenges to implementation must be considered. Exploitation will 
require enhanced capabilities, and adaptations in existing organizational structures and 
policies.
Capabilities
The methodology presented in Chapter V provides a framework. However, when 
implementation o f the process is considered, several practical problems emerge. Chief 
among these is how to manage the immense trove of required information. That is, how 
can analysts determine the important interrelationships, and once they do, how can the 
potentially thousands of linkages be captured and handled to present some practical 
knowledge to the decision maker?
The importance of information on the adversary is nothing new. Intelligence 
agencies exist to do this. However, what is still needed is a process that collects, analyzes 
and synthesizes information across the political, economic, and, and as well as the 
military systems, and provides the critical holistic view. The problem is more than an 
ability to collect information. Rather it is the ability to manage the data and to transform 
it into actionable knowledge.
The use of connections and linkages between entities has been effectively 
employed in more recent operations. The eventual capture of Saddam Hussein is credited 
in part to the efforts of two junior intelligence analysts who plotted the connections 
between the deposed dictator and his family and supporters. This analysis reportedly was 
conducted using paper notebooks and presented on a handwritten chart. Effective
2. Farnaz Fassihi, “Two Novice Gumshoes Charted the Capture o f Saddam Hussein, The Wall Street 
Journal, 18 December 2003. The depiction o f  the relationships, which included information on over 300
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utilization of the approach will require tools that are more sophisticated. Many of these 
may already exist, and could be readily adapted for the specific analysis tasks. The rapid 
pace of software development makes identification of the optimum knowledge 
management and analysis tools itself a formidable task that will require dedicated and 
organized effort.
Advances in information technology make the knowledge management dilemma 
less daunting, but the inherent complications are immense and the difficulty in 
developing the adequate tools should not be underestimated. Likewise, maintenance and 
keeping current such a knowledge system is an enormous task. Decision support aids 
such as modeling and simulation, and structured argumentation tools will be required.
The discussion of systems in Chapter IV identified feedback as a critical element 
in the understanding of system behavior. A complex adaptive system is continuously 
responding to stimuli. Among these are the coercive actions taken to influence them. 
Development of measures of performance (how well the action was accomplished) and 
measures of effectiveness (how well the objective was accomplished, e.g., did the action 
have the desired impact on the node and hence the overall system?) is a challenging 
undertaking. In some cases, the problem is relatively uncomplicated. For example, battle 
damage assessment using sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities may provide with some assurance whether an air attack on a bridge actually 
destroyed or damaged the node. To a lesser extent, determination of the attainment of the 
effect, e.g., insurgents unable to move forces from point A to point B is more 
problematic. In the political and social systems, determination of the effect of actions is
individuals was credited with leading to a source who eventually provided the precise information that 
enabled the capture.
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exceptionally difficult. Indeed the effect of the bombing of commercial enterprises in 
Yugoslavia on the behavior of Milosevic is still being debated. Since the process of 
coercive activity is dynamic, knowledge of the feedback loops within the system is an 
exceptionally confounding, but mandatory capability. This requirement mandates 
methods of intelligence collection beyond the abundant imagery and electronic 
surveillance resources.
Capabilities are comprised of more than equipment; the manner in which human 
and technology resources are applied is an equally important element. Hence, adaptation 
in concepts, doctrine, and processes also must be accomplished. The principal raison 
d’etre for applying a system of systems construct to assessments of national power is an 
enhanced ability to achieve the desired effects that support attainment o f overall 
objectives, as well as to anticipate the secondary effects o f those actions. There is less 
incentive for a new approach if  a traditional attrition based model is utilized. A recent 
trend in security thinking has been a movement toward focus on desired outcomes instead 
of actions. As part o f its transformation efforts, the U.S. military is adopting effects-based 
operations as the model for future engagements.
This approach is more than a specific concept; rather it is a different way of 
looking at achievement o f objectives. Its antithesis is the attrition paradigm where the 
primary considerations are actions conducted to destroy or degrade the target—often 
without a clear connection to the objective to be achieved. The value of effects centric 
thinking in determination of the potential cascading effects of military actions was 
demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War. The classic example was the disruption of electrical 
power to an entire city through non-kinetic attacks on a very small umber o f targets.
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The same principles apply to uses of all national power resources, including diplomatic, 
information, and economic, as well as military assets.
Edward Smith takes this broader view and defines an effect as “a result or impact 
created by the application of military or other power.”3 Successful use o f an effects based 
approach, where all elements of national power are employed, necessitates a holistic 
understanding of the adversary’s system of power. This will require true integration of 
information gathering and dissemination procedures. However, as the ordeal o f the post 
9-11 efforts to develop processes for information sharing among varied intelligence 
agencies in the U.S. displayed, addressing the organizational and policy issues may be the 
more intimidating task.
Organization and Policy
Effective utilization of the system of systems construct will require a shift away 
from current structures for information collection, analysis, and dissemination that focus 
on individual systems. The common analogy is that of stovepipes, i.e., responsibility for 
specific information requirements assigned to particular agencies. In the U.S., for 
example, military, political, and economic collection is accomplished primarily in the 
Defense, State and Commerce Departments respectively. While suitable for information
3 . Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis 
and War (Washington DC: DOD Command and Control Research Program, 2002), 111. He considers these 
efforts to be incomplete and that even after 9-11, U.S. approaches remain focused on “destruction o f  an 
opponents physical capacity to make war,” and he contends, “it remains attrition based” (ibid., 17). This 
volume remains the basic text for an introduction to effects based operations. A U.S. DOD strategy 
document asserts that the goal o f  effects based operations is not physical attrition o f  the enemy, but rather 
“to induce an opponent to or an ally or a neutral to pursue a course o f  action consistent with our own 
security interests.” U.S. Department o f  Defense, ““The National Military Strategy o f  the United States o f  
America,” 34.
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collection, such structures make synthesizing information into actionable knowledge 
problematic. Realignment o f assets to meet this requirement is already being undertaken.
One o f the reoccurring themes from the investigation into intelligence failures 
arising from the attacks o f September 11th is the conclusion that the degree of 
information sharing and level of coordination between intelligence agencies was 
inadequate.4 This problem is exacerbated when working in a multinational context, since 
the sources o f much o f the required information are sensitive at the national level. The 
dilemma goes beyond the willingness to share information. The current structure, where 
agencies focus on their specific areas and are unwilling or unable to share information 
will not provide the requisite holistic view of the systems to be acted upon. The ability to 
share and synthesize information across the systems area is a critical enabler of a system 
of systems construct. However, increased information sharing, in itself, will not be 
sufficient for the methodology to be effectively employed.
Development of assessments based on a system of systems construct will require 
teams of analysts dedicated to the task. Governments will be unable or reluctant to 
augment the staffing levels of the agencies that will be responsible for the assessments. 
This will require internal reorganizations and realignment of existing assets between 
agencies; both tasks are normally painful processes. Effective utilization of the 
methodology will also require a diverse set of skills and expertise. Anthropologists, 
sociologists, psychologists, and economists must be incorporated into the process along
4. Richard A. Best, Jr., “Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence 
Agencies,” CRS Report for Congress, 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21217.pdf. A goal is 
the fusing o f  information across the spectrum to provide a holistic view. “National Intelligence” is the term 
used for intelligence that is o f  concern to more than one department or agency and provides the basis for 
national security policymaking. A U.S. Senate study identifies systematic weaknesses in analyses 
“compounded by lack o f  information sharing.” U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, 
“Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” 7 July 2004,
108th Cong., 2nd sess., http://intelligence.senate.gOv/iraqreport.2.pdf (accessed 1 April 2005).
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with the more traditional physicists and military intelligence experts. Importantly, 
constant dialogue between analysts must be accomplished. Enhanced communications 
technology provides the option of dispersed but networked teams who need not be 
physically collocated. In addition to these internal organizational transformations, the 
traditional characterization of the objects o f assessments must be reconsidered.
I have demonstrated how the system of systems approach can improve the 
knowledge available to the decision-maker. While a critical element in the process, 
enhanced knowledge is not in itself adequate to guarantee more effective decision­
making. The process through which policy is determined is itself exceptionally complex 
and multiple elements may be factors in the ultimate decisions. While the Rational Actor 
Model, which uses an analysis o f aims and calculations o f governments in explaining 
decisions, appears to be the major beneficiary o f enhanced knowledge of the system to be 
influenced, alternate paradigms will also enter into the calculus. Graham Allison and 
Philip Zelikow address other explanations, most notably the Government Politics Model. 
They argue that there is no decision-making monolith, and that resolutions are the result 
of bargaining among players in the governmental hierarchy.5 Actions result from collages 
of multiple interests from actors who focus on different issues.
A holistic understanding of the system can provide benefits regardless of the mix 
of decision-making models that influence the process. I described several of these 
advantages in the case studies. I also identified instances, notably in Somalia, where
5. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Second ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1999). While the Cuban Missile 
Crisis provides the single case for illustration, the authors include an excellent presentation o f  the various 
models utilized to explain the decision-making process and their relationship to the major themes o f  
international relations theory. For a similarly engaging presentation and application o f  theory using the 
1991 Gulf War see Steven A. Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making in the Persian G ulf 
War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
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superior knowledge was rendered ineffectual by flawed bureaucratic processes in the UN. 
Hence, adoption of a system of systems approach to assessments does not represent the 
complete solution. The approach does not solve decision-making pathologies; hence, 
significant institutional reform is still required.
One area where organization and policy changes are evident is in the treatment of 
entities that are not sovereign nations. Recently, and tragically for the United States, the 
need for assessments of non-state actors has been made apparent. A1 Qaeda is the 
infamous and best-known example. Investigations into the organization have revealed 
economic and social as well as military and political elements. In some areas, notably in 
international funding, its economic system was as sophisticated and far-reaching as those 
of several nations. A1 Qaeda may be thought of as conducting its own foreign affairs.
“The role o f the al-Qaeda network is apparently one of co-ordinating and supporting 
various groups around the world that have a militant Islamist and anti-western agenda. As 
a consequence, al-Qaeda has developed a global reach, with cells in up to 50 countries.”6 
Without question, its impact on international security has been as significant as any 
nation’s in the post cold war era. Due to its basic similarities to a sovereign nation, the 
principles of the construct may be applied to al Qaeda as well.
The major difference is ownership of autonomous territory from which to operate. 
Nevertheless, even non-state actors must be physically somewhere. As was made clear in 
Afghanistan, a powerful non-state entity may be potent enough to dominate an existing 
failed or collapsed state. The sizeable differences between non-state actors and sovereign
6. House o f  Commons Library, “11 September 2001: the Response,” Research Paper 01/72, 85, 
http://www.parliament.uk (accessed 1 April 2005). The study adds, “Mr. bin Laden and al-Qaeda have a 
broad ideological base, advocating a pan-Islamic, rather than a pan-Arab, approach. Ties with other groups 
reportedly cross sectarian lines, bringing together Sunnis in al-Qaeda with Shi’as belonging to Hizbollah in 
Lebanon.”
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nations cannot be ignored or discounted. However, the similarities are strong enough so 
that for purposes of assessments of power the system of systems construct also is 
appropriate for use when dealing with non-state actors.
The Way Ahead
The stated goal o f this dissertation was to determine if a multi-disciplinary 
approach to assessments could contribute to a holistic understanding o f national power. 
The examination of the principles of non-linearity in mathematics and physical systems 
resulted in the conclusion that nations (as well as some non-state actors) may be 
described as operating as complex adaptive systems. Hence, I displayed how a systems 
approach to assessments is an appropriate basis for development o f an enhanced 
understanding of the functions of system elements as well as the interactions between 
entities within and across the systems that comprise national power. The proposed 
methodology provides the framework for a tool to assist decision-makers in 
understanding the effects o f coercive actions.
While I assert this to be a worthwhile contribution, a framework does not in itself 
provide near-term practical benefits. Therefore, continued investigation into the use of 
the system of systems construct is needed if progress beyond the existing, and less than 
adequate, supply of tools available to the decision-maker is to emerge. The opportunities 
for follow-on research are many and myriad.
I have not provided empirical evidence that adoption of the system of systems 
construct will enhance decision-making. The case studies identified examples where the 
principles of the construct were utilized, and may have provided the purported
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advantages, specifically the ability to better understand the effects of coercive actions. I 
used these to illustrate the potential of the approach in dissimilar environments. 
Individually, the examinations were not of sufficient depth to establish causation between 
the use of the principles of the construct and better comprehension of system effects. The 
analysis also was constrained by the limited amount of information about the decision 
process. A dedicated and exhaustive reassessment of the cases when this information is 
declassified and made available to researchers would be a valuable enterprise.
I acknowledge the vast scope of the effort that is required to resolve the 
considerable organizational issues and knowledge management challenges. However, 
while extensive, they are not insurmountable. The ongoing experimentation efforts in the 
U.S. and NATO are developing and refining the processes and procedures to implement 
the concept.7 Movement beyond model, to produce capability has been the objective of 
ongoing concept development and experimentation efforts. These programs provide the 
means of confronting and resolving the practical problems that preclude wide adoption of
Q
the construct.
In conclusion, this analysis and proposed methodology provide a multi­
disciplinary approach to assessments of national power that could provide tangible 
enhancements to the decision-making process. Adoption of the construct is required now 
because the environment and consequently the nature of coercive power have changed. It
7. The U.S. efforts center on the Operational Net Assessment (ONA) concept that is a process that 
“frames our understanding o f  a potential adversary’s political, military, economic, social, information and 
infrastructure systems.” Link analysis, network analysis, and structured argumentation are used to identify 
critical nods and vulnerabilities. United States Joint Forces Command, “About the Operational Net 
Assessment (ONA),” http://www.jfcom.mil/abaout/fact_ona.htm (accessed 15 April 2005).
8. The U.S. Joint Forces Command has conducted experimentation with a system o f  systems construct 
since mid-2001. Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the U.K. have participated in some o f these 
efforts. NATO ’s Allied Command Transformation established its own, more limited system o f systems 
experimentation program in 2005.
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is possible now due to innovative approaches to military operations and advances in 
information technology. The framework represents only a necessary first step. Efforts in 
this area should be continued and expanded. The alternative is to continue to utilize 
processes and procedures that are inappropriate for assessments of the complex adaptive 
systems that characterize national power.
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